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Can the intellect be its own object`? Or is the intellect some anomalous entity about 
which nothing can be said? This dissertation is about ancient treatments of the problem 
of self-intellection. The manner in which ancient philosophers dealt with self-intellection 
took them into both the epistemological and metaphysical domains. For the subject 
matter reflects upon questions about identity. causality and coextensivity, all of which 
arise when the object of thought happens to be the thinking subject. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: The first chapter opens with an 
analysis of Parmenides' account of thinking and the relation it enjoys with its object, 
`being'. Here, I suggest that Parmenides intentionally outlines an account of thinking 
which is paradoxical, given the strict identity relation which, according to him, the 
thinker and its object enjoy. 
The second and third chapters examine Plato's epistemology. Chapter II 
argues that the final argument of Republic Book V should be interpreted as Plato's 
response to this Parmenidean paradox. For here Plato outlines how the epistemic subject 
and its object are coextensive relata, a relation which entails differentiation. With the 
epistemic subject and object clearly distinguished, the third chapter, on the Theaetetus, 
examines the nature of the epistemic subject per . se. Taken together, these two chapters 
develop the subjective aspect of the intellectual activity required for one to he in a 
position to explain how the epistemic subject could have itself as an intellectual object. 
The fourth chapter is an examination of how Aristotle copes with the 
intellectual process in De Anima, in particular the aporia of whether the intellect can he 
its own object. However, unlike Plato in the Theaetetus, Aristotle does offer us a 
coherent account of how the subject relates to intelligible objects, regardless of whether 
that object is the epistemic subject or not. Yet he does so at the expense of that epistemic 
subject, since his account is an object-oriented one in which the epistemic subject is 
subsumed by its object. Thus a problem has emerged: we either have an account of the 
I 
epistemic suhject that eclipses its object, or an account of how that subject relates to its 
object but at the expense of the subject. However, if an account of self-intellection is to 
he tenable, an equilibrium between the two sides is necessary. 
The final two chapters, five and six, centre around a paradox which Sccxtus 
Empiricus brings against the Stoics concerning whether the epistemic suhjcct can havc 
itself as an object. Chapter V begins with an analysis of the paradox and then goes on to 
look at related issues in Stoic epistemology. Ultimately, the positions the Stoics outline 
do not afford an adequate response to Sextus' paradox. The final chapter concentrates on 
Plotinus, whose account of self-intellection does contain an answer to Sextus' paradox. 
With Plotinus' resolution of the paradox, we finally have a coherent account of how the 
epistemic subject has itself as an object of intellection. 
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The Scope of Self-Intellection 
In his Principles of Philosophy, Rene Descartes defines thought in the following manner: 
By the term `thought', I understand everything which we are aware of as 
happening within us, in so far as we have awareness of it. I 
Every intellectual act for Descartes, therefore, involves the ego's awareness of that act. 
Thus, when `I think', I do so self-consciously. I know or am aware that `I think' or `I 
will' .2 
One cannot entertain thoughts or think without some sort of immediate concomitant 
or contemporaneous awareness of that act. 3 Self-consciousness or self-awareness in this 
sense is exactly what this dissertation is not about. I am interested in exploring the concept 
of self-intellection, by which I understand the epistemic subject4 having itself as a proper, 
call it first-order, object of intellection. The central thrust of this dissertation is to examine 
whether an adequate theory of this intellectual process can be discerned in the ancient 
Greek philosophical tradition. Given my stated aim, it is essential that such a formal 
analysis of the epistemic subject and its object which are to be the basis for a theory of 
self-intellection not be confused with, say, an analysis of the self-awareness that one has 
of oneself and the psychological or ethical issues which arise from such a self-awareness 
1 Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, 1.9 (AT. 7). The Philosophical Writings of Descartes. vol. I (in 3 
vols. ), trans. by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985). Similarly, in his replies to objections, Descartes has this to say about thought: 
'Though .I use this term to include everything that 
is within us in such a way that we are immediately 
aware of it. Thus all the operations of the will, the intellect, the imagination and the senses are thoughts'. 
Descartes, Objections and Replies: Second Set. AT 160. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. H. 
The demarcation AT refers to page numbers according to the twelve volume edition of Descartes' works as 
edited by Adam and Tannery. 
2 cf. Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1978), p. 
70 and Quassim Cassam, `Introduction', Self-Knowledge: Oxford Readings in Philosophy, ed. Q. Cassam 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 6. 
3 cf. Christopher Gill, `Is there a concept of person in Greek philosophy', Companions to Greek Thought. 
II% Psychology. ed. S. Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 169,173. 
4 To avoid any confusion, throughout the dissertation I shall refer to the subject as either the epistemic 
subject or simply the subject. The scope of either term is intended to cover all epistemological, cognitive 
and psychological acts. 
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or self-consciousness. Accordingly, this dissertation is explicitly not about such issues as 
whether and in what manner knowing oneself is a necessary or sufficient condition or 
both for being virtuous, or happy or performing intellectual acts. 
Having ruled out the problems of the self which arise when taking the 
Cartesian approach to the epistemic subject and self-consciousness, I should also make it 
clear that this study is not about `personhood' in the sense in which functionalists, such as 
Daniel Dennett, discuss the issue. In this dissertation, I shall not be examining or 
analysing the notion of `personhood' or `persons' from the functionalist point of view in 
which a `person' is understood in terms of being an `intentional system' (i. e. something 
which can be understood in terms of intentional states [hopes, fears, desires etc. ]). 5 
Nor shall I be looking at `personhood' in the manner of the action theorist, 
whose understanding of what it is to be a `person' is centred around the idea that only a 
rational agent capable of pro-attitudes (i. e. beliefs/desires that something is/be the case) 
qualifies as a `person'. 6 In other words, the behaviour of the entity in question can 
legitimately be analysed and framed within a practical syllogism.? Legitimacy in this 
context entails that the `person' actually have performed rational deliberation, i. e. 
syllogised, and it not simply be the case that the action could be described in syllogistic 
terms, despite the fact there was not any rational deliberation on the part of the agent. 
My dissertation, at most, might incidentally overlap with some part of the 
`personhood' domain, inasmuch as the concept of the epistemic subject, an entity which is 
capable of theoretical thought, and what it is to be a `person' overlap. However, such an 
overlap will be entirely coincidental. Instead, my primary focus is upon whether and how 
an intellectual entity or the intellectual faculty can be its own object of intellection and what 
sort of theory would be required to support such an intellectual phenomenon. Moreover, it 
would be incorrect to infer that because I am looking at the intellect, by extension, I am 
looking at human beings exclusively, i. e. those things with which we usually equate 
`persons'. In ancient Greek thought, the class or set of intellectual things, especially when 
5 cf. Daniel Dennett, `The Conditions for Personhood', The Identities of Persons, ed. A. O. Rorty 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 179. 
6 cf. Christopher Gill, `Is there a concept of person in Greek philosophy', p. 184. 
7 This view is sometimes referred to as `externalism', cf. Q. Cassam, 'Introduction'. pp. 16-17. 
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it comes to such thinkers as Aristotle and Plotinus, contains more than just humans. It also 
includes gods. 8 
Having stressed what this dissertation is not about, let me say something about 
the topic which the dissertation will be addressing and why I think it is important. 
Beginning with the topic itself, the domain to which self-intellection belongs is 
epistemology. Self-intellection is, first and foremost, an instance of intellection, thinking. 
It is an instance of thinking in which the epistemic subject, the thinker, has itself as an 
object of thought. This is very different, say, from what the physicist examines when he 
focuses upon objects and how they relate to one another or how one object might relate toi 
itself. For the nature of that relation is not an intellectual one. Yet it does not follow from 
this claim about intellection that self-intellection is something which is exclusively and 
simply epistemological. For self-intellection might be about intellection and how that 
which thinks can have itself as an object of thought but, by the same token, it is also very 
much about relations and relata. And these issues originate from or belong to the domain 
of metaphysics. For self-intellection is a process or activity in which something as a 
subject relates to itself as an object. Thus self-intellection might originate in the 
epistemological domain but it is something which can only be apprehended if certain 
principles from the metaphysical arena are deployed or imported. This need to turn to 
metaphysics and make use of its principles is one reason why, inter alia, it is crucial to 
distinguish self-intellection from the Cartesian account of self-consciousness or self- 
awareness. With the latter, reflexive awareness is built into the subject, it is in part 
constitutive of what it is to be an `I'; so one need never leave the epistemological or 
psychological domain from which one begins when trying to understand the nature of the 
reflexive apprehension of the self. Everything is all there in (i. e. built into) the epistemic 
subject. With self-intellection, on the other hand, the epistemic subject is conceptually 
much thinner or more austere than the Cartesian ego. Because of this austerity, 
metaphysics takes on a pivotal role in the explanation of how the intellectual subject gets a 
hold of itself as the object of its intellection. For the 'self" in seif-intellection. unlike its 
8 cf. Aristotle. Nicomach<<in Ethics. 1177b33-1178,0. Also cf. Christopher (Till, 'Introduction'. jjjsý 
Person and The Il man Mind. cd. C. Gill (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 199(l). p. 14. 
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Cartesian counterpart, is not immediately reflexive. For the latter, the Cartesian ego, all 
thoughts are `I' thoughts. 
Before discussing how metaphysics underpins the structure of self-intellection, 
I want to come back to the other question just touched upon: Why is self-intellection even 
an issue? Why is self-intellection important? Most intelligent creatures assume or take it as 
a basic intuition that their own intellect is not an anomalous entity, an ineffable mystery. 
Rather, they regard their intellect as a piece of intellectual furniture that exists in the world 
like any other. That is, one's intellect can be thought and known. Offering an account of 
self-intellection is an attempt to satisfy this intuition which we have about our intellectual 
self, namely, that I am capable of thinking myself as an intellectual entity. This is different 
from the Cartesian claim that all my thoughts entail self-consciousness or are `I' thoughts. 
The former is a claim which holds that among the infinite number of objects of thought 
which I believe I can entertain, I include myself qua thinker. I can have an intellectual 
relation to myself in which I, as an epistemic subject, can think myself as that thing which 
thinks. Thus, self-intellection is an epistemological theory which attempts to justify that 
basic intuition. 
Metaphysics, strictly speaking, is about Being. It examines various things 
such as universals, material objects and minds from the point of view of ontology. It 
focuses upon the various ways in which these things can be said `to be'. However, such a 
description is by no means exhaustive. For this science also examines how it is that these 
things relate to one another. It looks at the sorts of relations there are and what it is to be a 
relatum. Yet, despite the fact that relations and relata, strictly speaking, belong to the 
domain of metaphysics, it does not follow that they are unique to or the exclusive property 
of metaphysics. For such notions can and must be imported into other arenas of 
discourse, epistemology being an obvious example. For without such notions, 
epistemology would be incoherent and unintelligible. For the mind and its content or 
objects are relata. 
Having said this, what are the sort of relations which one must import into the 
epistemological domain in order to account for intellection and self-intellection? There are 
four basic relations which arise in this domain. Firstly, there is the relation in which `x' is 
a necessary condition for `y'. Secondly there is the relation in which `x' is a sufficient 
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condition for `y'. Then there is the relation in which `x' and `y' are both necessary-and- 
sufficient conditions for one another, and, finally, the relation which expresses their 
identity. Now, `x' and `y' are simply logical place-holders. Properly expressed in the 
epistemological domain, they would be replaced with the epistemic subject and object. For 
intellection or thinking comprises thinkers and the things which those thinkers think, that 
is, epistemic subjects and their objects. 
Now in order to understand properly the various ways in which the epistemic 
subject and its object relate to one another, they must be viewed within the overall context 
of relations. In other words, the epistemological forms of these relations should be 
examined alongside their metaphysical counterparts. Three of the four relations mentioned 
(identity being the exception) have both logical and causal applications. Beginning with 
the necessary condition, a simple logical instance of this relation would be the claim that 
being a man is a necessary logical condition for being a king. By definition, one cannot be 
a king, unless this condition is met. Causally, an instance of such a relation would be the 
claim that being in a dry state is a necessary causal condition for the match box being 
ignited. Match boxes only ignite when this condition is met. Now, when we come to the 
epistemological application of such a relation, it is of a causal nature. However, that does 
not mean it excludes the logical relation. Rather, if the causal relation is successful, i. e. if 
the event or activity occurs, then this relation will also entail that the logical relation holds. 
(This entailment will also apply to the sufficient causal relation. ) Now an epistemological 
instance of this relation would be the claim that the epistemic subject can only think if 
intelligible objects act on that subject. That is, these objects must be present to the subject 
and act on his intellect, if that subject is to be able to think. They are a necessary condition 
for the occurrence of thinking. However, these objects are not a sufficient cause of 
thinking because thinking also requires something else. It requires that the epistemic 
subject be in the appropriate state for the affection to occur, something for which the 
objects themselves cannot account or provide. 
The second relation, the sufficient condition, like the necessary, can be 
expressed in all three guises. Logically, being a king is a sufficient condition for being a 
man. Once it is known that `x' is a king, by definition nothing else is required to 
demonstrate the claim that `x' is a man. Knowing `x' is a king is sufficient. A causal 
11 
instance of this relation would be that a prolonged absence of oxygen is a sufficient cause 
for a human death. Such an absence by itself will kill humans. The epistemological 
application of this relation, again, takes a causal form. An example of this relation is the 
following: thinking is sufficient to establish the existence of intellectual content or 
intelligible objects. For the act of thinking, it could be argued, stipulates that there be 
intellectual content, otherwise it, thinking, will be meaningless. In other words, it will not 
be thinking. So the idealist, for example, would claim that thinking is sufficient by itself to 
cause there to be intelligible objects. Nothing else is required to guarantee the existence of 
intelligible objects. 
As for the third of these relations, necessary-and-sufficient, the logical 
application plays a crucial role in understanding intellection. So, for the sake of economy, 
I shall use one example to express both the logical and epistemological applications of this 
relation, for the epistemological application is an instance of the logical one. The epistemic 
subject and object enjoy this necessary-and-sufficient relation: one cannot have a subject 
without the presence of an object or an object without a subject. For, they -- by definition 
-- mutually entail one another. Thus, they can be said to be coextensive with one another. 
This relation is the most basic one, epistemologically speaking. For without it, any 
account of thinking, believing or any other mental act is doomed (including self- 
intellection). 
When it comes to a causal instance of this necessary-and-sufficient relation 
things are not so clear, because causal relations are usually thought of as unidirectional. 
Thus, the example of the moon passing in between the sun and the earth might be the only 
cause of an eclipse, yet it does not enjoy the symmetry -- the mutual entailment -- of its 
logical counterpart. For although one might infer that an eclipse occurs when the moon is 
in between the earth and the sun, he would refrain from saying that the eclipse caused the 
moon to be in between the sun and the earth in the same way as he would the moon 
caused the eclipse. 
The final of the four relations spoken of at the outset is identity, by which I 
intend strict identity. Now this relation does not have a causal application for an obvious 
reason: causality assumes or implies the non-identity of that which acts and that which is 
affected. However, identity has a logical application. It takes the form that `x' is Y. In 
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other words, it is the trivial relation in which 'x' relates to itself by being identical -- Milli 
`x' -- with itself. Under no description or under any circumstances can there he any 
differentiation. Now this form of strict identity is the most troublesome sort of relation 
when brought into the epistemological domain because it is potentially lethal to 
intellection, and by extension self-intellection. For despite the fact the subject and object 
logically entail one another in their coextensive relation, they both retain their own unique 
properties, i. e. what it is to be a subject and to be an object. And in terms of their causal 
relations, the object of thought might act upon the subject or the subject might cause the 
object but they remain distinct and discernible throughout the process. However, when the 
relation in question is one of strict identity, the subject and object area rendered 
indiscernible from one another, since such an identity claim entails that they have all the 
same properties in all possible situations and, as such, are indistinguishable from one 
another, numerically, qualitatively and definitionally. Yet intellection, be it of itself or 
something else, must, if it is to be intellection, retain the distinction between what it is to 
he an epistemic subject and object. 
So why import identity into the epistemological domain in the first place? If 
this dissertation is to achieve its stated aim of tracing a theory of self-intellection, an 
account of how the epistemic subject is identical with its object -- itself -- will have to he 
set out. Coextensivity and causal relations in the epistemological arena are insufficient to 
explain this epistemological phenomenon. One might account for the subject and object 
distinction and the other dynamic aspects of the intellectual process with them but they do 
not fully explain how the subject can be its own object. But, as self-intellection is a 
relation in which epistemic subject thinks itself, some account of the identity relation 
between the subject and object will have to be given. However, to do so is somewhat 
perilous, because if an account of self-intellection gives too much ground to the identity 
relation between the subject and object, it cease to be intellection altogether. Instead, one is 
left with something rather trivial: The intellect is the intellect. And, as a result, the intellect 
will remain anomalous. Hence the task of this dissertation is to offer a theory of self- 
intellection which can somehow accommodate coextensiv, ity, causal relations and identity. 
All are required. 
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II 
The Structure of the Dissertation 
The dissertation consists of two parts. The first part, `The Emergence of the Problem', 
attempts to trace the problem which arises when one tries to explain how the epistemic 
subject can relate to itself as an object of intellection. The second section, `The Problem 
and Its Resolution', focuses on some attempts to explain how one might offer an account 
of self-intellection in the face of this problem, i. e. how the epistemic subject can have 
itself as an object. However, ultimately, these considerations of self-intellection are 
vulnerable to what seems to be an intractable paradox, namely self-intellection is 
impossible because one is either a subject or object but not both. I shall refer to this as 
Sextus' paradox. Chapter VI then focuses on Plotinus' response to Sextus. In this 
chapter, I argue that Plotinus successfully answers Sextus, with the result that we are 
offered a coherent theory of self-intellection. 
Given this general statement of the dissertation's structure, let me briefly 
sketch out the chapters themselves. In the first chapter, `Parmenides Challenge', I argue 
that the Parmenidean account of thinking (to vo£iv) and being (, TO' Eöv) is such that it 
destroys or undermines any sort of intellection. This is accomplished, I suggest, by 
Parmenides' deliberately outlining an account of thinking and being (Fr. 8) in which the 
epistemic subject and its object are identical. This is the only relation -- the identity relation 
between the subject and object -- Parmenides' position affords. As a result, the relata are 
reduced to the trivial relation of self-identity. One is left with the claim that the 
Parmenidean principle, tio' Eöv, is identical with itself. The epistemic subject and its 
object, qua subject and object, have ceased to be coextensive relata. Now it is this positing 
of the subject and object in a strict identity relation which I interpret to be Parmenides' 
challenge. It is a position which, if not met, rules out any sort of intellection, be it of the 
epistemic subject or otherwise. 
Chapter II, `Plato's Response', takes up this challenge. There I argue that the 
final argument of Republic Bk. V (476d8-480a13) could, and should, be read as Plato's 
response to Parmenides' strict identity thesis. It is a response which rejects the identity 
relation between the subject and object in favour of the coextensive relation, thus 
reinstating the subject and object as differentiated relata. This is the first step in any 
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account of intellection, since the intellectual process requires a discernible subject and 
object, including self-intellection. The manner in which I defend the claim that Plato is 
responding to Parmenides is first by drawing attention to several literary and philosophical 
allusions between the text of Parmenides and the relevant text of Republic Book V. Then, 
in order to substantiate my view further, I attempt to reconstruct a plausible account of 
what Plato's interpretation of Parmenides might have been, using two Platonic texts 
(Parmenides 132c9-11 and Sophist 244b6-e8). In the third part, I then give an 
interpretation of the final argument of Republic Book V and conclude with a brief account 
of exactly how this passage constitutes a proper response to Parmenides. 
Having rescued the subject and object from the strong monism of Parmenides, 
the third chapter, `Plato's Epistemic Subject', turns to the Theaetetus. This chapter takes 
the next step towards establishing a theory of self-intellection. It explores the structure of 
the epistemic subject per se; that is, what it is to be an epistemic subject. As already noted, 
coextensivity by itself cannot constitute a theory of self-intellection. If the subject is to 
have itself as an object of intellection much more is required to explain such a 
phenomenon. For before one is in a position to say how the intellect qua subject can be 
related to itself qua object, the structure and nature of the subject itself must come into 
focus. Thus I discuss the Theaetetus in detail, for it is here where Plato tells us what the 
epistemic subject is, i. e. what it is that is unique about being a epistemic subject. The only 
shortcoming with this text, as far as my enterprise is concerned, is that it falls flat when it 
comes to intelligible objects. For the Theaetetus ends in aporia when it comes to providing 
an account of intelligible objects. And without objects, a theory in which the epistemic 
subject has itself as an object of intellection is doomed for obvious reasons, i. e. there is no 
account of what it is to be object. 
At this point I turn to Aristotle (Chapter IV, `Aristotle on the Epistemic 
Subject's Relation to its Object in De Anima') and examine the manner in which he 
understands the epistemic subject to relate to its objects. I concentrate on De Anima not 
only because Aristotle gives us a very rich account of how it is that intelligible objects 
relate to the epistemic subject, but also because it is the natural successor to the 
Theaetetus. Both texts are interested in explaining how the various senses and their proper 
objects relate to the epistemic subject (Theaetetus 184b-187a and De Anima 3.1-2). 
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However, unlike Plato, Aristotle gives us a much richer object-oriented account in which 
the object causally acts upon the subject. The Aristotelian position makes much use of the 
causal relation. Intelligible objects are a necessary condition for intellection and so, by 
extension, self-intellection. For in virtue of being acted upon by its object, the subject 
thinks that object and in the process, according to Aristotle, becomes that object. Thus, on 
the Aristotelian account, by virtue of the causal relation between the object and the subject, 
we also derive an identity relation. The subject literally becomes the object and so is 
identical with it. And it is because of this, i. e. becoming its object, that self-intellection is 
possible. For the subject is capable of being an intelligible object. However, it is self- 
intellection at price, and that price is the loss of the subject. For the subject in the 
intellectual process is subsumed by its object, which is really itself, but opaquely so. 
These four chapters taken together constitute the first part, `The Emergence of 
the Problem'. The reason they do so is because the result of the development is such that 
we either end up with a subject which ceases to be able to relate to objects and thus cannot 
think itself as an object or we have a subject which gets subsumed by its objects with the 
result that it ceases to be a subject during the intellectual act. Hence the sort of self- 
intellection with which we are left is coincidental. By thinking, the epistemic subject 
coincidentally thinks itself. 
The second section, `The Problem and Its Resolution' (Chapters V& VI), 
opens with a paradox raised by Sextus Empiricus against the Stoics: If the intellect is to be 
its own object, then it will be a subject without an object or it will become the object and 
cease to be a subject. Either way the intellect ceases to remain both the subject and object; 
and yet it must so remain, if one is to have a coherent account of self-intellection. For if it 
does not have itself as an object then self-intellection is out of the question, whereas if it 
has become the object, then there is nothing to do the intelligising. The principle of 
identity either forces us to have a subject without an object or an object without a subject, 
thereby destroying coextensivity, causality and along with them self-intellection. The 
philosophical presuppositions which motivate the paradox are the materialistic ones of the 
Stoics. Thus, after the paradox is set out, I examine Stoic epistemology and concentrate 
on some of their attempts to come up with a balanced account of how the epistemic subject 
might have itself as an object of intellection without one side eclipsing the other. There, I 
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argue that the accounts of Hierocles and Epictetus do shed some light on this 
epistemological phenomenon. However, both attempts ultimately fall short of being able 
to answer Sextus' paradox. 
Chapter VI, `Plotinus' Response to Sextus' Paradox', picks up where Chapter 
V left off, with Sextus' paradox. In this chapter, I argue that Plotinus' account of the 
Intellect does constitute a proper response to Sextus' paradox, resulting in a coherent 
theory of self-intellection. Plotinus, I argue, manages to keep both sides of the self- 
intellection equation intact through his use of the notion of `whole on whole' and 
'transparency'. Ultimately these concepts, along with his use of Plato's µ&ytaia yEv71, 
afford Plotinus an account in which the epistemic subject has itself as non-opaque 
intelligible object. The relations of coextensivity, identity and causality are fused together 
in such a way -- what I call epistemic identity -- as to allow for a certain sort of transparent 
reciprocity between the epistemic subject and its object, itself. The result of the Plotinian 
account is a successful and coherent theory of self-intellection. 
17 
I 
The Emergence of the Problem 
I 
Parmenides' Challenge: 
The Identity of the Epistemic Subject and its Object 
Fragments 1-8 
In this first chapter, I shall explore the Parmenidean account (Fragments 1-8) of how the 
epistemic subject and its object relate to one another. The reason for taking Parmenides 
as my starting point is as follows: His account of the manner in which the epistemic 
subject and its object relate to one another is such that if it were allowed to stand, it 
would be lethal to any account of intellection, and by extension sell'-intellection. For his 
is an account which does away with the epistemological distinction of and, 
consequently, the relation between subject and object. On the Parmenidean account, we 
have a thesis that takes the subject and its object, the relata, to be identical with one 
another, and so indiscernible from one another. In effect, there is only one self-identical 
entity. The notion of relata within this context can only be applied in the most trivial 
sense, namely, the Parmenidean entity, w> Ov, is related to itself by virtue of being 
identical with itself. Thus, if a theory of self-intellection is to be a possibility, then 
Parmenides' position will have to be met and overturned. For if the only sort of relation 
tolerated is self-identity, then a coherent epistemology and the sort of relations which it 
entails will be prohibited. 
The chapter itself is set up as follows: I shall begin by outlining the structure 
of the first half of the poem (Fragments 1-8), culminating with an account of 
Parmenides' (strong) monism. Then I shall explore how Parmenides' monistic principle 
stands in relation to the route which allowed him to reach that principle, emphasising the 
paradoxical implications which such an account entails for the epistemic subject, its 
object and the sorts of relations they might enjoy. Finally, I shall conclude this initial 




The proem opens with Parmenides being taken up in a horse-drawn chariot for an 
audience with the goddess. ' Upon his arrival, he is told that he must learn everything 
(xpEw SE a E tävtia icu9Ec Oai). 2 By tävia the goddess intends two things, the `unmoved 
heart of well-rounded reality' and the `opinions of mortals' : 
iv 'AXTIOctr Evxvx%, &o; ätpE tES atop 
i &E ßpotiwv Sö cLS, balg cn)K vt nia'ctg ak, 10hc. 3 
% The scope of this dichotomy is the entire poem. The first part ('AXii96'r1S ätpg1E i cop) 
-- the part on which this chapter will focus -- is the section in which thinking and tiö £öv 
(the Parmenidean principle and object of thinking) are examined. The second part, the 
Way of Seeming, consists of Parmenides' cosmological account of things. This part con- 
centrates upon the opinions of mortals and so falls outside the scope of my study. Mortal 
opinions will only be relevant to the extent that Parmenides raises them within the 
context of the Way of Truth (Fr. 2-8) as a possible third option. 
II 
Fragments 2-7 
Taking an overview of these six fragments, Parmenides' objective is to canvass all the 
possible routes of inquiry into the true nature of things ('AblOeblS ätpg1E fjiop, Fr. 
1.26), eliminating those which are unthinkable. This endeavour is premised upon two 
points which Parmenides takes to be self-evident. There is some sort of reality, i. e. that 
which `is', and it can be thought, i. e. there is thinking. Thus his task in these fragments, 
especially the eighth, is to disclose the nature of this reality. 
In the second fragment Parmenides outlines two routes in the form of a 
disjunction. The disjuncts are that which `is' and that which `is not'. According to the 
I Fr. 1.1-21. The Parmenides text is based upon H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 
16th edition (Berlin: Weidmann, 1972), unless specified otherwise (hereafter referred to as D-K). 
2 Fr. 1.26-8. 
3 Fr. 1.29-30. Trans: `... both of the unshaken heart of well-rounded reality and of the opinions of mortals, 
which comprise of no genuine conviction. ' Most manuscripts give 671a0iog in place of ci nw cA o;. I 
follow the D-K reading which is based upon Simplicius. For the cünetOEoq reading, see D. Gallop, 
Parmenides of Elea (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1984), p. 52. Translations of Parmenides are 
loosely based upon David Gallop's translation, unless specified otherwise. 
20 
goddess, they, East and ovx Bait, are the only two conceivable routes: 
atn£p 6801 µovvat 8týýjatöS £iat voýiaat 
Tj JLEV o1WX, catty TE Kat ( oUiC £aTt 4TI £tvat, 
II£tOoi S &aTt KE%£UBog ('AblOc it yäp ömqS£i), 
iý S' iN oüK EaTty T£ Kai wS xp£wv Cart µiß £ivat, 
tv &ý Tot cppaým nava7t£U9&a cµµ£v ktapnov 
oUT£ yap av yvotrlS do y£ µrß coy (ov yap avu(Ytov) 
4 ovi£ cppaacnS. 
Thus the disjunction is intended to be exhaustive. Moreover, given that the two disjuncts 
are contradictories, 5 they are also mutually exclusive. Accordingly, the two sides of the 
disjunction cannot both hold, yet one of the two must hold. 6 It cannot be the case, given 
that the disjunction is exhaustive, that neither holds. Of course, the choice of disjunct 
will have to be decided on metaphysical, not formal, grounds. 
Having glossed the first disjunct as that which `is', along with the 
impossibility for it not to be, 7 Parmenides turns his attention to eliminating the second 
disjunct, ovx EG CI. 8 He dismisses this disjunct on the grounds that it, oüx Eatii., can 
neither be recognised or known (7voirlS) nor shown or pointed out (cppäa(xLS) 9 It has no 
4 Fr. 2.2-8. Trans: `... which are the only routes of inquiry for thinking. The one, that it is and that it is not 
possible for it not to be, is the journey of Persuasion, for it (i. e. Persuasion) attends on reality, the other, 
that it is not and must not be, this indeed I tell you is a path entirely without report; for you can neither 
know that which is not, for that is not possible, nor point it out. ' 
5 Although the disjuncts need not be taken as contradictories (i. e. -0- and 0-- are not contradictories, LI 
and --Q are), Parmenides, judging from Fr. 8.16-18, certainly took them in to be. I think Kirk, Raven and 
Schofield state the matter well in saying that Parmenides' characterisation of the disjuncts in the Fr. 2 is 
meant to bring out their mutual incompatibility which is characteristic of contradictories. See G. S. Kirk, 
J. E. Raven & M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), p. 246 n. 1. Also cf. D. Gallop, Parmenides of Elea, p. 8 and Aryeh Finkelberg, `Parmenides' 
Foundation of the Way of Truth', Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. VI (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1988), pp. 43-4. 
6 cf. Fr. 8.16-18. 
7 cf. Jonathan Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), pp. 163-5 
on the issue of whether Parmenides is confusing necessitas consequentis with necessitas consequentiae. 
8 As for the debate about what the subject of ia'rt is, I follow Owen in taking it to be the task of the 
subsequent fragments, culminating with Fr. 8, to spell this point out. For example, by the time we get to 
Fr. 6, it is clear that iö rröv is the subject. For comments on the difficulty surrounding the question of what 
the subject of Cacti is, cf. G. E. L. Owen, `Eleatic Questions', Logic. Science and Dialectic. ed. M. C. 
Nussbaum (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1986), pp. 9-16 and M. M. Mackenzie (now M. M. 
McCabe), `Parmenides' Dilemma', Phronesis 27 (1982), p. 2 and relevant note. Thus until the full nature 
of the subject is disclosed, to speak of `it' as attending upon 'Ak'n0 hut, is not to say too much, save that it 
enjoys some sort of relation to 'AkilOth t. For a different line on what the subject of on is, cf. A. 
Finkelberg, `Parmenides' Foundation of the Way Truth', pp. 44-7. As for the other controversial issue, i. e. 
the question of whether the Batt is best regarded as predicative or existential, cf. M. Furth, `Elements of 
Eleatic Ontology', The Pre-Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Alexander P. D. Mourelatos 
(New York: Anchor Press, 1974), pp. 242-48 and Kirk, Raven & Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, 
p. 245ff. For a general discussion of the verb `to be' in ancient Greek philosophy, cf. Charles Kahn, Jg 
verb ctvai in Ancient Greek (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1973) and `The Greek Verb "to be" and the Concept of 
Being', Foundations of Language. vol. lI (1966), pp. 245-62. 
91 am following Mourelatos and Finkelberg in translating cppäßatq as `show' or `point out' instead of `to 
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intelligible content about which to think and thus cannot be thought. Consequently, it 
must be abandoned. As a result of eliminating the oüx Gait disjunct, Parmenides has 
narrowed his options considerably. With one of the two disjuncts eliminated, and, given 
that one of the two disjuncts must hold, a fortiori the an disjunct holds. 
However, before Parmenides examines `E"an', he raises the possibility of a 
third option in fragments 6 and 7 (the route of the (3potioi which was alluded to in the 
proem): 
a1rt&p CnELt' än' Ti;, "jv Sid ßpotioi Ei6&rES ov6ev 
n rovtiat, SiKpavot " äJiT %avtT yäp Cv a&rr v 
ar OCCFIV WVEL itkaKrÖV VÖOV " of S& (popovvtiat 
icoxpot ojuo , n)(p% of tc, TE9qnöiES, a cpvra cpi a, 
ot, 'LÖ iEA. ELV 'CE Kat o'UK ELVat'CaÜ'CÖV VEVOJLL6Tat 
1cov tic cti v, nävTwv SE naA, iv'cponOg k 10 a'ci KEA OoS. 
Presumably, Parmenides takes this step in order to rule out any other possible 
alternative, prior to taking up the Eßit route. For it is clear that by the time we come to 
the eighth fragment, he supposes that every option, save that which `is', has been 
exhausted (Fr. 8.1-2). The third option, according to Parmenides, consists in the 
equating and confusing of the contradictories, being and not being. In virtue of this 
confusing and conflating of contradictories, the epistemology of mortals, i. e. their 
knowledge of the phenomenal world, is untenable. For their mental activity is riddled 
with contradictions and, as a result, is incoherent and unintelligible. So, as this option 
too is not a viable one on the grounds of unintelligibility, Parmenides is left with only 
one alternative (by a process of elimination), tiö Eöv. It is the only intelligible route left. 
As remarked above, Parmenides does not question whether or not there is 
thinking. Rather, as with being or that which `is', he takes it to be self-evident that there 
is thinking. His interest is in exploring the exact nature of that which `is' and how 
thinking relates to it, and not in demonstrating whether that which `is' is or whether 
there is thinking. So, how do thinking and being relate to one another? 
Fragments 3 and 6.1-2 shed some light on the nature of this relationship. 
utter'. The primary sense of this verb is to show where something is or the way to somewhere. See A. P. D. 
Mourelatos, `Ipäýuo and its Derivatives in Parmenides', Classical Philology 60 (1965), pp. 261-2 and 
A. P. D. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), p. 20 and 
relevant note. Also see A. Finkelberg, `Parmenides' Foundation of the Way Truth', p. 54. 
10 Fr. 6.4-9. Trans: `... and secondly from that path on which mortals knowing nothing stray two-headed (I 
prevent you), for perplexity in their own breasts directs their minds astray; and they are borne on deaf and 
blind alike in bewilderment, people without judgement, by whom being and not being have been thought 
both the same and not the same, and the path of all is backward turning. ' 
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Taking the third fragment first, we read: 
... to yap aüto vo¬tv 
EaTiv TE xai ctvat. l 
The fragment as translated ('... for the same thing is both for thinking and being. ') 
simply claims that that which `is' for thinking also `is'. In other words, that which `is' is 
a necessary condition for thinking. Thinking cannot think that which `is not'; such an 
endeavour, as we have seen, is vacuous and untenable. However, some scholars, such as 
Gregory Vlastos, take this fragment to make the much stronger claim: `... to think and to 
be are the same thing'. 12 This interpretation, I think, is problematic. For there is nothing 
in the argument prior to the eighth fragment that enables one to infer such a strong 
identity thesis. Fragment 2 does not give us that. The eighth fragment, however, is the 
complete disclosure of what that which `is' is. Thus (if we assume that Fr. 3 fits before 
Fr. 8)13 one should not then expect a full account before Fr. 8 of how it is that being 
relates to thinking, i. e. whether they are identical or not. Only when the nature of being 
has been fully disclosed, will we, the reader, be in a position to understand why being 
and thinking enjoy the relation they do. 
At present, we know two things: the an route is and thinking can only think 
that which is intelligible, i. e. that which `is'. For that which `is not' is unintelligible. 
Moreover, as thinking cannot think that which `is not', the contradictory fusion of the 
two (the route taken by the (3poioi), is also unintelligible. Thinking must think that 
which 'is'. Thus that which `is' is a necessary condition for thinking. Yet, although 
being is a necessary condition for thinking, it does not follow that that which `is' is 
identical with thinking. For example, that which is thinkable or intelligible need not be 
exhaustive of that which `is'. As it stands, all that can be said is that if there is thinking, 
then there must be being but not that, if there is being, there is necessarily thinking. 
Fragment 6 reinforces the view that being is a necessary condition for thinking (and by 
extension speaking): 14 
11 Fr. 3. Trans: `... for the same thing is both for thinking and being. ' I am following Burnyeat's 
translation. See Myles Bumyeat, `Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes saw and Berkeley 
missed', The Philosophical Review 91 (1982), p. 15. 
12 Gregory Vlastos, `Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge', The Transactions of the American Philological 
Association 77 (1946), p. 68. 
13 On the place of Fr. 3 cf. A. Finkelberg, `Parmenides' Foundation of the Way of Truth', p. 55. 
14 on speaking as an extension of thinking, see J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, pp. 158-9. 
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Xpiý % Tö X ymv Te voEiv T' cöv 4LIEvat " EaTt yp Ei vat, % 
n1&ty S' ovic EaTnv . 15 
Thus these two passages shed some light on the relation between thinking and being. 
Yet, in order to understand fully the relation (or relations) which hold between them, the 
nature of 'th Eöv will have to be entirely disclosed. 
1111 
Fragment 8 
The Parmenidean account as it stands is one in which three possible routes have been 
posited, two of which have been rejected. One remains: 
govo; S' F, -"tit µvOo; ö6oio 
XEi7EEtiati, wS EoTty . 16 
Now, the eighth fragment, with the exception of the last part (50-61), outlines exactly 
what tiö Eöv is and, in the process, the nature of the relation which it has to thinking. 
This fragment can be divided roughly as follows: lines 1-6 set out the program of 
attributes, the aýjµaia, which will be discussed; 11.6-25 examine monistic attributes in 
temporal context; 17 11.26-33 introduce monistic attributes, this time from a spatial 
perspective, which has implications for qualitative homogeneity; 11.34-41 then looks at 
thinking and its relation to the monistic principle; 11.42-49 finish the spatial account; 
and 11.50-61 serves as an introduction to the second part of the poem entitled zöa, 
Fragments 9-16. 
First a list of the ai uxta: rb Eöv is ungenerated (äyc'viiiov), imperishable 
(äv(OXc8pov), whole (ovXov), 18 of a unitary kind (µovvoycviq), unmoved (ätpcµk), 
perfect (ti , ctov), 
19 entirely together (ogov itäv), one ('v) and continuous (ßuvcx ). 2o 
15 Fr. 6.1-2. Trans: `It is necessary that that which is for speaking and thinking is (exists); for it is for 
being, but nothing is not. ' For a discussion of the modal fallacy which occurs here see G. E. L. Owen, 
`Eleatic Questions', p. 60 and D. Gallop, Parmenides of Elea, p. 24. 
16 Fr. 8.1-2. Trans: `Only one story of a route remains, that it is. ' 
17 Owen argues that lines 26-33 are part of the temporal argument. He maintains that this passage restates 
two previous conclusions and argues for temporal invariance with the use of the `xdpaS' imagery. I 
disagree with that reading for two reasons: i) much of the imagery has become spatial and ii) there is no 
point in using this passage to establish temporal invariance, since lines 6-21 establish inter alia that point- 
Cf. G. E. L. Owen, `Eleatic Questions', pp. 18-21. 
18 D-K read o1u oµeS at 8.4. Gallop reads oüAov µovvoµcg, see D. Gallop, Parmenides of Elea, p. 64. 
I follow Tarän's reading of oüAov gouvoyevq. See L. Tarän, Parmenides (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1965), pp. 88-93 Also cf. J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 179 and `Parmenides and the 
Eleatic One', Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Band 61 (1979), pp. 8-9. 
19 Following Owen's reading. Cf. G. E. L. Owen, `Eleatic Questions'. pp. 23-4. Also cf. A. H. Coxon, fl 
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The first argument (6-21) focuses on generation and destruction. 21 The claim 
Parmenides attempts to defend is that yeveat; and S? 1 poq have no place in a proper 
account of the nature of iö Möv: 
ti )S ycveatg µev &7t ßa Eatat uai änvatog ö%9po;. 22 
Beginning with generation, Parmenides deploys two arguments against it: Firstly, he 
claims that if tiö Fov were generated, its state, prior to the generative act, would be 
different from its present state, do Eov. For such a generative process entails that tö Eöv 
is different from what it now is, rb F-öv. At one point, it would, therefore, have had to 
have been in a state of not being. For the exclusive and exhaustive nature of the 
disjunction in Fr. 2, a point which Parmenides reiterates at 8.16-18, leaves no 
alternative: 
irfii itöOcv avgiiO&v; ov6' & µiß Eövtiog M aaw 
q &aOat a' o0i voeiv " ov yäp cpatiöv of von r6v 
catty oirwS omc can. 
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Moreover, assuming such a generative process were the case, one would, as a result, 
have to accept that not being and being are causally related. For not being would have to 
be thought of as that which produces or is generative of being. And this would attribute 
a metaphysical status, i. e. a causal capacity, to not being which is entirely inappropriate. 
For nothing can be said or thought about not being. 24 
The second argument which Parmenides brings against a generative account 
is the `why now as opposed to later' argument. 25 Assuming being could have been in a 
state of not being and assuming a causal relation could hold between them, when was 
the yevEatg of iö Eöv from not being supposed to have occurred? Why, Parmenides asks, 
should it occur at t2 as opposed to tl or t3: 
Fragments of Parmenides (Maastricht Van Gorum & Co., 1986), p. 61. D-K read äti o cov. 
20 Fr. 8.2-6. 
21 cf. J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 179. Also see his `Parmenides and the Eleatic One', p. 
12. 
22 Fr. 8.21. Trans: `Thus coming to be is extinguished and perishing not to be heard of. ' 
23 Fr. 8.7-9. Trans: `How and whence did it grow? Not from not being shall I allow you to think or say. 
For it is not to be said or thought that [it] is not. ' Also cf. Fr. 7.1. 
24 Fr. 8.8-9 which is a reiteration of his rejection of the not being route in the second fragment. Cf. J. 
Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 186. 
25 cf. J. Barnes, iUL, pp. 187-8 on the Principle of Sufficient Reason with respect to this argument. I 
think, pace Barnes and Stokes, that such an account is unnecessarily complex for what Parmenides is 
trying to achieve, see n. 31 and M. C. Stokes, One and Many in Presocratic Philosophy (Washington: 
Center for Hellenic Studies, 1971), pp. 253-5. 
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Ti S, äv µtv Ica! xpfoc wpaEv 
26 uaTEpov 1j npoaOcv, Too AnS&vog äp äj vov, cpvv; 
For, if it is in a state of non existence at t1, there is no reason for it to change, as there is 
nothing to cause it to do so at that time or any other. For there is only that which is or is 
not. These two arguments lead Parmenides to conclude that there was never a time in 
which or at which iö Eöv came into being, since it always was what it is. And because its 
present state is a state of being as opposed to not being, it always has been being. 
ov'to; 1j näµicav neXivat xpc v eattiv 7"1 oüxt. 27 
The essential point, I think, is that tiö Eöv be constant in its state, whatever that state 
might happen to be. Now, as its present state is rb Eöv for the metaphysical reasons 
outlined in Fr. 2, it follows that its past state -- if you can call it that -- is the same as its 
present, i. e. tiö iov. And, given such constancy of state, Parmenides also uses this 
argument to deny that rb Eöv ever perishes. 28 For the argument is applicable in both 
directions: 
OUSE 7Lo'C EK gil £OvtoO E(pilaEL ? LLattoc taxi); 
ytyvcaOat'n nap' auto-, rob EiveKcv oucE yevcßOat 
OUT, 1 ävfKE At" xaAäaaaa n , 9taty, 
ÖLkx, ExEL' 11 SE Kptatg 11Ept 'Cou'r wv ev 'C(J)LS' Catty ' 
V 9% 1 $p £ß'CLV 110-0 K £6ttV '29 
Thus tio'Eöv is sempiternal; it is temporally homogeneous. 30 Yet, as the argument stands, 
strong monism does not follow. Qualitative homogeneity and quantitative identity or 
invariance (i. e. being equal throughout) are still lacking in both spatial and temporal 
forms. To say that tiö Eöv always is, at best, commits one to a weak sort of monism. For 
temporal homogeneity is only a necessary condition for both qualitative homogeneity 
and quantitative identity. 31 
Parmenides begins to address these issues in the next section (Fr. 8.22-25) by 
redirecting his focus inwards. 32 For it is no longer a matter of whether iö Eöv `is' but 
26 Fr. 8.9-10. Trans: `And what need could have impelled it to grow later or sooner, if it began from 
nothing? ' 
27 Fr. 8.11. Trans: `Thus it must either be completely or not at all. ' 
28 cf. Kirk, Raven & Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 250. 
29 Fr. 8.12-16. Trans: `Not ever from what is will strength of trust allow it to become something apart from 
itself (following Barnes). Therefore neither its coming to be nor its perishing has Justice allowed, relaxing 
her shackles, but she holds [it] fast. Concerning these things the decision rests on this: [it] is or [it] is not. ' 
Cf. J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 189 for all the various construals of 11.12-3. 
30 cf. J. Barnes, `Pannendes and the Eleatic One, p. 19. 
31 It is for this reason that the Principle of Sufficient Reason is inappropriate to the earlier argument. 
32 cf. G. E. L. Owen, `Eleatic Questions', pp. 13 and 18-19. 
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rather what it is like at all the temporal instants within that time: 
ovSE SLatpetov £atnv, £nei nöcv caTty öµotov "33 
ovSE Tt tnjt µiz Aov, 'tö'cev c1pyot µtv avvExcaOat, 
ovS¬'n xetpoupov, näv S' Ei g0 ov ca'nv eovTog. 
TWt 4vvexEg näv &&Ttv " eöv yä% p Mö 34 vTt ncA, . ct. 
The first line speaks of identity through time that does not permit of internal temporal 
division (ou8 Siaipe rov). In other words, we are not permitted to speak of tö Gov at t j, 
-tö Eöv at t2 and To' Eöv t3. The claim that tib Eov is indivisible, along with its temporal 
homogeneity, is another step towards establishing qualitative homogeneity. For temporal 
homogeneity ensured the constancy of, at least, certain non-relational properties, such as 
being. 35 But now, given the temporal indivisibility, it follows that iö Eöv will be unable 
to sustain different properties at different times, relational or non-relational within its 
sempiternal existence. Whatever properties it has, relational or otherwise, it has them 
sempiternally. None of its properties can alter. It can neither take on new ones or lose 
others. As yet, the argument has shown it to be qualitatively constant, not qualitatively 
homogeneous. It is only when this temporal argument is coupled with its spatial 
counterpart, 11.26-33 that, I think, qualitative homogeneity will be established, the latter 
being a necessary condition for strong monism. 
On the basis of indivisibility through time, Parmenides infers that there is no 
temporal inequality within tö Eöv (oi tit'ºjt . 
t&XXov or oüöc tit x£tporepov) in which 
one part -- using the term `part' very loosely -- is any different from another at any 
particular time. The entire whole is full of what is (ßäv S' Eµ7cXthv E(Fiiv Eöv'coS), and, 
as such, it does not lend itself to being broken down into temporal instants in which a 
discrepancy can be discerned between the parts qua more or less full. The quantitative 
properties of co' Eöv -- assuming there are any -- do not lend themselves to being 
analysed into successive instants in which quantitative discrepancies can be discerned at 
specific times, say tl and t2. Like, their qualitative counterparts, they are constant at each 
33 Following Owen in taking ogoiov adverbially and not entailing qualitative homogeneity. See G. E. L. 
Owen, ii., p. 13. As Barnes notes, if it meant to imply qualitative homogeneity, then Parmenides would 
be introducing it without warrant, since he has not argued for it. See J. Barnes, The Presocratic 
Philosophers, p. 210. For the view that it does imply qualitative homogeneity, see L. Tardn, Parmenides. 
pp. 107-8. 
34 Fr. 8.22-25. Trans: `Nor is it divisible, since it all alike is; nor is it somewhat more here, which would 
keep it from holding together, nor is it somewhat less, but it is all full of what is. Therefore it is all 
continuous; for what is is in contact with what is. ' 
35 cf. J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, p. 188. 
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possible instant, assuming instants were discernible (which they are not). Consequently, 
Parmenides' r o' Eov is one continuous indivisible temporal whole. 36 
The two temporal arguments (6-21 and 22-25) demonstrate that (i) Tö iov 
always `is' and (ii) within that sempiternal period it does not alter in any sense. Next 
Parmenides has two spatial arguments (11.26-33 and 42-29). The first, I want to argue, 
focuses on the qualitative dimension and the latter, the quantitative. Beginning with the 
first account, in this section Parmenides introduces the idea of boundaries or limits at 11. 
26 and 30-31 (µ£yä? ov Ev n6paßt BEßµwv and 'AvayKTI lt£ipaioS £v SE(Tµoiaty ExEt 
[sc. TO' Eöv]). The lines which are contained within these references to n6ipaia, 27-30, 
reiterate the two previous conclusions (11.27-8 that of 6-21 and 11.29-30 that of 22-5). 
But this passage (11.26-33) is not simply a reiteration of those previous conclusions. For 
one thing, the notion of boundaries tells us that if there is to be an identity thesis, this 
time it will be in a spatial guise, i. e. there will be no place within these limits in which 
do Eov differs from any other place. 
So far the eighth fragment has examined qualitative properties -- both 
relational and non-relational -- and quantitative properties in that order. Now, if 
Parmenides is to achieve a symmetry and balance between those two arguments and 
these latter two, presumably the first one should develop the qualitative dimension and 
the latter the quantitative. And it is clear that the second of the two arguments does 
develop the quantitative side. For there he does speak of quantitative properties such as 
size and equality (11.44-9). So if he were to introduce qualitative homogeneity, it should 
presumably come in the third of the four arguments, namely, the present one. Moreover, 
if, as I shall argue, in the next section (11.34-41) Parmenides is claiming that the relation 
which holds between thinking and being is one of strict identity, then his argument 
would be well served by introducing qualitative homogeneity before making such a 
strong identity claim. Finally, given that one of the signs which Parmenides mentioned 
at the outset was µouvoycvcq (8.4), some account of qualitative homogeneity is to be 
expected. With these demands in mind, let us now turn to Parmenides' closing remarks 
36 To use a well known phrase, r6 aröv enjoys the state of the timeless present in which it might be tensed 
grammatically but not logically. Taken from G. E. L. Owen, `Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless 
Present', Logic. Science and Dialectic, ed. M. C. Nussbaum (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 
1986). pp. 27-8. 
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of this section. For it is there, I think, that qualitative homogeneity can be discerned: 
ovvcUEv ovu &Tex6n'rov Tö cov BEµt; Eivag 
COT, yap ovic cnt&Eueý" [µh]37 cöv S' äv navr6; c6ctro. 38 
'TO Eöv is complete (ovic ätcXE VTq'cov). If it were lacking (irt&£vES), Parmenides infers 
that it would lack everything (('x'v iravtbS s litho). I take this passage to be indicative of 
qualitative homogeneity for the following reason: Whatever qualitative properties it has, 
they must not only be omnipresent but also undifferentiatible. 
Let me begin with the weaker claim, omnipresence. If it were the case that 
one property were in one place and not in another place, i. e. if any of its qualities could 
be differentiated locally, iö Eöv could be said not `to be' in some sense. For the property 
would be restricted to a particular part and, as a result, not be or inhere in another part. 
But omnipresence alone only entails coextensivity and not qualitative homogeneity. It is 
entirely compatible with there being a plurality of properties. However, I think the 
notion of `not lacking' in any way whatsoever can also be shown to entail qualitative 
homogeneity for the following reason: Different predicates which express different 
such as tiö Eöv is `x' and iö Eöv is 'y', ' properties, would cause io Gov to lack inasmuch 
as do eöv, by satisfying one predicate, would not be simultaneously satisfying another. 39 
And to the extent that one predicate excludes -- is differentiated from -- another, tiö Eöv 
is `not' the other. In other words, the notion of differentiation itself allows for a sense in 
which tiö Eöv can be said to lack and, as a result, not to be. Now given the force of 
Parmenides' claim at 8.33, if it were to lack in any conceivable way whatsoever, it 
would lack everything altogether. It would be not being. 
Thus far the account of tiö E-öv entails that it is an eternal, unchanging 
continuous entity, whose qualities are undifferentiated temporally or spatially. Now, as 
for what the properties are, it is clear from Fr. 2-7 that the only two which Parmenides 
has in mind are being and thinking. So, if he is to retain the view that there is more than 
being, now would be the appropriate time to introduce rö voEiv and explain how it and 
37 As with most commentators (including D-K), I am leaving out the µiß. See L. Tardn, Parmenides, p. 119 
and D. Gallop, Parmenides of Elea, p. 68. 
38 Fr. 8.32-33. Trans: `Wherefore it is not right for that which is to be incomplete: for it is not lacking; but 
if it were, it would lack everything. 
39 TarAn uses a similar argument to deduce not being at 8.22.1 agree with his point but I do not think it 
should be introduced at line 22 for the reasons which I, pace Barnes, noted earlier. See L. Tardn, 
Emenides, 
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iö cov relate to one another; thus the next section (34-41)40 begins: 
Tautov S' can vociv 're at ovvc cv caTt voi1µa "41 
So what is the exact nature of their relation (vociv) and (6vE1Ev =, r0 Eöv42)? To begin. 
as the last section has shown, coextensivity is not sufficient to account for the way in 
which the constituents within the boundaries relate to one another. Rather, in keeping 
with the tone of the previous section, Parmenides is asserting their identity. This identity 
thesis, I think, explains his use of iaiuiöv. For the demands of such a strong claim are 
already in place. Within this Parmenidean principle there is no room for qualitative 
differentiation in either the temporal or spatial arenas. Hence the next part of this 
passage (35-8) speaks of 'rb Eöv as exhausting the whole. But as thinking is expressly 
, said to be part of that whole, one is then forced to conclude that they are identical with 
one another: 
01) yap avEV tov EovtioS, EV wt nECpaTt(Yµcvov Eatity. 
EÜpt actL, 'C0 voeiv. oÜS£v y&p 6) £atty Tj CaTal 
'%Xo täpc4 tiov eövtioS, ýýEi % tiö yE Moip' ent8i aEv 
oviwv a tvrltiov ti' Eµevav 
Thus by the time we reach 8.38, we have a changeless, shackled, indivisible whole 
which is qualitatively undifferentiated. Thinking and being are identical with one 
another. The only way to deny the identity between thinking and being, is either to place 
thinking in the not being category or to disregard Parmenides' account of 'CO' Eöv as 
given in the first 33 lines of Fragment 8.44 Neither option being a viable one, the end 
result looks something like this: do vociv East co Eöv. In virtue of this strict identity 
40 Tardn takes this section to be proof that thinking and being are not identical because that would make 
thoughts or thinking eternal when in fact they are not everlasting. In response, I would agree with Frankel, 
and say that for Parmenides insight is not an act but a form of existence. See L. Tardn, Parmenides, pp. 
198-200 and Herman Frankel, `Studies in Parmenides', Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, vol. II, edd. 
R. E. Allen and D. Furley (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), p. 3. Or to state the matter 
differently, what Tarän calls thoughts I would call opinions, at least as far as Parmenides is concerned. 
41 Fr. 8.34. Trans: `To think and that for the sake of which the thought exists is the same. ' 
42 Following the rendering of Kurt von Fritz, who takes the view that the o. SvEUCv preserves the sense of 
ou evEKca. See Kurt von Fritz, `Noun, Noein and their Derivatives in Pre-Socratic Philosophy', The Pre- 
Socratics: A Collection of Critical Essay,, ed. Alexander P. D. Mourelatos (New York: Anchor Press, 
1974), pp. 45-47. Vlastos takes the same line, see G. Vlastos, `Review of J. Zafiropoulo L'Ecole elEate', 
Gnomon 25 (1953), p. 168. 
43 Fr. 8.35-38. Trans: `For not without being, in which it (sc. thinking) unfolds itself (or is expressed), will 
you find thinking; for nothing else either is or will be besides that which is, since it was just this that Fate 
did shackle to be whole and changeless. ' Following von Fritz' translation of Ev w 7tc4paTtagcvov Eaciv. 
See Kurt von Fritz, `Nous, Noein and their Derivatives in Pre-Socratic Philosophy', p. 47. 
44 Vlastos uses this argument, viz. if thinking exists then, given the monistic account, it must be identical 
with being. See G. Vlastos, `Review of J. Zafiropoulo L'Ecole eleate', p. 168. 
30 
thesis, thinking will have the all same attributes as being. It too will be complete, self- 
identical, continuous, changeless and eternal. 
The remainder of this section (38-41) touches on the mortal beliefs about 
what they take to be true, the phenomenal world: 
Twt nävt övoµ(a) EaTat, 
öaaa ßpotioi uati&6cvtio ncnotooTcg Eivat kbl", 
yiyveaOat ti¬ icai ö? i aOat, divat to uai oirx{, 
xai tionov ä? aaacty Stare xpoa cpavov ajtet 3ctv. 45 
The point of this passage at this stage, it seems, is that of highlighting the difference 
between thinking and the opinions of mortals. It was argued earlier that the latter were 
empty unintelligent utterings because they were riddled with contradictions. As a result, 
opinion as a third route was untenable. Now, having been exposed to how thinking 
relates to tiö Eöv, we can appreciate fully the difference between thinking and the 
opining of mortals. The former is one with the only legitimate metaphysical entity, while 
the latter is incapable of entertaining a proper relation to anything because of its 
fundamentally flawed epistemological structure. 
Assuming the monistic account and the identity thesis as outlined thus far is 
correct, a new question emerges: why the need for the further monistic account (8.42- 
49)? In short, the identity relation between thinking and being pertains to qualitative 
differentiation. Their identity is premised upon qualitative homogeneity. The spatial 
context so far has served as the setting for an examination of qualitative properties. But 
if Parmenides' account of rb Eöv is to be complete -- if it is to entail strong monism -- he 
must also rule out quantitative differentiation. And this is the issue which he now 
addresses in the final argument (8.42-49). 
45 Fr. 8.38-41. Trans: `Therefore all that mortals posited convinced that it was true will be a [mere] name, 
coming into being, perishing, being and not being, change of place and exchange of brilliant colour. ' 
Following D-K. Also cf. L. Tardn, Parmenides, p. 84. It must be stressed, however, that line 38 is a 
controversial and disputed reading of the manuscript. D-K and Tarän, prefer nävi' övoµ(a) Eatat over 
bvöµaatiat or wvogaatat. The latter reading has been defended by Woodbury and Long and slightly 
modified by Burnyeat (as Woodbury is open to Owen's grammatical objection). Cf. Leonard Woodbury, 
`Parmenides on Names', Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 63 (1958), p. 147ff., A. A. Long, `The 
Principles of Parmenides' Cosmogony', Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, vol. II, edd. R. E. Allen and D. 
Furley (London: Routledge, Kegan & Paul, 1975), p. 88, Owen, `Eleatic Questions', p. 69 and Myles 
Burnyeat, `Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes saw and Berkeley missed', p. 19, n. 22. 
Burnyeat's translations reads: `Wherefore it (the one being) is named all the names which mortals have 
laid down in the (mistaken) belief that they are true (of it). ' In either case what mortals say is meaningless 
since on the former reading they are only names referring to nothing or on the latter their words might 
refer to that which `is' but they speak of it in an incorrect and contradictory fashion. The ßpotoi do not 
speak in a meaningful manner. 
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'cö Eöv extends or reaches out to the ncipaia in such a way as to leave no 
place vacant from the centre to the limit. This is because Tö Eöv is complete 
(tictcXEathvov, 8.42-44). If it was not, it would be nothing. 46 The image he employs is 
of a smooth well-rounded sphere (8.43) which is indicative of there being no gaps or 
empty places. Rather it is identical throughout, consisting of like bordering on like (46- 
47). 47 There is no internal quantitative differentiation or discrepancies. No part -- using 
the term rather loosely -- is bigger or smaller than any other part (8.44-45), greater or 
less (8.48). There is quantitative invariancy throughout: 
of yap iräv roicv taov, o uoS cv nctpaat xvpct. 48 
As with our first quantitative account, units -- this time spatial ones such as size and 
place as opposed to temporal ones -- are inapplicable. For they presuppose something 
which lends itself to division and differentiation, something which can be quantified 
over. With this final argument, Parmenides has closed off the last possible avenue for 
any sort of differentiation, quantitative differentiation within the spatial domain, i. e. size, 
density or place. Thus strong monism has been established. 
IV 
Parmenides' Realism and Idealism 
It has been said that Parmenides, like Wittgenstein, throws away the ladder once he 
achieves his goal. 49 In other words, he destroys the route by which he reached iö Eov in 
Fragment 8. I want now to focus on his route or, so to speak, his ladder. It can be 
understood in one of two ways, which I shall refer to as realism and idealism. The 
difference between these two interpretations lies in the causal relation between the 
epistemic subject and object: Either that which `is' is a cause of thinking or thinking 
causes there to be being. I must stress, however, that either account is an equally 
plausible reading of the text and both accounts cease to be functional with the 
introduction of Parmenides' strong monism. 
Starting with the realist interpretation: Thinking requires an independent pre- 
46 Cf. 8.11 and 33. 
47 cf. Fr. 4.2-4. 
48 Fr. 8.49. Trans: `For equal to itself from every direction, it lies uniformly within limits. ' 
49 cf. G. E. L. Owen, `Eleatic Questions', p. 22 and `Plato and Parmenides on the Timeless Present'. p. 30. 
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existent referent. Without this object, thinking would be impossible, for there would be 
no intelligible content to think. The former is a necessary condition for the latter. Thus 
the assumption which the realist interpretation makes is that there exists a mind- 
independent object (or objects). If the object is not already in place, i. e. actually exists 
independent of the mind prior to that mind thinking it, then the act of thinking -- at least 
in any meaningful sense -- is impossible. 50 Thinking itself is incapable of generating its 
own intelligible content. Rather, some pre-existent object(s) acts on it. This 
interpretation ensures two things: (i) its objects enjoy a mind independent existence and 
(ii) these objects are constitutive of the thinker's intellectual content. In other words, the 
objects act upon the thinker and are that in virtue of which thinking is possible. 
Let me now turn to the text in order to extract this reading. The dramatic 
setting of the poem set out in the proem casts Parmenides in a passive role. His position 
is that of one having some divine thing ('AX719EirlS EvxuKAAoq äipq .tS 
rjtiop) revealed 
to him. Despite the fact that this is only the proem, the imagery is well suited to a realist 
reading in that Parmenides is having something shown to him which, at least on the face 
of it, has a separate divine existence. One does not get the sense that he is conducting a 
thought experiment. Rather he has been brought before a goddess to be shown the 
structure of reality, both that which truly is and what is not. 51 It would seem, therefore, 
at least as far as the dramatic setting is concerned, the text is better served by the realist 
interpretation. 52 
The second fragment introduces the framework of the route which will lead 
to the Parmenidean principle. The language employed in this fragment is that of roads of 
inquiry (ööoi Sicilatoq). On either reading, the central issue is what makes them routes. 
50 On this line, Myles Burnyeat remarks: `Thought requires an object, distinct from itself, and that object, 
Parmenides argues, must actually exist'. Myles Burnyeat, `Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What 
Descartes saw and Berkeley missed', pp. 15-6. According to him the ancients, Parmenides included, never 
got beyond the realist position. He thinks that it is a post-Cartesian phenomenon to think of the categories 
of thought as constituting or determining the nature of the world. For the ancients it is the other way 
around. cf. Myles Burnyeat, `Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes saw and Berkeley missed', 
pp. 22-3 and 33. 
511 think Vlastos is right to emphasise the religious aspect of all this imagery. To paraphrase, Parmenides 
is presenting the reader with a mystical revelation in which he is attempting to bridge the gulf between 
mortal and divine. See Gregory Vlastos, `Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge', pp. 74-5. 
52 Perhaps a far more obvious sign post in the proem which points the reader towards the realist 
interpretation lies in how one understands V016dil. For 'AblOcii is after all the object which goddess is 
going to disclose. If we follow WJ. Verdenius, the realist account will be victorious. For he takes the line 
that 'AXtiOthi is to be understood as the true nature of things and not some mental category or property. 
See WJ. Verdenius, `Parmenides B2.3', Mnemosyne 15 (1962), p. 237. 
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Are they constructs of the mind? Is it the thinker's thinking them which makes them 
what they are, i. e. a route which leads to something? Or is it the objects to which they 
lead that makes them what they are? The realist account would emphasise two points: (i) 
The terms employed by Parmenides in Fragment 2 seem to imply that there exist pre- 
thought objects or referents and (ii) the grounds for discarding the oüx &aif route. 
Starting with (i), the term Stýij tq (apparently coined by Parmenides from 
the verb &cfjµ(xt) connotes the idea of a search or inquiry in which the existence of the 
object of that search is not in question. 53 That is, the term carries with it the sense that 
one is searching for a pre-existent object. So to judge by Parmenides' choice of 
terminology or coinage of earlier terminology, it would seem that the intellectual inquiry 
is not constitutive of that object. Such an account also fits nicely with Parmenides' 
description of the Eau route as the path of persuasion. For persuasion, according to him, 
attends upon (=186) reality or truth, a notion which implies that the existence of what 
is attended upon, in this case reality or truth, is presupposed. 
As for (ii) the manner in which the ovx gart route is discarded, one could 
argue that the acceptance of one route and the denial of the other is based upon a 
somewhat modified or primitive form of denotability. 54 In the case of ib Eöv, there is 
something in Parmenides' ontology, i. e. tiö E-öv, which corresponds to the idea or 
thought. There is some mind independent referent out there to denote. In the case of not 
being there is no referent which can be picked out, and, consequently, that route is 
inaccessible. A necessary condition for thinking, i. e. an object, is not satisfied. 
I shall pass over the third fragment as there is not much either reading can 
hope to gain from it. The fourth fragment, however, could be taken as substantiating the 
realist reading: 
üaa¬ S' OP-3; änEövtia vöwi icapeövTa ßEßatwg- 
ov yäp änotiµij4EL 'CO' 6V 'rob E'övioS ExcaOat 
o1TE ßxtiSväµCVOV näv"t tavtiu xatiä xößµov 
55 otte 01vvtat64Evov. 
53 I take this point about &cijatg from A. Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides, p. 67. Mourelatos cites 
the example of the Homeric voyage motif as a place in which the 68k Stý71atoq imagery is employed. In 
Heraclitus we find the phrase ESt)rlaäµrly igewu my (D-K Fr. 22/101) which does not conflict with the 
realist account, since the existence of that which is consulted or sought after, i. e. myself, is not in question. 
54 In this I am following M. Furth, `Elements of Eleatic Ontology', p. 252. By `modified form' I 
understand that the notion of multiple sense is left out. There is a one on one mapping. 
55 Fr. 4. Trans: `Look upon things which, although far off, are firmly present to the mind; for you will not 
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Here Parmenides speaks of the thinker not being able to sever being from being, i. e. not 
91 f being able divide up -To' F ov. According to the realist reading, this fragment is making the 
point that what thinking can and cannot do depends upon and is determined by the 
structure of tio' Fov. This claim asserts more than that one must think that which `is'. It 
also asserts that one's thinking will have to mirror or accurately depict the structure of 
what is thought, i. e. being. For `thviwS' in `aKiSväµCVOV thv rou tävTqi' stipulates 
that even qualitative or quantitative differentiation is unthinkable. The realist would 
interpret this to mean that the nature or structure of iö Eöv determines the structure of the 
intellectual process which thinks it. 
The realist account, accepting the argument that the ßpoioi do not denote 
anything in their everyday mental activities but just entertain contradictions, would 
claim that Fr. 5 and some of the imagery in Fr. 6. has the expression it does because 
there is only one denotable object (a result of having eliminated the two paths), to % Eov. 
Thus it does not matter where the goddess begins her discourse. She will be forced to 
return to that object: 
4vvöv 86 got' iotty, 
6=60ev 6cp4o tat " ti60t yap n&Xty t oµat avtt;. 56 
Similarly, with the circular imagery deployed when discussing the activity of mortals 
(the aimless wandering [jv Sri f potiolt Ei&öi£S ovSEv ir? , vrovtiat, 8ixpavot] and 
backwards turning motion [täviwv SE ir(xXivtipoiröS Batt KEA, ci Oog]), the realist would 
take this to be the result of entertaining contradictions. 57 Because the f3poioi only latch 
onto vacuous names, names which lack a proper referent, they do not satisfy a necessary 
condition for thinking. As a result, they are on an aimless backwards turning journey. To 
conclude, the realist would argue, only if there is a proper mind independent object in 
place can thinking occur. It is only in virtue of this object (these objects) that the thinker 
can climb the ladder. 
cut off that which is from holding onto that which is, neither scattering itself (TÖ 2öv) in every way 
everywhere in order, nor drawing itself together. ' Following Gallop's translation. See D. Gallop, 
Parmenides of Elea, p. 57. 
56 Fr. 5. Trans: `It is the same to me where I begin for I shall come back to that place again. ' 
57 Fr. 6.4-9. It is along these lines that Kurt von Fritz remarks: `It is still the primary function of noos to 
be in direct touch with ultimate reality'. Kurt von Fritz, `Nous, Noein and their Derivatives in Pre-Socratic 
Philosophy', p. 52. For a different view cf. J. Barnes, The Presocratic PhilOsoftrs, p. 611. Barnes argues 
contra von Fritz that this is wrong and voi S is from time to time erroneous. 
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What about the idealist reading? It too can give an account of how the 
epistemic subject relates to that which `is'; of how one climbs the ladder to reach the 
Parmenidean principle, tiö Fov. Unlike the realist account, however, in the case of the 
idealist interpretation it is not a question of a pre-existent mind independent entity acting 
on the thinker but thinking itself causing there to be being. For thinking, by its very 
definition, stipulates that there must be some intelligible content, i. e. being. 58 Thus, 
thinking, given its nature, causes or is generative of being. 
Beginning with the proem, presumably the idealist would not be too worried 
about the setting since it is just that, a dramatic backdrop for the entire poem and not just 
the Way of the Truth. Parmenides does not properly begin to set out the route or the 
ladder which he will climb to reach his principle until the second fragment. As for the 
second fragment, it is perfectly compatible with the idealist reading. For all that 
Fragment tells us is that thinking, in order not to be vacuous, must have some content 
and this content must have the status of a something. It must `be'. Nothing -- which is 
not -- is not constitutive of intellectual content. Thus thinking itself, as just noted, is 
stipulative of that content. For if it is to be meaningful or successful as an intellectual 
activity, it requires this content. As for whether the content is mind dependent or not, 
that is irrelevant. The crucial point is that the content of thinking `is', regardless of 
whether it exists solely in the mind or not. The second fragment, therefore, is perfectly 
consistent with both readings. 
The third fragment, as already mentioned, helps neither interpretation. The 
fourth, however, it was said was well-suited for the realist reading. Is it a problem for the 
idealist? No. For all that Parmenides asserts is that the structure or nature of iö E6v is 
such that it is neither cut off from the epistemic subject or itself. It is not scattered about 
(ovtc axtöväµEvov ttäv'crit itävt(S). The way in which the idealist reading would 
account for such a remark is that what the thinker thinks must be such so as to satisfy the 
58 M. M. McCabe takes this line of interpretation. She holds that Parmenides does not assume `real 
objects' of thought en route to explaining 'co" iov. The basis for such a claim is as follows: `We think 
thought must have content otherwise it would be vacuous, and could not be said to occur at all. We think 
about something, and not about nothing, .... 
So if the choice between Satt and OvK Satt can be 
reinterpreted as a choice between something and nothing, we must take Fait. What can be thought is, and 
nihilism is false. For whatever its status, something is happening, even if the event only occurs in my 
brain. Moreover anything other than something must be impossible. So differentiation is impossible and 
strong monism may be thought to follow. ' M. M. Mackenzie, `Parmenides' Dilemma', p. 2. 
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conditions of intelligibility. Thus it must be present to the thinker and cannot be 
scattered. For if it were not present to the epistemic subject, then presumably it would 
not be an intelligible object. And if it were scattered then presumably there would be 
gaps in it which would consist of not being, something which does not satisfy the 
conditions of being intelligible or thinkable. Thus the idealist would argue that 
Parmenides outlines the structure of co Eöv as he does in the fourth fragment because 
thinking demands just such a structure. 
Finally, the fifth, sixth and seventh fragments do not pose a problem for the 
idealist account. For, again, it is simply a question thinking's stipulatory demands. 
Vacuity and contradiction are inconsistent with a meaningful intellectual activity. Thus, 
it does not matter where the goddess begins, because if she is going to give a proper 
account of thinking, she must return that thing which is thinkable, 'CO' Eöv. The 
contradictions of mortals will not suffice. If anything, the grounds on which Parmenides 
rejects the route opted for by mortals is better suited to the idealist reading than the 
realist reading. For the problem is not with hybrid objects but their contradictory claims 
and beliefs. Thus their route is rejected on epistemological and not ontological grounds. 
Either reading, realism or idealism, can, therefore, give a coherent account of 
Fragments 1-7. For both accounts allow for a meaningful relation between the epistemic 
subject and its object. In the case of realism, do F-öv causes thinking and in the case of 
idealism, thinking causes tiö E6 v. Either one is a suitable ladder because they both 
distinguish between the epistemic subject and its object, the climber and the thing which 
is climbed. 
V 
The Identity of the Epistemic Subject and the Intelligible Object 
I would like now to conclude with a few remarks about how both interpretations stand in 
relation to the strong monism, i. e. the strict identity thesis, of the eighth fragment. The 
essential point about both readings is that they allow for, albeit in different forms, 
coextensive (i. e. differentiated) relata, the epistemic subject and its object. The question 
then becomes: What does Fragment 8 entail for the epistemic subject and its intelligible 
object, for these coextensive relata? What does Fragment 8 do to the ladder? In short, 
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the distinction between the epistemic subject and the object is a distinction which cannot 
be upheld in the face of the strong monism as outlined in that Fragment. The ladder is 
cast aside. For the account in the eighth fragment prohibits all conceivable distinctions 
and differentiation, be it quantitative, qualitative, relational or non-relational, given that 
it sets out such a strict identity thesis. Thus the distinction between the epistemic subject 
and the intelligible object, do Fov, collapses in such a way that the two sides are rendered 
indiscernible from one another. They are identical. 
As a result of this strict identity thesis, what can be said about the epistemic 
subject and its object? Such an identity thesis is lethal to their existence qua `subject' 
and `object'. For as coextensive relata, they did not enjoy all the same properties. One 
was a subject and the other an object. One thought and the other was thought. So, if such 
a strict identity thesis is allowed to stand, it will not make very much sense to regard the 
epistemic subject as thinking TO' Eöv. For there is no subject to think iö £öv. Nor will it 
be very useful to regard TO' Eöv as an intelligible object, since it, iö Eov, is incapable of 
enjoying any relation whatsoever with anything other than itself. And it could only relate 
to itself in a rather trivial manner, simple self-identity. The Parmenidean principle, 
therefore, when fully disclosed, prohibits one from distinguishing either the epistemic 
subject or the intelligible object, because it does not allow for coextensive relata. Thus 
both the subject and its object (at least qua object) are annihilated in the face of such an 
identity thesis. All of this is to say that when the subject and object are absolutely 
identical, they cannot be regarded as coextensive relata. For the notion of coextensivity 
is premised upon differentiation. And it is upon this relation -- the coextensive -- that the 
existence of the epistemic subject and object as subject and object is based. For the 
concept of `subjecthood' is vacuous once its relational property, i. e. being a subject in 
relation to some object, is deleted. And an object, likewise, is only an object, if it is 
related to a subject. 
To conclude, the Parmenidean philosophy leaves room for neither a thinking 
subject nor an intelligible object. Thus, both the realist and idealist ladders which 
allowed for the distinction between the subject and object have been discarded. For 
those ladders had as their very foundation just such a distinction. Parmenides has, as a 
result of his strong form of monism, left us, his audience, with a challenge; a challenge 
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which says that the distinction between the epistemic subject and object is an untenable 
one. A direct result of such a position is that any sort of intellection, be it of self or 
otherwise, is out of the question. For all intellection is premised upon the distinction 
between the epistemic subject and intelligible object. If thinking or intellection is to be 
rescued from this Parmenidean position, then the restoration of relata as differentiated 
and not identical is the next task. 
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II 
Plato's Response to Parmenides 
The result of this (u. the description of the sight-lovers) is that in this 
book (sc. Republic Bk. V) Plato has said nothing to Parmenides. 59 
The objective of this second chapter is to demonstrate that Plato does have something to 
say to Parmenides in the closing argument of Republic Bk. V (476d8-480al3). His 
response is that the epistemic subject and its object are indeed discernible from one 
another. They are, in fact, coextensive relata in their capacities as subject and object. 
This claim, if it can be defended, does more than just simply rescue an account of self- 
intellection. It saves epistemology as such from utter vacuity. For the strong monism of 
Parmenides rendered thinking itself unintelligible. Thus Plato's response is crucial, if we 
are to have any sort of tenable epistemology, let alone an account of self-intellection. In 
order to substantiate the claim that Plato is responding to Parmenides' strong monism in 
the form in which I suggest, I shall begin by drawing attention to some textual parallels 
between the final argument of Bk. V of the Republic and the Poem of Parmenides. 
parallels which suggest reading this concluding argument of Bk. V with Parmenides and 
his monism in mind. Then, I shall attempt a reconstruction of Plato's interpretation of 
Parmenides' monism with an analysis of two well-known passages and, having done 
that, return to the closing argument of Republic Bk. V in order to show how this 
argument does constitute a philosophical response to Parmenides. 
I 
Literary Echoes of Parmenides 
in Republic Book V 476d8-480al3 
There are very good grounds for interpreting Plato's account of the epistemic subject 
and its object in the final argument of Republic Bk. V as a response to Parmenides' 
monism. Let me begin by bringing to light some literary echoes of Parmenides in the 
Republic passage. Of course. these literary resonances will only constitute the first step 
51) ]. ('. Gosling. 'Rcpuhlic Book V: tä nokk KUXä'. Phronesis 5 (1960), p. 1 "ti 
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in proving that Plato was actually responding to Parmenides. Their function is simply to 
disclose echoes of Parmenides and his Poem. More significantly, I want then to see 
whether Plato actually uses these Parmenidean allusions to score philosophical points 
against the position of his Eleatic predecessor. If the latter can also be shown, then there 
will be some grounds for claiming that the final argument of Republic Bk. V is best 
interpreted with Parmenides' Poem in mind. 
It has already been noted by others that Plato would have been aware of the 
striking similarities between his and Parmenides' use of such phrases or terms as iö o'v, 
iö µý % ov, wS £ivat, µil Vivat. and Sö a. 60 This use of terminology, obviously, by itself 
need not be taken as an indication that Plato is alluding to Parmenides. For example, in 
the Meno Plato uses the term 804a systematically without making any philosophical 
allusion to Parmenides. The context and the manner, however, in which Socrates speaks 
of knowledge and ignorance and how they relate to being and not being respectively 
certainly counts more in the way of reminding the reader of Fragments 2,6.1-3,7.1 and 
8. 
More specifically, however, it is striking that Socrates sometimes uses yvcuµil 
(476d5) and yvwatg (477a9,478c8,47860 and 478c13) for knowledge, and at other 
times uses EirtaTjµt. This inconsistency in terminology is of some interest since we find 
yvwµi and its derivative forms in Parmenides (Fr. 2.7,8.53 and 8.61). Now the fact that 
Plato alters his terminology by itself might not be too significant. But that he does so 
just at the point of introducing his own unique Platonic position should give us some 
cause for concern. For Plato begins his discussion by referring to knowledge as yvwµn 
and yv6xnS but then suddenly at 477b1 in mid-paragraph switches to inta'ri ti. The 
reason, I think, he does switch is because he is departing from the sort of dichotomy 
which is perfectly suited to the Parmenidean distinction of being and not being (as 
outlined in Fragment 2) to the Platonic trichotomy, knowledge, opinion and ignorance. 61 
60 cf. R. E. Allen, `The Argument from Opposites in Republic V', Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy 
edd. J. P. Anton and G. L. Kustas (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1971), p. 165, W. K. C. 
Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 492, 
J. C. Gosling, 'Republic Book V: ra noW icul&', p. 128, Vlastos, `Degrees of Reality', Platonic Studies 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 66. 
61 One could argue that since Parmenides also has the faculty of 86ta, his position, like Plato's, is centred 
around a trichotomy. In response, I would argue that no matter how one wants to interpret the status of 
8640E (as presented in Frr. 6 and 7). the disjunction of Fr. 2 is certainly intended to be exhaustive and 
exclusive. However, even if one were to argue that Parmenides goes on to introduce 864a in order to set 
41 
For the Opposition Plato speaks of at 477a9, yvw nS and äywoaw, would fit very nicely 
with the Parmenidean schema of being and not being. However, in the next line Plato 
begins to speak of a tertium quid in a wholly Platonic manner and in the subsequent line 
he is suddenly referring to the other two epistemological states, knowledge and 
ignorance, as Eici, atijµrl and äyvoia. And throughout the development of his thoroughly 
Platonic notion of knowledge and opinion as faculties with their distinct independent 
objects, Plato uses the term ENCtßVJRIJ (477b1-478b4). 62 
The next allusion that can be discerned is Socrates' use of äväß at 477a9 
and 478c3. On those two occasions Socrates is discussing how ignorance is related to 
that which `is not', which mirrors Parmenides' use of it at Fr. 8.16-17 when he remarks 
that, as is necessary, that which `is not' has to be let go as unthinkable. 63 A trace or echo 
can also be noted in Socrates' description of Söýa as darker (aKoti(0&&ai£pov) than 
knowledge but brighter (cp(xvO rEpov) than ignorance, a description which he deploys on 
two occasions (478c 13-14 and 479c8-dl). Such a contrast would no doubt have 
reminded Plato's audience of Parmenides' use of light and darkness and day and night as 
a way to distinguish the realm of being from not being (Fr. 1.9-11). 64 
In addition to this, Plato uses the unusual phrase irayüw; voißat at 479c4. 
ira'ytw; is not a common Platonic term. However, that by itself would not merit any 
special attention, if it were not for the fact that the only time it does occur in our passage 
(479c4), it does so with another peculiarly loaded term, voffßat. 65 Concerning vof aat, 
it must be borne in mind that voi S and its cognate forms only occur two other times in 
the Bk. V passage, 477e7 and 478b7, and on those occasions they have either an 
up a trichotomy, it would be a very short-lived one. For as soon as he posits it, he discards it on the 
grounds of its contradictory nature; contradiction being something Parmenides is unwilling to tolerate (cf. 
Fr. 8.16-17). I follow Aryeh Finkelberg in taking SSýa to be a bisection of the second route of Fr. 2, with 
the result that the formal structure of the original dichotomy (Fr. 2) is left unscathed. See Aryeh 
Finkelberg, `Parmenides' Foundation of the Way Truth', pp. 58-60. 
62 One might object that after 478b4, Plato drops beta cilµrl and returns to yvC at;. In response, I would 
argue that such a switch is due to the fact that the discussion has turned to opinion's relation to ignorance 
and Plato is once more referring to the framing faculties of knowledge and ignorance. 
63 Also cf. Fr. 8.30 and 10.6. 
64 Also cf. Fr. 8.57-60 and 9.1. 
65 There only three other occurrences of n(xyüc in Plato. They are & public 43442, Theaefetus 157a4 and 
Tja 49d2. Only the Theaetetus passage is remotely similar. Interestingly, in that context too there 
would seem to be a Parmenidean allusion occurring. There, we are told that it is impossible to have a `firm 
notion' (nay{o); voißat) of becoming. The irony of such an odd usage which carried possible 
Parmenidean overtones in the Heraclitean context of flux would not have been lost on Plato's audience. 
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idiomatic or rhetorical sense. In the first occurrence at 477e7, voiS is part of the Excov 
voüv idiom. On the second occasion at 478b7, its function is rhetorical. Socrates is using 
the imperative form of Evvo£iv, ordering Glaucon to reflect on a point about ignorance 
(EvvöEt SE). Thus Plato is not using von-)S or voEiv in a technical or philosophical manner 
as he is with, say, 864a. It is not part of his epistemological vocabulary in this particular 
argument. The peculiarity of this phrase becomes all the more loaded when it is 
remembered that voi S and its cognates are littered throughout the first eight fragments 
of Parmenides' Poem, voijßai itself occurring at Fr. 2.2.66 Now if one compares the 
content of the two passages (Fr. 2.2 and 479c4), a very interesting contrast can be 
discerned. At Fr. 2.2 Parmenides is distinguishing and clearly demarcating the different 
paths which are or are not available for thought, i. e. being and not being. With the 
Platonic text we have a situation in which that which is and that which is not cannot be 
separated and distinguished in thought but are instead hopelessly confused: 
Kai yäp tiavTa EnaµcpotEpiýEty, Kai ovti' ¬ival ovtic µil Eivat oüSEv 
avtiwv Svvatiöv itaytw; voijaat, ovIt 1 0' 'ce ag(ponpa o StE ov8EtEpov. 67 
It would therefore seem quite plausible that Plato intends to remind his audience of 
Parmenides with the phrase irayiou vof aw. and use it in a context in which the opposite 
philosophical point is being made. 68 
The final passage of Plato which, I think, presents the reader with a 
Parmenidean echo is 479d3-5: 
Hvp1jKaµcv dpa, ÜDc £otKEV, on Tä t& v noU v noWx vöµtµa Kaiwü 
tie ntpt Kai tiwv ? k) ov µc'rcz nou i& tv&EITat toi Tc µiß SvTOS Kai 
, Cob ÖV'Co; £iXLKptvü . 
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If one compares this account to Fr. 6.8-9, 
01; 'C0% 7taetiv tie Kai o1K eivat tia&thv vcVogtatat 
66 That on both occasions, Fr. 2.2 and our Platonic text, the term vofjaat occurs at the end of the line 
could signify an allusion on Plato's part to the hexameter of Parmenides' Poem. 
67 479c3-5 Trans: `For these things also equivocate, and it is impossible to conceive firmly any one of 
them to be or not to be or both or neither. ' All Plato passages in Chapters II and III are taken from the 
Oxford Classical Texts. Translations of Plato, unless indicated otherwise, are based upon The Collected 
Dialogues of Plato, edd. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). 
68 In the Theaetetus passage just cited (see n. 65), the inversion is somewhat similar to here inasmuch as 
in that context one is attempting to hold a firm notion (nayiwg voi act) in the midst of Heraclitean flux 
and confusion. 
69 479d3-5 Trans: `We seem to have found, then, that the many conventions of the many about the fair 
and honourable and other things are tumbled about in the mid-region between that which is not and that 
which is in the absolute sense. ' 
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70 
xov TaüTOV, navTwv Si naXivtponK iou 10 Ooq- 
there are at least two reasons which lead one to conclude that Plato is alluding to 
Parmenides. Firstly, the language of custom or belief (vöpo; and its derivatives) can be 
found in both passages with respect to how subjects understand the opinable: Plato uses 
vogtµa and Parmenides v£vöµtatiat. 71 Yet more revealing than the similarity in 
vocabulary is the context in which they are used. In both instances, the focus is on Sö a 
and the imagery is that of circular motion. For Parmenides, by conflating being and not 
being, the path taken by mortals when they opine is a backwards turning (IrAlvTpoiröS) 
one. With Plato, the objects of 80ja tumble (xvXtv66ti(xt) in between being and not 
being. But despite the similarity in imagery, here too our authors are making markedly 
different points. For Parmenides, the backwards turning does not apply to an object, the 
opinable, but pertains to the subject's epistemic process. & a, as far as Parmenides is 
concerned, is a mental state that is subject to contradiction, which causes it to self- 
destruct as a viable third option. Plato, on the other hand, is speaking about how the 
object (the 8o4(xa cov), not the subject, relates to the same opposites (being and not- 
being) but in a context which is non-contradictory. In effect, Plato uses notably similar 
imagery to that of his Eleatic predecessor in order to make exactly the opposite point, 
i. e. to establish a tertium quid as a feasible epistemic option. 
What these allusions to Parmenides' Poem demonstrate is that the final 
argument of Republic Book V should be read with it in mind. For there is clearly a link 
between the two. Moreover, as some of these allusions have clearly shown, the link is 
stronger than that of simply stylistic and linguistic resonances. Especially with the last 
two examples cited, Plato places these allusions in contexts in which he is making very 
different, if not diametrically opposed, philosophical points to those of Parmenides. The 
issue I am pursuing can now be put as follows: Is it the case that Plato is actually using 
Parmenides' position as a philosophical foil for his own position in the concluding 
argument of Republic ublc Bk. V? To be able to say one way or the other, I must first attempt 
to give a plausible reconstruction of Plato's interpretation of Parmenides' philosophical 
position, his monism. 
70 Fr. 6.8-9 Trans: `By whom being and not-being have been considered both the same and not the same, 
and the path of all is backward-turning. ' 
71 Also cf. 476c2, where Plato refers to the cptAoOt . Loves as ö voµicuýv. 
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II 
Plato's Interpretation of Parmenides' Monism: 
Parmenides 128a4-b7.132b3-cl 1& Sophist 244b6-e8 
There is evidence in Plato which shows that he attributed two monist theses to his 
Eleatic predecessor. The first one, the more obvious and commonly accepted account, 
simply denies the plurality of things. According to this version of monism, there is only 
one thing. The grounds for claiming that Plato thought Parmenides held such a view can 
be found at Parmenides 128a4-b7: 
a (sc. "Parmenides"72) tEv yäp CV Tot; not7jµaaty `v cprýS divas TO 
näv, xai tiovtiwv tiF-xµ7jpta 7EapEx1 ,I xaX, 
o; Tc xai EA, ) 73 
There is nothing very controversial in maintaining that Plato attributed such a position to 
Parmenides. 74 However, matters become somewhat more complicated when one tries to 
attribute a more radical interpretation of Parmenides to Plato. This second (more radical) 
thesis, for which the first is a necessary condition, goes something like this: In addition 
to maintaining the singularity of the first account, it rules out every kind of conceivable 
internal distinction and differentiation. It is a position that adheres to a strict identity 
thesis, which at most allows for the trivial relation of self-identity. So distinctions, such 
as the one between that which thinks and that which `is' or between different epistemic 
states such as the act of thinking and the mental content or product of that act, the 
thought which is thought, dissolve, with the result that the distinguished items give way 
72 For the sake of clarity, whenever I refer to the Parmenides who appears in the Platonic dialogue by that 
name, I shall use double quotes. Otherwise I am referring to the historical individual, Parmenides the 
Eleatic. Anticipating an objection against my usage of the dramatic personage of "Parmenides" as a means 
of getting at Plato's interpretation of the philosophy of the historical individual Parmenides, let me simply 
say this in my defence. In part I of the Pannenides (the part from which I extract the relevant argument), 
nothing is attributed to "Parmenides" that contradicts the philosophy of the historical individual 
Parmenides, which the character in the dialogue is supposed to represent, perhaps with the exception of 
the last argument (133b4ff. ). For example, it would be difficult to deny that the present quote bears a very 
close resemblance to the philosophy of the historical individual and, more to the point, that this was how 
Plato interpreted his position. For we find the same view expressed in other places, such as Theaetetus 
180e1-4 and 183e3-6. So it would seem to be a legitimate endeavour, within reason, to attempt to extract 
Plato's interpretation of Parmenides' philosophical position from the manner in which Plato portrays the 
latter in his dialogues, especially the dialogue in which he is the central figure. Accordingly, if it can be 
shown that this "Parmenides" puts forth an argument that makes use of certain presuppositions, such as 
the identity thesis of the second version of monism (which I shall come to shortly), we would have 
reasonable grounds for taking such an account to be indicative of how Plato interpreted Parmenides. 
73 128a8-bl. Trans: `You assert in your poem that all is one and for this you advance a very admirable 
proof. ' 
74 Given that the Republic passage on which I want to focus (476d8-480a13) does not question whether or 
not a plurality of things exists (for example, the opinables [8oýavcä]) but just assumes that a plurality 
does exist, I shall not concern myself with this monistic thesis. 
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to this identity thesis. A direct consequence, therefore, of such a strong identity thesis is 
that the distinction is ruled out between the epistemic subject (i. e. that which thinks) and 
its object. (The relevance of this version of monism, i. e. strong monism, to the final 
argument of Book V is readily apparent, as the latter has the objects of cognition as its 
focus. ) Now, that Plato actually attributed such a strong position to Parmenides, can, I 
think, be shown from an analysis of two passages, Parmenides 132b3-c 11 and Sophist 
244b6-e8, taken in tandem. 75 
Beginning with the Parmenides, the relevant passage (132b3-c 11) consists of 
two corresponding arguments (132b6-c8 and 132c9-11) against the hypothesis that the 
forms are thoughts (voi twta), mind-dependent entities existing in our souls (iv 








a, xai ov8aµov a&r4 npoaipgi &ry{yvE Oat ('xik oOt ij Ev 
WvxaIS 
Socrates' motivation for positing this hypothesis is to overcome the regress of the Third 
Man Argument. Now it is essential to bear in mind that the term v oil µa is itself 
ambiguous. It could either mean thought as in the act of thinking, the intellectual 
process, or it could mean thought as in the intellectual or mental content of that act, the 
product or result of the intellectual process. 78 In the first of the two arguments (132b7- 
132c8) put forth by "Parmenides", he takes vöriµa in the latter sense, i. e. as mental or 
75 A point about the chronology of the Platonic dialogues is in order here. One might object that the 
dialogues from which I extrapolate Plato's interpretation of Parmenides' monism are later than the 
Republic and so cannot legitimately be used as examples of what Plato's interpretation of Parmenides 
might have been when writing Republic Book V. In response, I would argue that nothing in the Republic 
or any other dialogue prior to it indicates that Plato interpreted Parmenides in a way different from that of 
the above. Given this lack of evidence, I assume that Plato's interpretation was the same as it appears in 
his later dialogues. Such an assumption is thinner than, say, the assumption which maintains that Plato had 
a different interpretation of Parmenides' monism when writing the Republic than the one which appears in 
the Parmenides and the Sophist. The onus of proving such a shift lies with my opponent. 
76 There is some debate as to whether the second passage quoted below (132c9-11) constitutes a second 
new criticism, the first one running from 132b6 up to 132c8, or 132c9-11 is simply the conclusion to 
which 132b6ff. leads up. I am obviously opting for the first route (i. e. taking 132c9-11 as constituting a 
second new criticism). For this line of interpretation, cf. M. Burnyeat, `Idealism and Greek Philosophy: 
What Descartes saw and Berkeley missed', p. 22 and M. Miller Jr, Plato's Parmenides (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 216, n. 37. Also cf. F. M. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides (London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1939), p. 92. For the view that it does not constitute a second new criticism, see 
R. E. Allen, Plato's Parmenides. Translation and Analysis (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
1983), p. 153. 
77 132b3-5 Trans: `But Parmenides, said Socrates, may it not be that each of these forms is a thought, 
which cannot properly exist anywhere but in souls (or minds). ' 
78 On this ambiguity, cf. F. M. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, p. 92 and H. M. Smyth, Greek Grammar 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), §§ 841.2 and 861.1. 
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intellectual content. 79 It is in virtue of taking thought in this manner, that he, 
"Parmenides", disproves Socrates' claim (or at least so they both think), with the result 
that Socrates is back to his original realist position, a position in which the forms 
enjoyed a mind independent existence. For by saying thought is of some specific 
characteristic or property (µi(xv ttvä i&Eav, 132c4) that is present to a whole range of 
cases, and that this one thing is a form (d&o;, 132c6-7), it is just assumed that such a 
thing must be a non-mental entity. 80 In other words, when the supposed mental content 
(which is needed for Socrates' hypothesis to work) is given this form-like description, it 
ceases to be mental or intentional because only the non-mental can supposedly satisfy 
such a description. The position of "Parmenides" is geared towards showing that there is 
no such thing as exclusively intentional or mental content, at least in a meaningful sense. 
On the present account, mental content, assuming there can be any, requires a mind- 
independent referent. 81 Now, regardless of whether "Parmenides" has disproven 
Socrates' hypothesis and shown that content must be mind independent, vörJµa or 
thought in this argument has been understood in the sense of intellectual content, as 
opposed to the intellectual process or intellectual act. For it is precisely because of this 
usage of vörlµa that the forms are not thoughts. 82 
Having attacked Socrates' claim along the lines that the forms, in order to 
fulfil their role as forms, require a mind independent status, "Parmenides" then offers a 
second argument (132c9-1 1) against taking the forms as thoughts (voi tatia). He 
remarks that if the forms are thoughts, then one is exposed to what prima facie appears 
to be a choice of two absurdities: 
79 cf. M. Miller Jr, Plato's Parmenides, p. 216, n. 37. 
80 Burnyeat speaks of this argument as `remarkable in its swiftness and the brutality of its realism'. M. 
Burnyeat, `Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes saw and Berkeley missed', p. 21. Also cf. 
K. M. Sayre, Plato's Late Ontology: A Riddle Resolved (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 
31. 
81 This is the basis for the distinction between vöiµa and voovµEvov (132c6). The former refers to the 
mental content and the latter to the thing out there in the world which is the referent of that content. Cf. M. 
Miller Jr, Plato's Parmenides, p. 216, n. 37. It would be difficult to use this distinction as evidence that 
Plato is portraying "Parmenides" as someone who is not a strong monist, on the grounds that 
"Parmenides" is prima facie distinguishing between the thinker's mental content and the referent of that 
content. For the context in which this distinction is drawn is one which is intended to show that, if 
anything, the mental content of the thinker cannot be separated from the referent but instead ultimately 
collapses into it, the referent (i. e. the form). 
82 To quote Myles Burnyeat. `Plato is unable to do so [sc. explain the world by reference to the categories 
of thought] because, ..., he cannot see past the idea that thought must be of something independent of 
itself. ' M. Bumyeat, `Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes saw and Berkeley missed', p. 22. 
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Ti 8e 8A; curtly Töv Ilapµtvu&&lv, oüic ävä i c&A a cpinS Twv ci&wv 
pE'r etv Boicci aot & voT pkrwv ExaaTOV divas icai theta voeiv, 71 
83 vrnjµaTa övTa ävärlta ctvat; 
A step-by-step analysis of the argument might look something like this: The forms are 
thoughts (voi taia). Next there are the particulars (ti&XXa) that participate in these 
forms (iwv ci&iýv pziex£tv). The implication of this participation in the forms, in these 
votgatia, is that each one (exaatiov) of the particulars thinks. That is, in virtue of their 
participation, they take on the property of thinking. If not, then the scope of the nävtia in 
tävtia vociv would not be all-inclusive, i. e. would not include both the particulars and 
the forms. Yet the force of the reductio requires such a strong claim. Hence the 
argument requires that the forms are vöriµaia qua `acts of thought' or `intellectual 
processes', 84 with the result that the particulars which participate in these forms, along 
with the forms, think. (This, of course, is to give "Parmenides" the benefit of the doubt 
and assume he is consistent within this second argument and does not derive thinking 
[at(xvtia voEiv] from thought qua product or content of thinking. ) 
Assuming it is unacceptable (at least for Socrates) to embrace a conclusion 
which holds that everything -- including rocks and trees -- thinks (vo£iv), the other 
alternative put forward by "Parmenides" is the contradictory (not contrary) claim which 
holds that there will be some thoughts (voýjµaia), i. e. some acts of thinking, which are 
thoughtless (ävöiiti(X). 85 That is, there will exist some acts of thinking, presumably some 
particulars, which are thoughtless. (Again, it is assumed that "Parmenides" is being 
consistent within this second argument by not altering the meaning of vkµa from `act 
of thinking' in the first disjunct to `product or content of that act' in the second. ) Now 
what it means to say that there will exist some acts of thinking which are thoughtless 
((xivoi, ra) is that there will exist some acts of thinking which are not acts of thinking. 
Because regardless of how one renders ävöiltia (i. e. `thoughtless', `unthought' or 
`unthinkable'), vonga qua an act of thinking is incompatible with all of these 
83 132c9-11 Trans: `And besides, said Parmenides, according to the way in which you assert that other 
things have a share in the forms, must you not hold either that each of those things consists of thoughts, so 
that everything thinks, or else they are thoughts which nevertheless are thoughtless? ' 
84 cf. M. Burnyeat, `Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes saw and Berkeley missed', p. 22-3 
and F. M. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, p. 91. 
85 Also cf. F. M. Cornford, iW., p. 91 and Burnyeat ii., p. 23 for the view that the disjunction comprises 
of two contradictory disjuncts, thereby making it exclusive and exhaustive. 
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meanings. 86 It is for this reason that Cornford speaks of this second disjunct as a 
`contradiction in terms'. 87 Thus what makes this passage (132c9-11) a refutation is that 
the first disjunct is unacceptable, as far as Socrates is concerned, and the second is 
completely unviable given its contradictory nature. And as the disjunction is intended to 
be exclusive and exhaustive, Socrates must choose one of the two options or abandon 
altogether the notion that the forms are voijµaia. 
One of the basic assumptions that "Parmenides" makes which enables this 
argument to go through is that the particulars, by participation in the forms, take on both 
the generic and specific properties of those forms. For that is how "Parmenides" deduces 
the conclusion he does in the first disjunct. To illustrate this, in the case of the form of 
blue, for example, the particular which participates in that form will acquire both the 
generic and specific properties of that form. It will both think and be blue. Now whether 
"Parmenides" is correct to make such an assumption is irrelevant. The issue about 
whether particulars take on both the generic and specific properties of the forms in the 
manner which the argument requires is a problem about the doctrine of participation and 
is of no especial significance when it comes to the issue of strong monism. However, 
having made the assumption that both types of properties are acquired, it is of pivotal 
importance that "Parmenides" be consistent throughout this second argument in his use 
of vörlµa qua an act of thinking. If he is not, he will either not be able to derive with any 
validity the conclusion itävia voEty from belief that the forms are vo'%Laia or he will 
undermine the force of ö vöria in the second disjunct which is supposed to be a 
contradiction in terms, or both of the above. Thus the second argument works as a 
reductio on the condition that vöruµa is rendered throughout as an act of thinking. 
How is this passage, when considered in its entirety (132b3-c 11), indicative 
of strong monism on the part of "Parmenides"`? To begin, what both arguments have in 
common is that they are attacking the same hypothesis, the forms as mind-dependent 
thoughts. Where they differ, however, is in the manner in which they render the term 
vörlµa. In the first argument, "Parmenides" attacks the hypothesis on the grounds that 
S6 Of course. Vüqµa qua 'content of that act' is not incompatible with all of these uses of ävörlta. which 
is alll the more reisen for taking vörlµa qua act of tbinkin`g, otherwise the force of the second disjunct is 
lost. 
S7 See 1-.. M. ('oruford. ii.. P. 02. 
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forms cannot be thoughts qua objects because objects, at least meaningful ones, are 
always mind independent. His realism is `brutal' because intentional or mental objects 
are simply not taken seriously as a viable option. The second argument attacks the 
hypothesis on the grounds that if the forms were acts of thinking, then one would be 
forced to embrace what prima facie appears to be one of two absurdities, nav to vociv or 
voiµaia övia avoiyra. Now there are two ways to account for this shift in meaning 
from the first (132b6-c8) to the second argument (132c9-11) on the part of 
"Parmenides". One could say that he has equivocated over the meaning of vogga and in 
so doing has undermined the strength of what is supposed to be a dual attack upon the 
forms as v of µai a. He should rather have stuck with one of the two meanings 
throughout. Or one could take the line, the one which I am advocating, and say it is not 
so much that "Parmenides"' equivocates and slides between the different meanings of 
vö1µa but rather that, as a strong monist, he does not distinguish between them in the 
first place. Thus the charge of equivocation is of no significance because such a charge 
is only applicable on the presupposition that they, the different meanings, are distinct 
from one another to begin with. 88 "Parmenides" acts exactly as one would expect a 
strong monist to act; he does not distinguish between the thinking and the object of that 
thinking but rather takes them to be identical with one another. To conclude, the 
arguments of 132b3-c 11 are indicative of "Parmenides"' strong monism to the extent 
that we see him establishing a dual refutation based upon an apparent equivocation, but 
the sort of equivocation which a strong monist would make. Thus from the 
"Parmenidean" strong monist point of view, the two arguments are not malaligned. Of 
course, this identity thesis between the different epistemic states is not sufficient in itself 
to show that Plato attributed strong monism to "Parmenides" but it certainly is a start. 
The second passage, Sophist 244b6-244e7, goes somewhat further in 
establishing the claim that Plato attributed a strong monistic thesis to Parmenides. In this 
text, the Stranger and Theaetetus are trying to determine what the Eleatics mean by their 
88 Given this last claim, one might object to placing so much emphasis on consistency in terms of how to 
take vörlµa in the second argument. In response, I would argue that it is one thing to say that different 
meanings are used from one argument to the next and try to infer something from that. It is altogether 
something else to make "Parmenides" equivocate in such a way that the arguments themselves which he 
puts are incoherent and meaningless. For if he were employing both meanings vöriµa in the second 
argument, it would cease to be reductio. 
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one reality (i1,5v, 2441,6-10). In particular they are examining how it, Tö 5v, relates to 
the name or names ("iö 5v" or "Ev") which are used to denote it. 89 The Eleatic 
Stranger's first move is to rule out the existence of a plurality of names. He does so on 
the grounds that there is only one nominatum or referent, tiö öv (243c 10-d2). However, 
the pressing issue is whether or not the monist's principle (tio' 5v) can have a name at all. 
According to the Stranger, there are two possible ways in which the Eleatic principle 
could have a name. Either the name is different from the thing named or it is the same. 
The first option does not really get off the ground because it generates two 
things, the name and its referent (ib öv), thereby contradicting the Eleatic's premise that 
there is only one thing, one reality: 
Ttwetq tic Tovvoµa rob npayµatioq etEpov Svo A yEt nov 'nvE. 90 
The other option, the name and nominatum being the same, breaks down into a further 
disjunction: 
Kai µilv &v 'cav rov ye a&r titOf rovvoga, fl µr18EvöS o'voµa 
ävayicaaOtjaccat XEyEty, ci &ý titvo; a&rö q aEt, avµ(311actat TO' 
ovoµa ovöµatioS ovoµa povov, aAAov SE ouocvoS 0v. 91 
The first disjunct (µr&EVÖS övoµa &vayKao, %aEti(xi keyety) renders the name such that 
it does not denote anything. As a consequence, the name effectively ceases to perform 
its proper function as a name and collapses into the referent or nominaturn, which it was 
supposed to denote. The result of such a collapse is that only -cO öv (i. e. that which is) 
remains, albeit without a distinct name. This first disjunct, therefore, gives way to the 
9 10 strict identity thesis of strong monism. The second disjunct (tiö o'voµa ovöµatio; ovoµ(x 
µövov, "W-t) SE ov8cv0 öv) offers us a name of name and nothing else whatsoever. It 
is no longer a question of denoting a thing which 'is', rb öv. This option too will fall into 
line with strong monism because the name which is denoted by the name, call it name*, 
89 As Plato goes so far as to make an explicit reference to Parmenides (244e2-7), there can be little doubt 
as to whom he has in mind here. 
90 244d3-4. Trans: `But, if he assumes the name is different from the thing, he is speaking of two things 
surely. ' For a similar view in which the name and the nominatum constitute two separate things cf. 
s 430a6ff. Also see M. M. McCabe, Plato's Individuals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1994), pp. 213-5. 
91 24446-9 Trans: `Whereas if he assumes that the name is the same as the thing, either he will have to say 
it is not the name of anything, or if he says it is the name of something, it will follow that the name is 
merely a name of a name and of nothing else whatsoever. ' At this point (244411), according to Cornford, 
the text becomes corrupt. He maintains, I think rightly, that the argument about the name and the 
nominatum, by the time we get to the end of the passage quoted (24446-9), is complete. See F. M. 
Comford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1935), p. 222. 
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does not itself denote anything. Of course, then one must question whether it, name*, is 
a name at all. Assuming it suffers the same fate as the name which did not denote 
anything in the first disjunct, it will cease to be a name. It will collapse into the Eleatic 
principle. And if that happens, the other name which was supposed to denote it will in 
turn cease to denote anything. For the name it was supposed to denote, name*, has fallen 
by the wayside. Presumably, this name will also be subject to the same difficulties, as it 
too has ceased to denote anything at all. In the case of either of these disjuncts, it is clear 
that the Stranger's account of the Eleatic principle is such that it does not allow for any 
internal distinctions or differentiated relations. The name just dissolves into that thing 
for which it is a name. 
The indiscernibility of the nominatum (in this context, co' iv) and its name 
from one another and the indiscernibility, in the Parmenides passage, of being an act of 
thinking and being the content of that act are both consequences of strong monism; 
consequences of a strict identity thesis. However the attacks cut in different directions. 
The Parmenides passage concentrates on different epistemic states of the subject, 
whereas the problem of naming and cO' öv focus on the subject and its object. For names 
are things that epistemic subjects use to denote things which are (iä övti(x). Since the 
account of monism outlined in the Sophist passage rules out internal differentiated 
relations along the subject/object axis -- a view which is further substantiated from the 
Parmenides' passage quoted92 -- it is clear that the epistemic subject's relation to its 
object would suffer the same fate. And as Plato is obviously well versed in Parmenides' 
Poem, it is unlikely that the fact that Parmenides often couples thinking and naming (Fr. 
2.7-8; 8.17 and 8.35-6) would have been lost on him. 93 
What the Parmenides and Sophist passages have shown or at least made 
plausible, is that Plato, regardless of whether he is correct to do so (I think he was), 
attributed a position to Parmenides that does not make allowances for internal divisions 
92 cf. n. 89. 
93 cf. G. E. L. Owen, `Eleatic Questions', p. 17 n. 55. I am following Owen in regarding the collapsing of 
naming and being into one another as extensionally equivalent to that of collapsing thinking and being 
into one another. However, I depart from Owen when it comes to whether or not Parmenides faced the 
question itself of whether the two were identical or not. Owen thinks that Parmenides did not face this 
question and thinks that Plato thought this. I, on the other hand, take the view that Parmenides did not 
avoid the question but answered it. His answer, as I argued in the previous chapter, was the strict identity 
thesis which resulted in strong monism. Moreover, Plato interpreted him as doing so. 
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or distinctions; a position which does not allow for differentiated relata. Thus there is a 
good case for saying that he assigned to Parmenides a version of monism that prohibits 
the distinction between thinking and mental content, name and nominatum and epistemic 
subject and object, which amounts to saying that Plato took Parmenides to be a strong 
monist. Given that this interpretation of Plato, especially that of the Parmenides passage, 
is far from obvious, one can judge its merits best if one views it in tandem with Sections 
III & IV, where both the philosophical position of the final argument of Republic Bk. V 
is spelled out and the exact manner in which it constitutes a response to Parmenides' 
philosophical position. 
III 
Republic Book V 476d8-480a13: 
Plato's Account of the Faculties 
With this interpretation of Parmenides outlined, I want next to turn to the final argument 
of Republic Book V. There Plato gives an account of the formal structure of the 
subject's faculties and how it is these faculties relate to their objects or content. 
The final argument of this book is designed to illustrate the claim that the 
mental or epistemic state of the sight-lovers can only be properly described as opinion 
and not knowledge. The reason for this is that the sight-lovers direct their mental energy 
towards the multifarious instantiations of the forms instead of the forms themselves 
(476c2-6). Given their condition, Socrates takes it upon himself to soothe 
(icap(xµiMcia8at) them and explain why it is that they do not know what they presume 
to know but rather only opine it (476e 1). 94 
In the process of educating the sight-lovers, Socrates sets out what he 
considers to be the constitutive components of a psychological faculty. The account he 
gives is two-fold: There is the effect (äir py4F_a9(xt) of the faculty and the object or 
94 I follow Gosling and Fine in their emphasis of the point that as Socrates is going to explain to the sight- 
lovers why it is that they do not possess knowledge, he cannot legitimately import into the argument any 
of his metaphysical assumptions from the passage prior to 476d8, such as the existence of the forms and 
how they are distinct from the particulars which partake of them. To do so would be futile, since the sight- 
lover is incapable of grasping anything that pertains to the forms. Instead Socrates' task is to demonstrate 
to the sight-lovers in a manner comprehensible to them why it is that they do not possess knowledge. See. 
J. C. Gosling, `A64a and A va t; in Plato's Republic'. Phronesis 13 (1968), p. 120. Also cf. G. Fine. 
`Knowledge and Belief in Republic Book V', Archiv für Gescichte der Philosophie Band 60 (1978), p. 
123. 
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content over which that faculty ranges or stretches (i&ti(xKtai Ent). Generally speaking 
there are two standard interpretations of Socrates' account. Some read it as an object- 
oriented theory, while others cast it in such a way as to limit the account to the subject 
and its mental content. 95 Let us start with the first interpretation, the object-oriented one. 
This is the view that the type of object determines the type of mental state. So, for 
instance, the objects of opinion (5o4aaiä) are such that they only lend themselves to 
opining and to the formation of opinions, while the objects of knowledge are accessible 
to the faculty of knowledge alone. 96 This view is often referred to as the two-world 
theory. A consequence of this object-oriented view is that there can only be opinions 
about sensibles, not forms and only knowledge of the forms and not the sensibles. 
Leaving aside what Plato says elsewhere, the main problem with this interpretation is 
that one is forced to defend a claim which at best is very odd and at worst simply false-97 
For a person could form opinions or beliefs about anything, be it the forms, the Good or 
whatever. One could also have some sort of knowledge about sensible particulars. 98 
The second interpretation gets around this problem by deflating the role of 
the object. On this reading, that over which or to which (iiri) the faculty in question 
pertains is not a mind-independent object but rather the mental content of that faculty 
95 This should not be confused with the long running debate about the status of eivag. For these rival 
interpretations do not divide in the same way as the views on civat do. As for the views on e{vat, there 
are three commonly accepted ways to interpret this term. They are the existential (to exist), the predicative 
(to be so and so) and the veridical (to be true). Cross and Woozley take the existential route, R. C. Cross & 
A. D. Woozley, Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary (London: Macmillian & Co. Ltd., 1964), 
pp. 145-65. Also see M. C. Stokes, `Plato and the Sightlovers of the Republic', Apeirop 25 (1992), pp. 
103-32. For the most part, however, the latter two interpretations, the predicative and veridical, find 
favour today. Proponents of the predicative reading include Julia Annas and Gregory Vlastos, see Julia 
Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Re uý blic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 190ff. and G. Vlastos, 
`Degrees of Reality', pp. 58-75. Gail Fine and J. C. Gosling defend the veridical reading. See G. Fine, 
`Knowledge and Belief in Republic Book V', pp. 121ff. and J. C. Gosling, 'A6 4a and MvvaµtS in Plato's 
Republic', pp. 119-130. For a general discussion of the verb `to be', cf. Charles Kahn, The verb dvat in 
Ancient Greek, and `The Greek Verb "to be" and the Concept of Being', pp. 245-62. Kahn argues that 
Millean distinction between the predicative and existential uses of the verb `to be' is a distinction to which 
the ancients did not adhere. On this point, also see M. Furth, `Elements of Eleatic Ontology', p. 243. 
96 This view is defended by R. C. Cross & A. D. Woozley, Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary 
pp. 170-95, G. Vlastos, `Degrees of Reality', pp. 58-75 and R. E. Allen, `The Argument from Opposites in 
Republic V', p. 165ff. 
97 In Meno 98a and the Theaetetus 201a, Plato speaks of knowledge and opinion with respect to the same 
object. And at Republic 506c and 520c we find claims which explicitly contradict the two-world theory. 
At 506c Socrates claims to have beliefs about the Good and at 520c, it is said that when the philosopher 
re-enters the cave, he will have knowledge of the things down there. 
98 To paraphrase Gail Fine, `this final passage could be made to support a two-world theory but at the cost 
of being a very bad argument'. G. Fine, `Knowledge and Belief in Republic Book V', p. 122. 
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and as such is internal to that faculty. 99 The virtue of this reading is that it avoids the 
difficulty of not being able to have opinions about objects of knowledge, such as the 
forms, or knowledge about sensibles. A possible drawback with this reading is that it 
does not sit well with the two-fold criterion for being a faculty because it undermines the 
force of the Eiti, allowing it to be subsumed by the effect (&nEp'yäýca9at) of the mental 
capacity. 10O 
Before we are in a position to judge whether or not this second interpretation 
places too much emphasis on the epistemic subject, a closer look is needed at Socrates' 
formal account of what a faculty or mental capacity (Suv(x. uS) involves and the means 
by which these capacities are distinguished from one another. To begin, what does 
Socrates have in mind by a SvvaµLS? 
Dilaoµcv Svv&pctg Eivat yevo; it tiwv öv'rcov, aiS Sid xai TiµeIS 
SvvapEOa ä Svva tEOa Kai äXÄo näv ott ncp äv KVMOLt, otov ki'«w 
9 to öynv Kai äxoi1v tiwv &vväµcwv Vivat, Et &pa µavOävEtS ö ßovkoµat 
? kycty To, EtsoS. 
1O1 
According to this passage, these SuvätnnS constitute a class of things (yEvo; ii iwv 
ovuov) in virtue of which we are able to perform our perceptual and cognitive functions 
or activities. To elucidate further what he has in mind, Socrates uses sight and hearing as 
examples (otov X&y(o o9 xViv xai äxoijv). Now, according to some commentators these 
examples are of no significance and should be cast aside. 102 In response, I would argue 
that these examples are, firstly, entirely appropriate for the occasion, given Socrates' 
hypothetical audience, the sight-lovers. These are people who spend their time watching 
and listening to beautiful spectacles. Secondly, these examples have a very significant 
99 cf. G. Fine, ibid., pp. 128-9. Fine, in taking the cni to range over mental content not objects, speaks of 
one who knows as knowing a piece of knowledge and one who believes as believing a belief. Along 
similar fines, Gosling speaks of the objects of the faculties as the `formal object' and Crombie speaks of it 
as an internal cognate. See Gosling `Aö4a and M vagtc in Plato's Republic', p. 123 and I. M. Crombie, 
Examination of Plato's Doctrines (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 58. 
100 Gosling, for example, remarks that the Eni is a slightly more elaborate version than the effect 
(änepygeaOat) but they are essentially saying the same thing. Gosling, p. 124. 
101 477c1-4. Trans: `Shall we say that faculties, powers, abilities are a class of entities by virtue of which 
we and all other things are able to do what we or they are able to do? I mean that sight and hearing, for 
example, are faculties, if so be that you understand the class or type that I am trying to describe. ' 
102 cf. J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic, p. 202 and J. Gosling, `Aö a and M vaµt; in Plato's 
Republic', pp. 123-4. Because Gosling takes &üvaµt; in a very weak sense, i. e. it is not as specialised as 
faculty with a proper object but is simply a power which need not have any object whatsoever, he goes on 
to maintain that sight and hearing are not employed to illustrate what the notion of a &üva uK is. Instead 
they are only thrown out as examples which are then quickly discarded. On Gosling's reading, the 
examples have very little, if any, explanatory force. 
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explanatory role. Seeing and hearing are specific capacities to perform certain types of 
acts in relation to specific sorts of objects, i. e. the capacity to see that which is visible 
and to hear that which is audible. 103 The two do not overlap either in their respective 
functions or with respect to their objects (at least their proper objects). 104 Thus if the 
examples of sight and hearing are granted this rather basic explanatory function, it 
would seem that each 81)vaµuS is to be regarded as a determinate capacity which has a 
certain power with respect to a certain sort of object. 
But, I would argue, the analogy does not stop there. The examples of sight 
and hearing are also very telling with regard to the sort of relationship that the 
psychological capacity and its objects enjoy. For the psychological capacities on the 
sight and hearing analogy naturally lend themselves to a causal interpretation in which 
the object of the faculty acts upon that faculty, say, as colour acts upon one's faculty of 
vision. If it is the case that such a causal schema holds for Socrates, then the present 
account is one in which the epistemic subject and its object have been clearly 
demarcated from one another. For the objects of these capacities, although they might be 
thought or perceived, do not themselves have the capacities or powers which allow them 
to perform such actions, at least not qua thinkable or perceivable object. 105 They as 
objects have the capacity to be perceived but not to perceive. The latter is unique to the 
subject. Hence the Svväµct; in the present context are that class or set of things which 
are constitutive of our 'subjecthood'. 
103 For a discussion of whether Svvaµtg should or should not be strictly translated as faculty cf. Adam 
who thinks that faculty is too technical a term for Svvaµt;, J. Adam, The Republic of Plato, vol. I 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938), p. 339. Also see Gosling, `Ao a and Ovvagig in Plato's 
Republic', p. 124. For my part I think it irrelevant whether one translates Süvagi; as a faculty, capacity or 
power. What is crucial, however, is that each Svvap; be taken as a specific power which ranges over or 
effects (änEpyaýeaOat) a specific class of acts and can only be affected by a certain type of object. 
Bringing this to the surface, I take it, is part of the explanatory force of the examples of sight or hearing. 
104 Of course, one might say the objects of the senses do overlap. Crombie takes this view. Cf. I. 
Crombie, An Examination of 
Plato's Doctrines, pp. 58-9. In response, I would say they do not with 
respect to their proper objects. It must be borne in mind that Socrates' audience is not very philosophically 
adept. So the last thing he wants to do is make some sort of counter-intuitive claim which prima facie is 
very controversial, such as sight or hearing have the same object. The question of common sensibles is 
very much a philosopher's point. For other discussions of the different senses and their proper objects, cf. 
Theaetetus 184aff and De Anima 3.1. For a similar view to mine on this point, cf. M. C. Stokes, `Plato and 
the Sightlovers of the Republic', p. 120. 
105 This final qualification, viz. qua thinkable or perceivable object, is necessary in order to account for 
those instances in which the object perceived coincidentally is itself capable of perceiving, such as another 
percipient being. The manner in which to cope with these objects is to distinguish between them qua 
perceiver and qua perceptible object and stipulate that it can only perceive in its former capacity and only 
be perceived in its latter capacity. 
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On the present interpretation, therefore, the examples that Socrates uses are 
taken very seriously. 106 What remains to be seen, however, is whether or not the 
explanatory force of these examples as outlined is borne out by Socrates' subsequent 
account: 
SvväµýwS S' ciS EKEtvo µövov 3 ito ecp' w Tc C'a'rt xai ö 
äýýpyäýEtiat, uai tiavTin xxäaty a&r v Svvaµty 'K6AEaa, xat tv 
µev EnM ti(P avtic4 TEtiayµEVi1v Kati To a& to aiepyacoµ£viv tv avty 
KaA(O, TIv S& Ent £tEP Mt £TEpov 9 (X7tEpyaýoµ£VAV & fv. 107 
At this point, Gosling's claim that the two sides (i. e. that to which the faculty is related 
[E_' cp' w] and that which it, the faculty, effects or accomplishes [ö äir£p'yäý£iat]) 
essentially amount to the same thing, becomes crucial. 108 A vital piece of evidence for 
Gosling's case that they do amount to the same thing comes at 477b 10ff. There Socrates 
is discussing what knowledge is related to: OüKOUV eitu 1j tii µ£V E7C1 XT ÖVit nECpUKE, 
yvciývat co; Eart co ov. From this passage, Gosling concludes that the object is either just 
a formal one or is simply highlighting a different task, to know that (co; ) that which is is. 
This interpretation might be very compelling as far as 477b 10-11 is concerned but as for 
the present passage, it seems rather ill-suited. For with the account of a Svvaµtg quoted 
above (477c9-d5), the two-fold structure (E-'(p' p and o (xitEp'yäc£tiat) is expressed in such 
a way that it does not lend itself to the sort of collapsing or telescoping which Gosling's 
position entails. Firstly, Plato's use of the tiE Kai expression in the pivotal phrase ecp' w 
tiE EßtiL Kai ö änEpTäý£tiat is standard Greek for expressing two distinct things. 109 It 
emphasises their distinctness. Secondly, the fact that Plato actually bothers to repeat 
both of these phrases (e(p' w and ö äicpyäývcat) together three times within the one 
sentence in which he introduces them also tells against their simply being different ways 
of expressing the same thing. 1 lo Finally, there is the contextual point. Before 477c l 
Socrates had not yet clearly set out what he took to be the relationship between the 
106 cf. n. 102. 
107 477c9-d5 Trans: `But in the case of a faculty I look to one thing only, that to which it is related and 
what it effects, and it is only in this way that I come to call each of them a faculty, and that which is 
related to the same thing and accomplishes the same thing, I call the same faculty, and that to another and 
which effects another, I call another. ' 
108 See n. 100 and cf. J. C. Gosling, `Aöýa and M vajuS in Plato's Republic', pp. 123-5. 
109 cf. J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), pp. 503-11 and H. 
M. Smyth, Greek Grammar ,§ 2974. A nice literary illustration of this use of re Kali can be found in 
Aeschylus' Prometheus, 1.927: to T' äpXc .v Kai To' 
Soi. ? e1 Etv (to rule and to be a slave). 
110 cf. G. Santas, `Hintikka on Knowledge and its Objects in Plato'. Patterns in Plato's Thought, ed. 
J. M. E. Moravcsik (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1973), p. 38. 
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faculty and its content or object. It is only here in 477c9-d5 that we have what Socrates 
considers to be his proper explanation of just how a faculty relates to its relatum. 
Accordingly, as soon as Socrates does make that remark at 477b 10-11, which Gosling 
takes as proof for his interpretation, Socrates interrupts himself in order to introduce 
these distinctions: 
OÜKOUV £7tLQ "" if ," TTjµIj µßv ant Tw Quit nEcpvKE, yviuvat wS EßTt To ov; -- 
µäxkov SE wS' got SoKei ltp&tcpov ävayxaiov Vivat StcxiaOa1.111 
These rather specific textual points aside, there is another and perhaps more 
important advantage in not undermining or circumventing the difference between these 
criterial constituents (i. e. the subject and object of the faculty). Once they are 
distinguished, the relevance of Socrates' choice of sight and hearing as examples 
becomes that much more apparent. For if those examples are taken as a guide, it makes 
perfect sense to take the present expressions (ecp' w and o äncpy4c-T(xt) as highlighting 
two different things: one, the mental capacities' effect, and the other, the object to which 
that effect is related. On this reading, the meaning of o ä1r£p'y6. ctiat consists in the 
manner in which the faculty apprehends its object, while the ecp' w refers to the sort of 
objects which the faculty ranges over, i. e. the sort that are accessible to that type of 
apprehension. Both the manner of apprehension and the object that lends itself to that 
sort or mode of apprehension are required. Thus in order to understand the nature of the 
differences between the various faculties, one must not only grasp what it, the faculty, 
accomplishes or effects -- the mental process of the faculty -- but also that to which the 
faculty is related. It is along these lines that I interpret the meaning of Socrates' remark 
in the passage quoted above (477c9-d5) when he says that he only thinks there is one 
faculty when the effect and its object are of like kind. Yet if the account which Gosling 
advances were correct, Socrates would presumably be misguided in making such a 
claim. On my interpretation, the various faculties can only be properly distinguished by 
making reference both to the nature of their capacity and the mode of accessibility of the 
object. "12 So, for instance, in the case of 864a, a proper understanding of that faculty 
111 477b10-12. Trans: `So is knowledge naturally related to that which is, to know that that which is is? 
But rather before we proceed we must draw the following distinctions. ' 
112 Such a line does not commit me to the existential interpretation since the predicative reading can refer, 
although it need not, to objects distinct from the faculty which may or may not have a mind independent 
existence. 
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requires both what is capable of opining and what is opinable. However, none of this 
entails that the object itself be exclusive to the faculty, only its mode of accessibility, 
thereby avoiding the pitfalls of the two-world account. Only when the subject and object 
are taken together is the definition of the faculty complete. 
The subsequent passage in which the various mental capacities are 
distinguished from one another (477d6-478e5) bears witness to this duality. For Socrates 
in his demarcation of 804(x from intati p. i does not restrict his account to their effects 
(ä1ccpyä4Ea9(xt), i. e. that one faculty is fallible while the other is not (477e6-7). Rather 
this difference of effect can only be properly or fully appreciated if some reference is 
made to the object as also being different: 
'Ecp' EtEpcp äpa Etiepov it Svvaµ. evrl xxatEpa avTwv nccpvxev; 113 
Thus when Socrates does finally distinguish SöEa and intaMpj, both aspects of the 
difference are given equal emphasis: 
'ASvvatiov, Ecp11, Eic 'C& )v ioµoXoyii, tvwv " cincp c'n' &? ) cp 'kXii 
Svvaµt; 1t (pvxev, Svväµct; SC äµcpötcpai eatiov, Söýa Te xai 
c7ttatirjµ11, aT Sc cKaticpa, wS cpaµEV, EK iov'cwv Sid oUK eyxwpci 
yvwßtiöv Kai. 8o4aatiöv tiavtiöv civat. 114 
The same two-fold criterion is also called upon when distinguishing 804a from 
äyvo aia. Socrates does not only distinguish the two qua effect, viz. 504a is sometimes 
false and sometimes true, whereas ignorance is never true, but he also refers to the fact 
that ö So4(4wv does So4ck ctv some thing (e"v ye 'ri), whereas ignorance does not. This 
emphasis on the role of the objects cannot be over-stated in the context of this final 
argument of Bk. V, since the last section of the argument (478e7-480a13) is entirely 
devoted to establishing what it is that qualifies as an object of 804(X. 115 
Assuming the dual criterion reading as outlined is correct, how does this 
position avoid the two-world account and the difficulty which was attributed to that 
position? The difference between the two is that here we have a criterion that is dual not 
two. That is, it does not consist of two completely separate components, but rather of 
113 478a4-5. Trans: `Thus each of them being a different power are naturally related to a different thing'. 
114 478a12-b2 Trans: 'Impossible by our own admission he said. If different faculties are naturally related 
to different objects and both opinion and science are faculties, but each different from the other, as we say 
-- these admissions do not leave place for identity of the knowable and the opinable. ' 115 Socrates himself explicitly marks this division in the text by remarking at 478e7 ToitUwv Bid 
vnoKCtp. EVwv. 
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two components that enjoy an inter-definitional or coextensive relation with one another. 
Yet it does not follow from that claim, that one cannot have beliefs about the Good or 
knowledge of particulars. The shortcoming, however, in only satisfying one side or 
aspect is that it does not constitute knowledge or opinion in the strict definitional sense. 
For the objects in question, when they are inappropriate, do not allow the mental 
capacity to be fully effective because it has not been fully affected. But to say this is not 
to say that the faculty cannot have any relation to an inappropriate object simpliciter. 
Just because a faculty has a proper object, it does not follow that that proper object is all 
that the faculty can relate to. 116 For instance, one could argue that the sensible world is 
knowable to the extent that it participates in the forms. But the faculty of knowledge will 
not be fully effective because it examines as intelligible an object which, strictly 
speaking, is unintelligible. That is, there is an object -- in this case, a particular -- but 
that object is put into a mode of presentation for which it is not best suited, and to that 
extent has a lesser effect on the mental process of the faculty. 
IV 
Plato's Response to Parmenides 
Having discerned a connection between the text of Parmenides and the final argument of 
Bk. V and having given an interpretation of the latter, what does the final argument of 
Bk. V have to say to Parmenides? How does it constitute a response? 
The Bk. V passage attacks the strong monism of Parmenides on two fronts. 
The first front centres around Plato's introduction of a proper tertium quid, the faculty of 
opinion. 117 The axis on which this attack operates is vertical. Plato, unlike his Eleatic 
predecessor, holds that there are three individual faculties which enjoy a hierarchical or 
top to bottom relation. On this basis, Plato illuminates the structure of knowledge by 
drawing on the faculty of opinion, situated in between knowledge and ignorance. In so 
doing, Plato stresses the compatibility of opinion and knowledge and thereby secures a 
place for opinion. 
Plato's second line of attack on Parmenides' strong monism is more radical. 
116 cf. J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic, pp. 210-11. 
117 dis view has already been noted by Vlastos, `Degrees of Reality', p. 66. 
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For it examines what it is to be a faculty or mental capacity. instead of just presupposing 
them. The point of this second criticism is to emphasise the distinction and demarcation 
of the epistemic subject from its object. To appreciate the force of this attack, the 
passage running from 477cl-4 must be recalled, where Plato outlines what it is to he an 
epistemic subject. Keeping in mind that just a few lines earlier Plato introduced his own 
epistemological vocabulary (iuou µrl), abandoning the Parmenidean terminology, he 
now makes a point of announcing that he must set out exactly what he means (ý, ty£ly ) 
by a mental capacity. If one considers this epistemological outline in tandem with the 
strong monism which I argued Plato attributed to Parmenides, it soon becomes apparent 
how Plato is attempting to undermine one of the fundamental -- perhaps the most 
fundamental -- tenets of Parmenides' monism. For Plato is setting out the structure, with 
the help of the sight and hearing analogy, of the epistemic subject in such a way as- 
clearly to differentiate and demarcate it from its object. In other words, he is setting Out 
a structure that prohibits any sort of strict identity thesis between the epistemic subject 
and its object, between that which thinks and that which is. This lack of a strict identity 
between the two sides is then further enhanced by the subsequent passage in which Plato 
emphasises the distinction between the subject's effect and the objects over which it 
ranges. 
Of course, one could claim that Plato's argument requires these distinctions 
and that the introduction of Parmenides and his monism only confuses things. In 
response, I would argue that if one were to allow all of the allusions to Parmenides in 
this closing argument to stand (Section I), it would become very difficult not to interpret 
this epistemological account of Plato as a response to Parmenides, when that account 
goes right to the core of the latter's philosophy, or at least his philosophy as interpreted 
by Plato. Parmenides' strong monism makes the perfect philosophical foil for Plato's 
account. 
To conclude, if we go back to Gosling's original remark. I think it is clear 
both that and why he is wrong. Indeed, Bk. V has much to say to Parmenides. For Plato 
in this argument meets the challenge of Parmenidean monism. He articulates a clear 
account of the epistemological subject and its object, establishing them as coextensive 
relata. Of course, the argument on the surface is there to soothe the sight-lover. But this 
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does not diminish the force of Plato's response to Parmenides. If anything, it enhances 
the argument by adding a wonderful sense of irony to the passages in question, since 
Plato is addressing two audiences who intellectually could not be further apart. 
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III 
Plato's Epistemic Subject 
In Chapter I, it was argued that Parmenides' strong monism rendered the epistemic 
subject and its object indiscernible from one another. The consequences of such a 
position were that nothing could be said either about the intellect or its activity, thinking. 
perhaps with the exception of the following trivial self-identity claim: whatever the 
intellect is, it is what it is. Chapter II, in response to this Parmenidean strict identity 
thesis, established the epistemic subject and its object as coextensive (i. e. differentiated) 
re/ata. For the account of what it is to be a faculty consisted of the activity of that 
faculty, its effect, and the object to which that activity is related; the components were 
discernible from one another. Thus the major achievement of Chapter II was that the 
activity of the epistemic subject, thinking, had been rendered intelligible, because the 
relata had been clearly distinguished and demarcated from one another. However, what 
the account of Republic Book V did not offer was what exactly the epistemic subject 
consists in; what is the epistemic subject per se. Book V focused on the epistemological 
relation which holds between the subject and its object without ever explaining what it is 
to he an e pistemic subject. It might have explained, by analogy, the various functions of 
that subject in relation to its object(s) but until the essential or distinguishing features of 
the epistemic subject itself are outlined, neither is an account of what the intellect is nor 
an account of how it might have itself as an object of thought possible. lls In other 
words, the intellect will remain anomalous, and, consequently, so will an account of 
self-intellection. For there is no point in attempting to offer a theory of self-intellection, 
if one cannot give a proper account of what it is to be a an epistemic subject. Until that is 
done, we will not be in a position to explain how that subject relates to itself as an 
object. Chapter II, therefore, in establishing the epistemic subject and object as 
coextensive relata. although a necessary development on the strict identity thesis of 
WS The statu' criticism could be levelled against the analogies of the Line. Sun and Cave. For the"c 
anak)"Acs 100 presuplxýse the cpikteunic subject and examine it in terms cif what it doc' or how it functions 
in fcl: atn)n to the appropriate sort of Ohject(s). 
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Parmenides, is only the first step. For the sort of relation in which the subject has itself 
as an object is only tenable if the nature of that subject is fully disclosed. 
The text I want now to examine is the Theaetetus. For there Plato does offer 
us an account of what it is to be an epistemic subject and how it is that such a subject 
might relate to itself as an object. The structure of the chapter is as follows: I shall begin 
by examining the Protagorean account of the subject. Once it is clear why such an 
account is untenable, the focus will shift to the Platonic account of what it is to be an 
epistemic subject. Once the nature of the epistemic subject has been disclosed, we shall 
be in a position to evaluate whether and how the intellect, the epistemic subject, can be 
its own object of intellection. 
I 
The Protagorean Subject: Theaetetus 152c 1 if. 
Plato's own account of the epistemic subject stems from his rejection of the Protagorean 
one. So the place to begin is with Protagoras. Once it is clear why Plato rejects the 
Protagorean account, we will be in a strong position to appreciate why Plato's epistemic 
subject takes the form it does. 
When Theaetetus offers his definition of knowledge at 151e2-3, ovx "c o ii 
E9 9 atity Eittatij ui 71 atiaOißnc, Socrates interprets it to be the same thing as Protagoras' 
Measure doctrine (151 e8-152a4). 119 He introduces the notion of `appearances' (tio 
cpaivE69(xt) and equates it with perception (a9ta9Tßt;, 152c 1). 120 The result of such a 
move is that Theaetetus' claim `knowledge is perception' (a'aO atq) is recast as 
`knowledge is that which appears' (tio cpaiv£68(xt) to the perceiver. The perceiver's 
perceptions are to be understood in terms of how things appear `to' and, as a result, are 
`for' him. The way things appear to the perceiver is constitutive of what they are for 
him. As a consequence, the perceiver's perceptions -- as befits knowledge -- are 
incorrigible (6cweu6ES, 152c5-6). Inasmuch as the perceiver perceives things, he is the 
119 cf. John McDowell, Plato's Theaetetus, translated with notes, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), pp. 
120-121 and Michael Frede, `Perception in Plato's Later Dialogues', Essays in Ancient Philosophy 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 5. Given that Socrates refutes both Protagoras and Theaetetus 
separately. I am not implying that the two positions are identical, but only that at this early stage in the 
dialogue, Socrates treats the two as if they were. 
120 cf. David Bostock, Plato's Tbeaetetus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 42. 
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measure of them. 121 The veridicality of the perceiver's perception is guaranteed simply 
in virtue of the perceptual act occurring. 
In order for the Protagorean account of knowledge -- an account which 
maintains that everything is true -- to succeed, the individual's status as a measure must 
be secured. And in order to be a successful measure, that individual's perceptions must 
be both indicative of the way things are and exhaustive of all cognitive possibilities. 122 
Otherwise, the individual measure will be liable to be contradicted either by another 
perceiver or by himself, with the result that he will not be a measure. In short, the 
possibility of contradiction and the Measure doctrine are incompatible. 
Socrates, on behalf of Protagoras, opens with the example of how the wind 
can appear simultaneously cold to one person and not cold to another and yet both of 
their perceptions are veridical. 123 Objects (since they are assumed, e. g. the wind) are 
going to have to be structured in such a way as to be simultaneously `cp' for `x' but `not 
cp' for `y' . 
124 In order to accommodate such a claim, Socrates invokes a Heraclitean 
account of external reality in which no perceptible object has a static or fixed nature per 
se (Ka8' (xbtö) but is always in a state of becoming (äe 8E ytyvEiat): 
'Eyd') Cpw Kai µäi, ' oü cpaviwv %, öyov, cuc &pa E v gev aütiö KaO' abt 
notovo'Uv 'CL, axx, O'ÜSEV E6'LLV, O'ÜS' &v CL npo thtotg opOGJC OWo 
cav wS µcya npoaayopEvjjS, Kat ßµtxpov cpavcttal, Kal eav ßapv, 
Kovcpov, ßvµnavta tie of twS, co; ini6cvoc o'vtio; evoq µni cc titvoq µrltie 
önOtOl)O V"k Se 8 (popäc 'CC Kai KLVT1acc1JS Kai KpäaEWS npOq 
'Xkli? a yt'yvetiat nävtia a, Sij cpaµev etvat, oiK öpOwS 
yvctat. npoaayopeuovtic " cart gev yap ouSEnoT' ov&ev, act Sc yt 125 
121 McDowell spells out the argument in roughly similar terms: (i) If something appears `f' to someone, 
then it is `f' for him (ii) Something's appearing `f to someone is the same thing as his perceiving that 
thing as being 'f' iii) If someone perceives something as being 'r, then it is `f' for him. See John 
McDowell, Plato's Theaetetus, p. 120. 
122 This is essentially a matter of scope, which is to say the Protagorean account, if it is to be successful, 
cannot be limited to perceptual predicates alone. In other words, believing and judging must also be 
included in addition to perceiving. As M. M. McCabe notes, once Protagoras enters the discussion, `the 
way things seem' is no longer exclusively perceptual but is judgmental as well. M. M. McCabe, Plato's 
Individuals, p. 134. On this issue of scope also cf. D. Bostock, Plato's Theaetetus, p. 42, John McDowell, 
Plato's Theaetetus, p. 120 and Myles Burnyeat, The Theaetetus of Plato, translation by M. J. Levett revised 
along with commentary by M. Burnyeat (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990), p. 30. 
123 152blff. On this point cf. Sarah Waterlow, `Protagoras and Inconsistency', Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie Band 59 (1977), p. 32 and David Bostock, Plato's Theaetetus, pp. 43-44. 
124 cf. Myles Burnyeat, `Protagoras and Self-Refutation in Plato's Theaetetus', Philosophical Review 85. 
(1976), p. 182. 
125 152d2-e 1. Trans: `I'll tell you now this is no ordinary theory, I mean the theory that there is nothing 
which in itself is just one thing: nothing which you could rightly call anything or any kind of thing. If you 
call it heavy, it is liable to appear as light and so on with everything, because nothing is anything or any 
kind of thing. What is really true is this: the things of which we naturally say that they `are' are in the 
process of coming to be, as the result of movement and change and blending with one another. We are 
65 
Perception is to be understood as a private affair and that which the perceiver perceives 
must be consistent with this privacy: 126 
Kai Tlgty ovTw gF-Xav re Kai X¬uKÖv Kai &Ttovv a' o xpwµa eK TýS 
npoaI3o, k is TWv 6a twv npo; Tqv npoßliKovaty cpopav cpatvCitat 
YEyEV1uL VOV, Kai ö Sid FKaatOV civai (pap v xpwµa ovTe 'TO 
npoa 3 Aov ovTc Tö rupoa 3aA, A, öµevov EaTat, &? z µctaýv Tt 
EKaaT(p totov y ovo; " 127 
As the beliefs of the `measurer' must be accurate at all times, the notion of appearances 
(, to cpaivca9(xt) takes on a pivotal role, because it enables one's perceptions to be 
indicative of the way things are in such a way as to avoid being contradicted by or 
contradicting the perceptions of another perceiver. 
Moreover, the perceptions/beliefs of a `measure' must also be exhaustive of 
all the cognitive possibilities. Otherwise, `cp' could appear to him in certain way, while 
he simultaneously harbours a contradictory belief about the same `cp'. An example of 
this would be the moon appearing a foot in diameter to someone despite the fact that that 
individual has the belief that it is much larger. Rather, the way things appear to `x' are 
the way things are for Y. What appears to be the case and what actually is the case must 
always coincide for the perceiver, if he is to be a successful measure. To put it another 
way, there is no place for the distinction between being and appearance. Thus as objects 
or the objective world have been assumed from the outset, these objects will have to be 
such as to be fragmented not only synchronically (as above) so as to avoid the beliefs of 
`x' and `y' contradicting one another, but they must also be capable of satisfying all the 
beliefs of `x' diachronically. For what appears to `x' to be the case about `cp' at t 1, t2 and 
so on, actually is the case at t1, t2 and so on. 
Is it still possible for a perceiver to contradict himself? Socrates' initial 
outline (152d2-e 1), when spelled out (153d4ff. ), not only speaks of perceivable objects 
constantly changing but perceiving subjects as well. The perceptual act itself takes place 
when these two fluctuating sides meet. Thus the account as it stands attributes flux both 
to the measurer and to the measured. As a consequence, the epistemic subject is 
wrong when they say they 'are', since nothing ever is, but everything is coming to be. ' Translations are 
based upon the Levert translation. 
126 cf. M. M. McCabe, Plato's Individuals, p. 271. 
127 153e5-154a2. Trans: 'According to this theory, black or white or any other colour will turn out to have 
come into being through the impact of the eye upon the appropriate motion; and what we naturally call a 
particular colour is neither that which impinges nor that which is impinged upon, but something which has 
come into being between the two, and which is private to the individual percipient. ' 
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continually changing: 
Exctg Toi co to püuS, n nox. µäXA, ov ö'ct oüS£ aol aüt ta&rbv & 
Tö µ11SEýE öµot aüTÖv aeairr &tv; ' 28 
It never remains the same from tl to t2 and so never perceives things in the same way at 
different points in time. However, fluctuation of the sort just quoted is by itself 
insufficient to prevent the subject from comparing his perceptions or beliefs with one 
another. The change that Socrates speaks of above does not necessarily rule out second- 
order perceptions or beliefs, i. e. perceptions/beliefs about one's own perception or belief 
about something. 129 And as long as there is room for second-order perceptions/beliefs, 
there is room for self-contradiction. In order to rule out the possibility entirely of one 
being able to contradict oneself, Socrates' account will need to be more radical than the 
one outlined thus far. And so it is when he further initiates Theaetetus into the mysteries 
of this position (156a2ff). 
Now the account speaks of active and passive motions which are nothing in 
and of themselves but when these motions, assuming they are commensurate, come 
together perception occurs (156d3ff. ). At that point one has seeing eyes and tasting 
tongues. But before two commensurate motions collide, there is nothing (157e4-7). The 
seeing eye and the tasting tongue last only as long the perceptual episode lasts. In other 
words, the subject only lasts as long as the perceptual act does. The perceptual subject is 
a series of completely disconnected and autonomous happenings; a series of atomic 
perceptual episodes. As a result, now there is no possibility of having an underlying 
continuous subject which persists through the change and which could compare one 
perceptual act to another. Instead of having a changing subject, we have something 
much more radical, a collection of utterly isolated episodic perceptual subjects. It is a 
subject that is unable to sustain any sort diachronic identity whatsoever: 
Oüxovv &yw to oü&Ev aW ztotie 7evIjaoµat oS'rwc aiaOavogevoS " toi 
yap &? J. ou äý. a, i aiaOiißtic, xai ä, %Aoiov xai ä? ov note! Töv 
128 154a7-8. Trans: `Wouldn't you be much more disposed to hold that it doesn't always appear the same 
to yourself because you never remain the same as yourself? ' 
129 This should not be confused with self-perception. In the case of second-order perceptions (or beliefs) 
its is not the self which is the object or content under consideration. Rather it is the content of the first- 
order perceptions or beliefs that is under consideration. And the second-order perception is just the 
comparing and contrasting of those first-order ones. Cf. M. M. McCabe, Plato's Individuals, p. 271. She 
speaks of second-order perceptions/beliefs as superepisodes, which are distinct from the first-order 
episodes. 
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aioOavop vov " 130 
From such a radical atomised account of the subject, self-contradictions cease to be a 
factor. For there is no underlying subject which could be contradicted by itself or 
anything else. The subject, or rather subjects, is nothing over and above this bundle of 
discrete instantaneous episodes. 131 It has, in effect, become a series of atomised subjects 
which endure but an instant. Thus the epistemic subject is not in a position whereby it 
can compare one perceptual episode with another. For it is entirely devoid of any stable 
focal point, over and above the stream of perceptual episodes, from which to compare 
these episodes. 
Not only does this subject lack any diachronic identity, it also lacks any 
synchronic identity as well. On the present reading, synchronic perceptions would 
require two different subjects; a subject for each perception. 132 The perceiving subject 
is, on this Protagorean account, really an aggregate of many disconnected subjects: 
Sei SE xai xatiä p&poS oviw XiyEty xai ncpi 710XXwv &Opota8Evtwv, w 
Sit &Opoiaµatii ävOpwnov tic tiiBEVtiat xai Mom Kai irxaatov CcPöv tie 
Kai E1SoS 133 
The epistemology of the subject within the confines of this theory is such that it must be 
viewed as a series of different subjects sequentially and, if necessary, contemporane- 
ously. The structure of the subject is entirely episodic, lacking any sort of identity. The 
account as it stands is one in which the individual's status as a measure has been secured 
but in doing so it has become clear that that individual is really a plurality of individuals. 
That is, to be a measure in the Protagorean sense entails being a plurality of measures in 
that each disconnected episode requires a new epistemic subject, and that subject is a 
measure. 
130 159e6-160a1. Trans: 'And I shall never again become percipient of anything else. A perception of 
something else is another perception, and makes another and changed percipient. ' 
131 As Burnyeat notes, at 159d-e it is revealing the way the text switches indifferently between Socrates 
and the tasting tongue as the perceptual subject. To quote, `We may indeed speak of Socrates tasting sweet 
wine but only on the understanding that this Socrates cannot be the subject, just as the wine cannot be the 
object, of any other perception (159e160b). There is no more to this Socrates than his tasting tongue, and 
no more to that than is given by the statement that it is tasting this sweet wine now; ... .'M. Burnyeat, The 
Theaetetus of Plato, p. 55. For a much less radical view cf. John McDowell, Plato's Theaetetus, pp. 152-4. 
For McDowell it is rather that the perceiving subject is differently qualified with each different perception. 
132 cf. Myles Burnyeat, `Plato on the Grammar of Perceiving', Classical Quarterly 26 (1976), pp. 31-2 
and D. Bostock, Plato's Theaetetus, p. 66-7. 
133 157b8-c2. Trans: `And this applies in speaking both of the individual case and of many aggregated 
together -- such an aggregate, I mean, as people call `man' or `stone' or to which they give the names of 
different animals and sorts of things. ' 
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II 
Some Obiections: Theaetetus 163b-165d 
Once Socrates has unpacked Theaetetus' definition of knowledge (160e 6M). he goes on to 
articulate three problems, which, for the purposes of trying to discern the structure of the 
epistemic subject, are very telling: Firstly, should memory, as it does not involve 
perception (at least not directly), be regarded as involving knowledge or not''134 
Secondly, if someone has one eye covered, can we say that he knows and does not know 
in the same way as we would say that he sees and does not sec`? 135 And, finally, can one 
know dimly just as one is said to see dimly when an object is very far off in the 
distance? 136 All three of these issues bring to the surface problems or dilemmas which 
the exclusively single-tiered first-ordered episodic epistemological theory just espoused 
is incapable of accommodating. 137 
The first objection stresses the need for a unified and persistent suh_jcct from 
the diachronic point of view. For the epistemological demands which the memory makes 
are that (i) the subject is able to store the content of his perceptions away and (ii) that 
same subject has the capacity to call this content up and compare it with present sensory 
input or perceptions. Memory and its content require a subject over time which is 
capable of performing second-order perceptions; a subject whose epistemic structure is 
multi-tiered. 138 But if the subject's structure is such that he is nothing over and above a 
series of disconnected perceptual events or episodes, memory will be something which 
this subject is unable to accommodate. For its structure is such that it will neither be able 
to store away the content of its perceptual episodes nor recall that content. 
The second objection highlights another consequence of a completely 
fragmented single-tiered epistemic subject, this time from the synchronic point of view. 
Either one says that each eye constitutes a perceiving subject, in which case, these 
sccing cvcs do not rcicr hack to some unified subject, but instead are themselves the 
subjects, so that the thing in which they inhere by extension is in a sense simultaneously 
1 . 14 1O3(I4-5. 
165b7-c2. 
137 c f. D. Bostock. Plato's 'I'hcaetetus. pp. S'0-80. 
cf. Plats account of memory in which the subject consciously compares one impression 
with another. 191c-196c. 
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seeing and not seeing. And as sense perception constitutes knowledge, this entity or 
individual in which the eyes reside can by extension be said both to know and not to 
know. Or one takes the view that covering one eye does not stop the perceiver from 
seeing. However, the latter interpretation requires some sort of unified perceptual 
consciousness over above the individual eyes and their respective perceptual episodes; a 
perceptual consciousness whose `subjecthood' does not reside at the level of the eyes 
themselves. For if there were a unified subject to which the two eyes referred, that 
subject, regardless of seeing through one or two eyes, would still be said to be seeing. 
Both of these objections highlight the need for some sort of unified 
consciousness which has a persistent identity. The first objection looks at matters from 
the diachronic perspective and the second from the synchronic. The third and final 
objection stresses the need for distinguishing between the purely mechanical side of 
things and some sort of independent consciousness over and above the mechanics of 
perceiving. Otherwise one will have to think of knowledge in terms of degrees. But as 
knowledge was spoken of earlier as something which is incorrigible, it will not admit of 
degrees. 
What all three objections have in common is that they highlight the need for 
there to be some sort of persistent unified epistemic subject which resides on a different 
level from that of the individual senses; a subject to which all the latter refer and whose 
content can be properly reflected upon and assimilated. 139 In other words, we require a 
epistemic subject that is multi-tiered. 
III 
Refutation of Protagoras: Theaetetus 170a-172c 
Socrates' first refutation of Protagoras which runs from 170a-172c is bipartite in 
structure: i) no one, including Protagoras, believes that the Measure doctrine is true, in 
which case the doctrine is true for no one. 140 iia) He believes it but no one else does, in 
139 Again, as discussed above with first and second-order perceptions, the relation between this cognitive 
subject and the various senses to which it relates will not be one of self-perception, since it will be the 
content of the senses and not the senses themselves that is under consideration. 
140 170e7-171a1. 
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which case it is true for fewer people than those for whom it is false. 141 lib) Protagoras 
has to accept as true the opinion of his opponent who does not accept the Measure 
doctrine; Protagoras has to accept as true the opinion that the Measure doctrine is 
false. 142 
It is not necessary for our purposes to give a detailed account of each stage of 
the refutation. What is relevant, however, is the solipsistic position to which Protagoras' 
position leads, resulting, ultimately, in the demise of the coextensive relation between 
the subject and object. The source of Protagoras' undoing rests with his claim that the 
Measure doctrine is a universal truth. 143 That is, he thinks one can consistently make a 
universal and objective claim which states that everything is private. 144 The first part of 
this refutation exploits the fact that Protagoras has universalised his Measure doctrine 
and in so doing has made himself vulnerable to contradictory objective claims, such as 
that no one, not even Protagoras, believes the Measure doctrine. '45 By universalising his 
doctrine, Protagoras is bound to acknowledge the beliefs of others and, as a result, must 
at some stage accept their verdict. 146 The second part of the refutation presents the 
141 171a1-3. 
142 171a6-b2. 
143 168b5-6. Of course, this account is by no means universally accepted. Sarah Waterlow, for example, 
disputes this approach in her paper, `Protagoras and Inconsistency'. She takes the line that the Protagorean 
position is undermined by what she refers to as factual relativism and not logical inconsistency. Waterlow 
argues that it is not because Protagoras agrees with the view of his opponent that he is refuted. She 
maintains that `x' can agree with `y' without accepting the content of the belief held by `y'. Instead her 
argument goes something like this: The truth of one's opinion or perception rests with the simple fact that 
it occurs. It is wrong to think that one is in a position to accept or reject anything. To quote, ` ... ; but that 
those who reject it [sc. Protagoras' theory] can have no reason even to consider accepting it. Protagoras 
rejects nothing that they assert in opposition. He cannot even reject any doubt in his own thoughts, should 
any arise, since that would imply that an appearance might be false. Nor can he hold that his external 
opponents might even be wrong. Thus an opponent confronting Protagoras' position confronts, so to 
speak, a dialectical nothing, offering no resistance. ' S. Waterlow, `Protagoras and Inconsistency', pp. 35- 
6. On Waterlow's account, it would seem that Protagoras is not even offering us a theory. Although I 
follow Burnyeat with respect to logical consistency, at the end of the day I think Waterlow is right with 
respect to the fact that one does end with a dialectical nothing. As I hope to show below, the reason for 
this dialectical nothing results from Protagoras' position ultimately leading to an extreme form of 
solipsism in which even the distinction between subject and objects -- their coextensive relation -- 
disintegrates. 
144 Myles Burnyeat states the problem in the following way: `Isn't there something inherently paradoxical 
about someone asserting or believing that all truth is relative? ' Myles Burnyeat, The Theaetetus of Plato. 
p. 30. 
145 cf. M. Burnyeat, `Protagoras and Self Refutation in Plato's Theaetetus', p. 182. 
146 cf. E. N. Lee, "`Hoist with His Own Petard": Ironic and Comic Elements in Plato's Critique of 
Protagoras', Exegesis and Argument: Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregg Vlastos, edd. 
E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos and R. M. Rorty (Assen: Van Gorcum & Comp. B. V., 1973), pp. 247-49. Lee 
compares Protagoras' account to a chess player who makes a move but refuses to take his hand off the 
piece. thereby both nullifying the move and playing the game. 
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denial of Protagoras' doctrine in a relativised form: It is true `for' Protagoras but not true 
`for' anyone else. However, Protagoras is still vulnerable because the claim `x is true for 
y' does still express a truth, namely, `x is true for y'. Regardless of whether the claim is 
relative or not, as long as it is assumed to be meaningful (as `x is true for y' is) to that 
extent it is objective. 147 And to the extent that it is meaningful, it is public and not 
private property. Protagoras, if he is to be consistent with what he writes, must take on 
board the beliefs of his opponents. 148 
However, is consistency something which even matters to Protagoras and his 
position? At this stage, Protagoras can either embrace the view of his opponents and 
abandon the Measure doctrine or ignore the objective demands of truth and pursue a 
course in which he is cut off not only from the world around him but ultimately also 
from himself. He chooses the latter: 
uai ei aviixa EvievMev ävaic cte pExpt toi (z1' vog, 'RO», 6 OM Eg£ 
tic a&y4ag XTJpovvtia, WS tiö ciKöc, icai ßE öµoÄoyovvta, Kaia& )S äv 
otxottio änorpExwv. a TIµty aväyxrl otµat xpAaOat ¶Ltv awrotg 
onoioi titv£S Ea1EV xai % 149 tä 8oxovvtia ekelt tiavtia Ä yctv. 
There are two issues that this passage brings to the surface as far as Protagoras' position 
is concerned: the type of subject his position affords and the sort of activity of which 
that subject is capable. 
Instead of joining in the argument and addressing what Socrates and 
Theodorus have to say about the Measure doctrine, Protagoras briefly appears as a 
fragmented entity, tosses out some utterances and quickly disappears before Socrates 
can properly address his remarks. We have a head by itself, lacking a body. Protagoras is 
not a whole integrated and unified person or subject. 15° Earlier on we spoke of seeing 
147 To quote John Passmore, `The fundamental criticism of Protagoras can now be put thus: to engage in 
discourse at all he has to assert that something is the case'. John Passmore, Philosophical Reasoning 
(London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1961), p. 61. Burnyeat invokes a similar principle, the principle 
of translation, which runs something like this: `x is true for y' thus `it is true that x is true for y'. Cf. M. 
Burnyeat, `Protagoras and Self Refutation in Plato's Theaetetus', p. 193. 
148 I follow Burnyeat's argument that `true' here means `true for', for the following reasons: a) the 
qualified version from the first refutation onwards has been shown not to be harmless and b) Socrates in 
the midst of the third refutation actually refers to Protagoras' written doctrine. So it would be rather odd if 
Plato did have not the relativised version in mind. See Burnyeat, p. 184. 
149 171d1-5. Trans: `And if he were to stick up his head from below up until his neck just where we are, 
he would in likelihood convict me twenty times of talking nonsense, and show you up too for agreeing 
with me, before he ducked down to rush off again. But we have got to take ourselves as we are, I suppose, 
and go on saying the things which seem to us to be. ' 
150 cf. M. M. McCabe, Plato's Individuals, pp. 276-80. 
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eyes and tasting tongues. Here we have another isolated part, a solitary head. The reason 
for Protagoras' part-like existence is due to the disconnected episodic structure his 
epistemology affords to the subject. The Measure doctrine, if it is still to be adhered to, 
only allows for disconnected parts, disconnected measures. If it were to deal with an 
integrated unified subject, that subject might be able to contradict itself. It might, for 
example, realise that a perception it had at tl is false when compared to a similar one at 
t2, or that one sense might contradict another, such as touch and sight with regard to the 
nature of the surface of a body. In that case, one sense (i. e. one measure) would be 
wrong and would not deserve the title of measure. 
As regards the activity of the Protagorean subject, this brings us back to the 
question raised earlier about whether or not consistency even matters to Protagoras; 
whether Protagoras feels any obligation to respond to Socrates' refutation. Judging by 
the manner in which he pops in and out, the answer would seem to be no. But, again, 
this disregard for consistency of argument stems from the episodic nature of his subject. 
Because his subject is composed of disconnected momentary episodes, that subject 
cannot enter into a discussion or an argument. 151 For to be able to do so presupposes that 
the subject has some sort of persistent identity, which enables it to formulate positions 
and follow them through. But if that subject is different from one instant or stage of the 
argument to the next, then it cannot be contradicted. To put it another way, consistency 
and inconsistency are rendered vacuous in relation to Protagoras' position. Thus the 
answer to the question raised earlier about whether Protagoras cares about consistency is 
an emphatic `no'. 
The episodic nature of Protagoras' position does not simply destroy the 
possibility of his entering into an argument with Socrates; its consequences are much 
more radical than that. His position destroys the very possibility of any sort of 
intelligible language. 152 For if the subject is incapable of lasting but an instant, it will be 
151 cf. S. Waterlow, `Protagoras and Inconsistency', pp. 35-6. Earlier she was quoted as saying that 
Protagoras' opponent, when confronting Protagoras, encounters a dialectical nothing. Agreeing with this, I 
would add that it is in virtue of just that point, that it is irrelevant what Protagoras says or does because he 
is outside theory or debate. Waterlow finishes her article with the following insightful remark: `For there 
is nothing that can lead him [sc. Protagoras] to alter, defend, reconsider or even reaffirm his own opinions, 
since all he encounters is the instantaneous concession of their truth. ' It is in virtue of this intellectual 
paralysis that Protagoras takes the only avenue open, meaningless utterances. 
152 cf. Cratylus 384c9-e4 where Hermogenes puts forward a view about naming which, like that of 
Protagoras' relativism, destroys truth, since the meaning of terms is reduced to the whims of the subject or 
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impossible for that subject to articulate thoughts in an intelligible manner, because to do 
so entails that the subject is able to put together something which has a complex 
intertwined structure, i. e. a judgement. But if the subject is constantly changing in this 
episodic manner, it will be incapable of persisting long enough to formulate a complex 
linguistic entity such as a proposition. At best this subject could blurt out meaningless 
atomic utterances. Consequently, Protagoras cannot enter into a dialogue with Socrates 
or anyone else, including himself. For dialogue, be it with oneself or someone else, 
presupposes the ability to communicate things in an intelligible manner through the 
medium of language to the listener. Thus, if Protagoras' position is allowed to stand, it is 
at the expense of having a coherent epistemic subject. Rather one is left with a subject 
which is cut off both from the world around it and from itself. Protagoras' subject is an 
entity which dissolves into a collection of instances incapable of performing any sort of 
intelligible activity. Ultimately, Protagoras' position is not even solipsistic because it 
does not have any world, be it private or public. It cannot enter into a meaningful 
relation -- such as coextensivity -- with anything. At best, the Protagorean subject is 
identical with itself in the most trivial and vacuous manner imaginable: It is whatever it 
is. In effect, it has ceased to be a subject. 
The final result of this position, ironically like that of Parmenides, is that the 
epistemic subject and its world, i. e. its object, simply collapse into another. As with the 
Parmenidean account both the epistemic subject and thinking are rendered unintelligible 
and vacuous. They do not admit of a coextensive relation with one another. They are 
indistinguishable from one another, so that even the epistemological language of 
`subject' and `object' is inappropriate. As in Chapter I, here too we are left with one 
relation, trivial self-identity; a relation which is not unique to the epistemological 
domain. Thus, just as Parmenides' strong monism acted as the perfect foil to the final 
argument of Republic Bk. V, here the Protagorean position and the demise of the 
epistemic subject act as the perfect foil for Plato's account of the epistemic subject. For 
it is only after exploring the implications of such a position that Plato comes to 




Plato's' Epistemic Subject: Theaetetus 184b-187a 
Having finished with Protagoras and Heraclitus, Socrates next turns his attention to 
Theaetetus' definition (184b-187a). In the process of refuting Theaetetus, Socrates 
articulates the structure of the epistemic subject and its activity. The refutation begins by 
Socrates asking Theaetetus whether or not we perceive through or with our sensory 
powers or organs: 153 
ßK07ECt yap" äitöxptat; iuwtepa op6otcpa, w op LEv 'tovtO Etvat 
oq naA, µoUS, TJ Si' ov opwµcv, xai w aKoüoµEv wra, ij Si' ov 
154 aKovopcv; 
Theaetetus rightly chooses `through' (8tä) over `with' (4). 155 If it were not `through' 
the sensory organs but `with' them that we perceive, we would have a situation 
reminiscent of what we encountered earlier with Protagoras. The structure of the subject 
would be such that it is internally disconnected or fragmented. Each sense would be 
completely isolated from the others, with the result that there would be five different 
perceptual acts occurring within one body that were in no way unified or centrally co- 
ordinated. However, the present account would be an advance over the Protagorean 
position to the extent that the individual sense retained an identity over time, allowing 
for a coextensive relation with their object. '56 Still, the only relation the various senses 
would have to one another is that they happen all to reside in the same body, i. e. in close 
physical proximity. 157 There would not be an epistemological relation between the many 
senses or the senses taken individually in relation to the horse in which they were 
contained. Rather their relation to one another and the wooden horse would be the sort 
of relation one finds in the domain of physics, a plurality of discrete self-identical bodies 
in a physical container. The wooden horse itself, therefore, would not be an epistemic 
153 For a discussion of how Plato slips between talking of organs and powers, see Burnyeat, `Plato on the 
Grammar of Perceiving', p. 41. 
154 184c5-7. Trans: `Think now. Is it more correct to say that the eyes are that with which we see or 
through which we see? Do we hear with the ears or through the ears? ' 
155 184c8-9. 
156 184d1. Burnyeat speaks the of the wooden horse analogy as Protagoras' theory without the flux, see 
Burnyeat, The Theaetetus of Plato, p. 55. 
157 The wooden horse, no doubt an allusion to the Trojan Horse, is a very well chosen image because it is 
not, so to speak, what it appears to be to us, viz. an intrinsically unified entity as opposed to a mere 
conglomeration of autonomous entities. I say an appropriate image because it was not what the Trojans 
thought either, viz. their destruction as opposed a new beginning. 
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subject, it would be a `thing' which contained other `things' : 
Aetvbv 7äp nov, w nai, ci ztoil. A. ai Ttvc ev i1µIv " gap ev Sovpeiotc 
tnnotg aiaO1 acts EyK Ollvtat, ä%, X& µiß tic iiav Ttv& i&Eav, &i'tc 
yrvxnv ELLE Ott Sei na iv, iuxvta TaüTa ai vtetvet, i öta Tovcwv oiov 
opyävwv aiaOavöjcOa 6aa aiaGrirä. 158 
Consequently, the awareness of the perceptual content would occur at the level of the 
senses themselves. There would be no focal point on which to converge. Thus the horse 
itself in which these various senses inhere, as they are not intrinsically connected to that 
horse, would not be aware of the perceptual content of the various senses. The 
`subjecthood' of the perceptions would exist at the level of each of the five senses. So 
the `with' reading falls short because it is still too close to the Protagorean position in 
that it offers us a completely fragmented subject. The identity of each sense over time is 
certainly an improvement on the Protagorean position but not sufficient to enable the 
horse in Plato's analogy to enter into an epistemological relation with the world around 
it, i. e. to be an epistemic subject. 159 
By advancing the `through' interpretation over the `with' reading, Socrates 
paves the way for a perceptual focal point upon which all the senses converge; a focal 
point that stands over the five senses themselves, which can unify and co-ordinate their 
disparate data. As Socrates put it, it would be a very strange or even terrible thing 
(S&tvöv), if there were not one thing, be it the soul or whatever, upon which all the 
senses converged. If this were not the case, it would be impossible to account for the 
unity of our perceptual experience because we would have five different subjects 
inhering in us, each doing its own thing. But as the `through' reading allows for a point 
of convergence, the autonomy of the individual senses is undermined and the beginnings 
of a unified and coherent epistemic subject can be discerned. 160 Our next task therefore 
is to see how this focal point, this subject, stands in relation to the five senses and what 
exactly is its own activity. 
Socrates now turns to the demarcation and limiting of the senses' scope. 
158 184d1-5. Trans: `Yes my son. It would be very a strange thing, I must say, if there were a number of 
senses sitting inside us as if we were Wooden Horses, and there were not some single form, soul or 
whatever one ought to call it, to which all these converge -- something with which, through the senses, as 
if they were instruments, we perceive all that is perceptible. ' 
159 cf. Burnyeat on the question of `subjecthood' with the senses, `Plato on the Grammar of Perceiving', 
p. 38. 
160 Burnyeat refers to this as the first account of a unified consciousness in the history of western 
philosophy. See Burnyeat, `Plato on the Grammar of Perceiving', p. 49. 
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Firstly, he argues that all the things which are perceived through the sense organs belong 
to the body. 161 Secondly, each sense has its own proper object, which is exclusive or 
unique to that sense. Thus one cannot perceive colour through the tongue or sweetness 
through the eye. Given the bodily nature of the objects and the mutual exclusivity of the 
senses, Socrates asks in virtue of what then can someone think (8t(xvofi) something 
which is common to more than one of the senses: 
Ei til apa nEpL aµcpatEpwv SLava'n, ovx av Stia ye tiov thpov 6 P7avov, 
01,5, av SLcc tiov etepov itcpt aµcpotiepwv ato ccvoL' 'äv. 162 
For he takes it to be an empirical fact that the subject is aware of things over and above 
the proper sensory inputs of each sense. The list includes things such as being, non- 
being, self-identity, singularity, plurality, likeness, difference and whatever else might 
be thought of as common to the objects of the various senses. 163 The argument can be 
rendered as follows: i) The various senses can only account for their proper objects, they 
cannot account for things which are common to all the senses; ii) the subject does 
apprehend or is aware of things in addition to the proper sense objects, it is aware of 
these common things, the Koiv(X. Hence these common things must be apprehended by 
the subject in virtue of something over and above the five senses. The bodily processes 
of the five senses are not sufficient to account for all that goes on in sense perception. 
What this means is that the subject must have an additional faculty or capacity unique to 
itself which enables it to apprehend such common things as, for example, being. And 
they, the common things, must be perceived or apprehended by the soul in a different 
manner from that of the physical component of sense perception, since there is no bodily 
component involved: 
'AW µä Aia, c) Ewxpa'reS, E'orye oüK äv Exotµt eiieiv, it) v y' &rt 
got So cI 'r v äpxI'Jv oü8' viva. tiotovtiov ovSEV tiovtiotq öpyavov 
LSLOV W676Ep EKELVOt;, OX avtiil St' a(tijS 11 1 VXI'j T& Ko1Va p. ot 
(QaLVEtat 7[Ept 16avtcoV E7[LaKo7tctv. 
1 
The exact manner of apprehension which is proper to the soul Socrates has already 
161 184e4-6. 
162 185a4-6. Trans: `Then suppose you think something about both; you can't possibly be having a 
perception about both, either through one of these instruments or the other? ' 
163 185c9-dl. 
164 185d7-e2. Trans: `But I couldn't possibly say Socrates. All I can tell you is that it doesn't seem to me 
that for these things there is any special instrument at all, as there are for the others. It seems to me that in 
investigating the common features of everything the soul functions through itself. ' 
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touched on at the outset of his refutation of Theaetetus' definition, viz. thinking 
(Stavof). The significance of all this is that Socrates has now clearly demarcated sense 
perception from thinking. The latter is something the soul carries out by itself (ai St' 
(m)-T%). Thus the complete picture of sense perception involves the bodily processes on 
the one side, the raw sense data, and the soul's activity on the other, i. e. its employment 
of icotvä. By carefully separating the physical component from the mental, Socrates has 
allotted a unique activity to the soul. And given that the soul has its own activity, there is 
no reason why this activity of the soul should be confined to sense perception. Hence 
Socrates goes on to remark that the soul can apprehend things in one of two ways, either 
through bodily powers or through itself: 
itpog Se tiw lc(Xei) Eroiiia6c µE jthX x ßvxvov A, ö'you änaa, Xö. ag, ei 
cpaivctiai ßoi tot pEv ait il Ti SL' (Xi)T% yrvXii entaKoneiv, Tä SE Stiä 
tiwv tioi ßwµatiog 8vväµcwv. 165 
In either case the soul acts upon the content or object before itself. Sense perception can 
no longer be sufficiently explained in terms of bodily processes alone. When the subject 
perceives objects, the common things are employed, such as being: `x is red or sweet'. 
The mind thinks about its content, whether this content is derived through the senses or 
from the soul itself. 
The senses themselves on this reading are completely passive and incapable 
of acting on their objects. They act simply as means of transmission of raw sense 
data. 166 They are in no way judgmental. Once the soul has received these data, it then 
165 185e5-7. Trans: `And besides being handsome you have done me a good turn; you have saved me a 
vast amount of talk if it seems to you that, while the soul considers some things through bodily powers, 
there are others which it considers alone and through itself. ' 
166 For a different interpretation of the senses' role, see J. M. Cooper, `Plato on Sense Perception and 
Knowledge: Theaetetus 184-186', Phronesis 15 (1970). Cooper takes the view that sense perception 
differs from thinking only in degree of complexity. Sense perception is only capable of immediate 
classification, whereas thinking is much more complex. It compares, contrasts and judges. Sense 
perception, on his reading, labels things which involves only a minimal amount of conceptualisation. In 
other words, when the eye sees red it implicitly says that the colour before it is red and not yellow and 
thus utilises such things as memory and comparison (pp. 133-4). Cooper defends his interpretation on the 
grounds that sense perception, as it were, uses the xotva implicitly and does not explicitly say to itself that 
that thing is red. According to him, it is only the explicit discernment which qualifies as 6u voia (pp. 132- 
33). 
However, there are certain problems with Cooper's `labelling' interpretation. Firstly, one must bear in 
mind the course of the journey which has brought us thus far. The problem with aiaOgag prior to the 
icotvä passage was that it was ambiguous whether sense perception was active or passive; whether it was 
intrinsically judgmental or not. Socrates tried to overcome that problem by being very specific about 
whether we perceive `with' or `through' our senses. He stressed the need for precision on this point 
(184c 1-5). The reason for such precision is to avoid any sort of ambiguity about whether sense perception 
strictly speaking is judgmental or not. The sensory powers or organs act simply as a means. Given such a 
limited function, Cooper's interpretation becomes counter-productive, because it blurs the precision which 
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articulates propositions such as `x is' or `x is different from y'. The significance of this 
is not simply that we have an epistemic subject which unifies, differentiates and co- 
ordinates the raw sense data which it receives via the five senses but that the soul's own 
proper activity has been clearly demarcated. Let us now focus on this activity which is 
unique to the soul, the epistemic subject. For once the subject's activity is clearly in 
focus, so too will be the identity and nature of that subject. 
In the case of sense perception, the soul's activity was seen to be the 
employment of the xotvä in relation to the sense data. That is, the soul's activity in that 
context was to co-ordinate the disparate phenomenal data received through the five 
senses and form judgements about those data. But what does the soul do when it is not 
passing judgement on sense data? It would seem, given what Socrates says, that the 
soul's activity, when not making direct judgements about phenomenal objects, consists 
in comparing and contrasting the judgements themselves and making complex 
calculations about them: 
T'iv 89 ye ovaiav icai ötii ior6v iced tiily ývavtit6 rvtia npöS ä&Xi o 
uat tigv ovatav al') tic cvavtitottioq auti i yrvxi cnavtouaa icai 
ßvµ(3ä, %Xovaa np6; a? iA, a xptveiv icctpatat rµiv. 167 
Socrates is after. Cooper wants sense perception to be able to perform `immediate classification'. But 
classification by its very definition is not immediate. So if we are to attribute it to our sensory powers, the 
8ux reading is going to have to be altered to some extent. For one of the functions of this reading was to 
ensure that all classification is done by that part of the soul which thinks. Sense perception never says `this 
is red as opposed to yellow' or even `red not yellow' but just `red', without recourse to memory or 
comparison, implicitly or explicitly. To talk about the senses implicitly comparing and classifying things, 
is another way of saying that the senses are implicitly discursive or rational. But as quoted earlier, 
Socrates explicitly sets out the two scenarios which involve the thinking soul: i) the soul can think things 
by itself or ii) it can think things with the assistance of the sensory powers. In the latter case, which is 
relevant for our purposes, what one has is the coming together of two fundamentally different things. 
But does rejecting Cooper's interpretation on this point necessitate that sense perception is not able to 
make out any differences among its proper objects? Can sight qua sense perception notice the difference 
between red and yellow, or is it thinking that does this? A consequence of perceiving `through' the senses 
is that they act as the perfect medium. As a result, each of the sensory powers is affected differently by 
different objects. Hence different coloured things affect the visual medium, viz. the eye, differently. So, 
there is no need to think that if we reject immediate classification at the level of the sensory powers we are 
left with indistinguishable perceptual masses. That is to say, it is not the case that sight sees an indis- 
tinguishable mass of colours and is saved simply by the classification of the thinking soul. Sense 
perception does not have to reflect on its objects as such to experience the difference. Without falling into 
Cooper's camp one can say yes, sense perception does perceive a red thing and a yellow thing as having 
two different properties but only because they, the two properties, affect it differently. The difficulty with 
Cooper's interpretation is that the notion of `labelling' attributes too active a role to sense perception. On 
the present reading, sense perception is purely passive (cf. Burnyeat, `Plato on the Grammar of 
Perceiving', p. 42, n. 38). Thus Socrates refers to our sensory experiences as affections (naOijµata, 
186c2). However, their affections can only be articulated by the soul for it has access to concepts which 
allow it pass judgement. 
167 186b6-9. Trans: `But as regards their being -- the fact that they are -- their opposition to one another, 
and the being, again, of this opposition, the matter is different. Here the soul itself attempts to reach a 
decision for us by rising to compare them with one another. 
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The latter activity is something which it only masters after a long and arduous 
development: 
rä SE nEpi tioI twv äva%oyißµata npöS 'CC of aiav xai wcQaEtav µönS 
Kai kV xpövcp SLä lEOXAwv npay uzto v xai nai&iaS zrapayiYvcTat ot; 
168 äv Kai ltapaytyvT ycat; 
The subject's activity therefore consists in performing complex judgements about the 
common terms and judgements which it made about sense data: 
'Ev µ"Ev  aPa tioiS nai a6LV OUK £VL £1[L6'Cijµr, £v SE Tw ncpi E'Kiivwv 
ouk oyLßµw " 169 
In other words, its activity is to syllogise (ouUoytago; ) or reason about the judgements 
(perceptual or otherwise) it makes, deducing in turn further conclusions. This, the 
syllogistic activity, is what is unique about the epistemic subject. Only through it, can 
the epistemic subject be properly understood. So, for example, the need for a persistent 
identity becomes obvious when one considers what the syllogistic activity involves: If 
the epistemic subject is to compare and contrast various judgements and arrive at 
intelligent consistent conclusions based upon them, that subject must be able to maintain 
its identity throughout the process. Secondly, this syllogistic nature is also indicative of 
just how complex the subject is. For the epistemic subject, in addition to being a unified 
entity with a continuous identity, is also an interwoven set of complex beliefs. That is, 
the subject is a complex structure of organised beliefs which originates from an 
examination of the judgements which it makes. So only when this syllogising activity is 
taken into account can we get a hold of what the epistemic subject is per se, since that is 
what marks it off from everything else. This capacity is what distinguishes it from the 
world and the objects in that world. Thus it is this notion of syllogising in which the 
identity of the epistemic subject lies. 
168 I86c2_5. Trans: `But calculations regarding their being and their advantageousness come, when they 
do, only as a result of a long and arduous development, involving a good deal of trouble and education. ' 
Given that Socrates qualifies this judgmental process by stating that it is not something which animals and 
infants are capable of but rather it requires a long and arduous education, I think is indicative of the fact 
that Socrates does not have in mind direct perceptions of sense data but rather more removed analysis 
about those judgements. That is, now he is examining the nature of the reasoning process itself. 
169 1 gß_3. Trans: `Then knowledge is to be found not in the affections but in the process of reasoning 
about them. ' 
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V 
Talking to Oneself: Theaetetus 189e-190a 
Having a clear sense of what Plato's epistemic subject looks like, i. e. that part of us that 
judges and syllogises, what sort of relation to itself, if any, does this subject enjoy? Can 
this subject relate to itself qua object? Can, as required by self-intellection, this subject 
be its own object? At 189eff. in the midst of his attempt to explain what false judgement 
is, Socrates offers Theaetetus the following account of how the epistemic subject thinks 
(Stävoua): 
A'oov'ov av'n' o'av 'v`v' &e E ctat it i wv äv a1co NlPS 'nl 11 ýY x1i PX P 1" wS 
yC µiß EiSwS aot äýocpaivoµat. tiovtio Yap got iv&? ctai 
6tavoovµtvi ovu äkko TL ý SLakiycaOai, aüirý Eavirýv epwTwßa icai 
änoxptVOµEVfl, Kat cpaaKovßa Kai ov cpäßuovaa. ötav S& opiaaaa, 
CITE (3pa&ütEpov CYTE xai ö vtiepov Cit aaa, tiö avtiö ý8ri cp'j Kai µiß 
8Latiäý11,60av tiavtirlv titOeµev alkf ;. 'v' EywyE TO' 8o40CýCty 
ý, ¬yety xaA, w Kai. tiiv 6o av ? oyov ctpijµevov, ov µcvtiot npog a ov 
01)8c cpwvýj, äa, X& atyp itpog avtio 170 v" 
The epistemic subject, with the assistance of language, is capable of having a certain sort 
of relation with itself: Xöyov öv a&r? np6; aüty yrvxil. It speaks and syllogises to 
itself about things. Having a Xöyov and syllogising is the manner in which the subject 
digests things. Yet such a relation to oneself, i. e. talking or syllogising, does not account 
for self-intellection, if the latter entails that the subject have itself as an object like any of 
its other objects. For syllogising explains the method by which the subject grasps objects 
but it does not account for how the subject might be its own object. By talking to oneself 
about objects, the subject is not directly and transparently reflected back onto itself as an 
object. Reflexivity is not a property or attribute of the syllogistic act. Thus, there is no 
reason to expect that the epistemic subject would see itself -- at least as a first-order 
object -- in performing its proper function. 
The account of the subject which Plato offers does not accommodate an 
account of self-intellection because it is just that, an account of the subject qua subject. 
170 189e6-190a6. Trans: `A talk which the soul has with itself about the objects under its consideration. 
Of course, I am only telling you my idea in all ignorance; but this is the kind of picture I have of it. It 
seems to me that the soul when it thinks is simply carrying on a discussion in which it asks itself questions 
and answers them itself, affirms and denies. And when it arrives at something definite, either by a gradual 
process or a sudden leap, when it affirms one thing consistently and without divided counsel, we call this 
its judgement. So, in my view, to judge is to make a statement, and a judgement is a statement which is 
not addressed to another person or spoken aloud, but silently addressed to oneself. ' For similar sorts of 
analogies cf. Sophist 264a-b and, perhaps, Philebus 38e-39a. 
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Plato is interested exclusively in setting out what the epistemic subject is and the method 
which it employs in order to understand the objects in the world. Thus he is not 
interested in whether or not the subject itself can be an object like the other objects in the 
world. Setting out the identity conditions which constitute an account of the epistemic 
subject do not require that he do so. He is interested in what it is to be an epistemic 
subject. And as the Theaetetus is a dialogue which never actually offers an account of 
what it is to be an intelligible object, the fact that he does not consider whether or not the 
epistemic subject can be its own object should come as no surprise. Everytimc an 
intelligible object is brought before this subject, that object comes undone, and so the 
dialogue ends in aporia. Nonetheless, this does not negate the fact that the dialogue 
offers a very rich and active account of what it is to be an epistemic subject. 
In Chapter II, 1 argued that Plato has an account of how the epsitemic subject 
and object are related to one another. In the Theaetetus, he gives a clear account of what 
it is to be a subject -- a necessary component for understanding both what the intellect is 
and offering a coherent theory of self-intellection -- but at a price. The side of the object 
has been eclipsed. There is no way to explain how our epistemic subject might qualify as 
an object, which it must if a theory of self-intellection is to be feasible, since the 
Theaetetus does not seem to allow for any objects. Thus this chapter might have taken us 
a step further inasmuch as we have a rich account of what it is to he an epistemic 
subject, but it is an isolated subject. We need an account of the subject which will also 
allow for a coherent account of what it is to be an intelligible object. Without such an 
account, a theory of self-intellection is impossible, since it entails that the subject have 
an object, itself. 
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IV 
Aristotle on the Epistemic Subject's Relation to its Object 
in De Anima 
Thus far we have witnessed the obliteration of the epistemic subject and its object as a 
result of the strict identity thesis of Parmenides' strong monism (Chapter I). the 
reinstatement of the subject and object as distinct and discernible relata which enjoyed a 
coextensive relation (Chapter II), and an account of the subject per se in the Theaetetus 
(Chapter III). Now I want to turn to Aristotle's De Anima, a text which, arguably, is the 
natural successor to the Theactetus. For both texts concentrate on developing the 
structure of the relation between the epistemic subject and its object(s) (De Anima 3.1-2 
and Theaetetus 184b- 187c). Both examine the issue of proper objects and the manner in 
which they relate to the subject. However, unlike the Theaetetus, Aristotle's De Anima 
does present the reader with a positive account of intelligible objects. For the difficulty, 
as it emerged in the last chapter, was that the account of the epistemic subject was such 
that it did not lend itself to explaining how that subject could have a coherent relation to 
objects. Yet a theory of self-intellection, if it is to suffice, requires more than just an 
account o(' the subject alone. It requires both an account of how it is that that subject 
relates to its objects and, more significantly, how it is that the subject can actually be the 
object of such a relation; how it can be its own object. Thus my next step is to examine 
the epistemic subject, this time with a view to seeing how it relates to intelligible 
objects. Only when that relation is disclosed, will it be clear whether and how the 
episternic subject can he its own intelligible object; how it is that vo6; can be its own 
vorliöv. 
To understand the Aristotelian account of voüc, it is necessary to have a clear 
conception of the type of relation vovS' sister faculty, ai68rlatc, has both towards its 
objects and itself. For the faculty of vovc appears, at least J)rinnn facie, to have a 
structure which in many ways mirrors that of aiaýßtlýt Thus it is essential to have a 
171 C. I )e : \uim, t 4)a 15-18 (1 lereafter abbreviated as D -A. 
). Or at least that is the way in which Ari'totle 
ýz 
clear sense of the of sort relation that ai atc enjoys with its objects and whether or 
not, given this relation, any form of self-apprehension or self-perception can be 
attributed to this faculty. Having outlined the aisthetic account, I will then turn to the 
voi S itself and explore the relation it has with its proper objects, the voith, and see 
whether such a relation lends itself to a theory of self-intellection. 
I 
Perception: 
De Anima 3.2 
In D. A. 3.2, Aristotle offers us a very elaborate description of what the perceptual act 
involves. He tells us that the activity of the object, the perceptible, and the subject, the 
perceiver, are one (. t (x), but their essence or being (tiö du(xl. ) is different: 
11 SE tioi aioOiirov evEpyeia Kai TT q aiaOrlatwU f avtiii µßv an Kai 
8, Eivat ou do auto aura ;" 172 µia, 'CO 
But what does it mean to say that their ivepynta is one? Why should we not think of 
there being two actualities? In the case of hearing, for example, we have two things, that 
which makes the noise and that which hears the noise. 173 Aristotle's response is as 
follows: 
ötiav S' Evep'yfi tiö 81)v6 t¬vov äxovEty Kai 1vo pIj tiö Svväµevov 
yrocpEiv, tioTE flxati, cv£pyciav axon aµav ytvEtiat xat 0 xati, EtEpyetav 
yio POS, Gov Etinotev äv titiS do icv eivati äxovßty TO SE yfo pTaiv. 174 
The perceptual F-vepyEta is one numerically because, if one were to count the number of 
activities taking place, there would only be one. The fact that the activity consists of two 
components -- that which it hears and that which makes the noise -- does not make it 
more than one numerically. However, by the same token, simply because there is only 
one activity, it does not follow that that activity does not consist of two components. 
treats them. 
172 425b26-27. Trans: `The activity of the sensible object and that of the percipient sense is one and the 
same activity and yet the distinction between their being remains. ' All Aristotelian texts, unless stated 
otherwise, are taken from the Oxford Classical Texts. Translations of Aristotle are loosely based upon 
Hamlyn's and those contained in McKeon. Aristotle, De Anima: Books II and III translated with 
introduction and notes by D. W. Hamlyn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968) and Aristotle, The Basic Works 
of Aristotle, ed. with introduction by R. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941). 
173 cf. Hamlyn, De Anima: Books II and III, p. 124. 
174 425b29-426a1. Trans: `But when that which can hear is active, and that which can sound is sounding, 
then the actual hearing takes place at the same time as the actual sound, and one might call these, the one 
listening, the other sounding. ' 
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Rather, the account of the Evep'ycta is such that it must refer to both of these 
components. For the EvEP'Eta of the sounding not only entails that there is an object 
which makes a sound but that that sound is heard by that which is capable of hearing 
sounds. Likewise, the act of hearing, if it is to be realised, entails that there is a sound to 
be heard. The sounding and hearing are simultaneous, they coincide with one another; 
hence when the actual sound ceases, so does the actual hearing of that sound. 175 One 
could view the activity of sounding from either the perspective of that which makes the 
sound or from that which hears the sound. 
The road analogy from Physics 3.3 proves insightful for two reasons in this 
context: 
14 
... 01)8' £L TÖ 160L£LV KaL 
thoX£LV TO aÜTO EaTLV, j. tt gEVTOL WTE TOV 
A6'yov £Lvat F'-'va TÖv (To') TL 1WV vat ? yovta, olov C, )S Ax. ntov Kalt 




(i) It illustrates how there could be one thing, i. e. one road, numerically, while (ii) 
emphasising how that one thing has or makes reference to two components, Thebes and 
Athens. On this analogy, there is only one actual road which can be described in either 
of the two ways: i) the road from Thebes to Athens or ii) the road from Athens to 
Thebes. So too in the case of the fully actualised perceptual act, there is only one 
perceptual EvEp'yEia which can be described or understood from different perspectives: 
the perspective of the thing making noise or the perspective of the thing which hears the 
noise. What is crucial is that the EvE'_pyEia, which is one numerically, make some 
reference to the two constituents involved in the activity, in the same way as a full 
description of the road has to make reference to both Athens and Thebes. 
The road analogy, however, is ill-suited for our purposes in this respect. It 
expresses -- forgetting about Athens and Thebes -- the logical relation of coextensivity 
and not a causal relation. For the point of origin and final destination joined by the road 
are coextensively related, they do not act upon one another, one does not affect the 
175 J2A. 426a18. 
176 Physics 202b 11-14. Trans: ` ... even if to act and be acted upon are one and the same, provided they 
are not the same in respect of the account that states their essence (as raiment and dress), but are the same 
in the sense in which the road from Thebes to Athens and the road from Athens to Thebes are the same, ... 
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other. 177 The audible object and perceiving subject of that object, on the other hand, are 
causally related in such a way that one acts upon the other. So the perceiver and the 
object of perception are different in being or essence (to Vivat) in that one side, the 
object making the noise, acts, and the other, the hearer, is affected, i. e. is the patient. 
Aristotle amplifies this notion of patient and agent. Staying with the example 
of hearing and sounding, the audible object has as its essence not only the capacity to 
make a noise but also to be heard. This is the second actuality of the object qua 
sounding. The perceiver on the other hand qua hearer has as its essence not simply the 
capacity to hear, its first actuality, but also actually hearing the audible thing. 178 The 
difference between the two essences as such is that one, the audible thing, in virtue of 
being in a certain state, affects certain things, viz. potential hearers. But it itself is 
incapable of being affected in the same way as the potential hearer. It cannot, under its 
present description, hear. It is sensible, not sensitive. 179 
Given the different sorts of essences in play, one can see why in perception 
the affection is not, as with contrariety (which we shall look at shortly), of a reciprocal 
nature. But does all this entail that the audible object does not undergo any change 
whatsoever when it is heard as opposed to, say, just making a sound which is not heard? 
Yes and no. It does not undergo any qualitative change ((X'X? oia)Gt; ) but it does undergo 
a quasi change in the sense that it is more fully actualised by being heard, as opposed to 
making a sound which is unheard. Thus when it is heard its being (or essence) is fully, 
not partially, realised. 
In contrast to this, the essence of the hearer, in virtue of having a certain 
disposition, is to be affected by audible things. That is, its essence is to be passive. It is 
sensitive and, as a result, has as its essence to undergo a certain type of affection, viz. a 
qualitative change (äX? oiw(y1S). '8° For that is what having a sensitive soul entails. 181 
And in virtue of its passivity, the perceiver is the locus in which the EvEp'yE1a will 
177 Obviously, such a logical relation has nothing to do with Athens and Thebes themselves. They are 
purely coincidental to this coextensive relation. 
178 cf. D. A. 412b18-21. Here Aristotle says that if the soul were an eye, its essence (oüaia) would be 
Slght. 
19 DA. 415b24-25. 
180 DA. 415b24. 
181 p. 415b25. 
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actually occur. 182 Hence it is not essential that the sort of agent with which we are 
dealing be moved when acting on the patient: St' o nc äväy ro Ktvoüv xiv£iaOat. 183 
What is the import of saying perceptibles cause the sense of the perceiver to 
undergo some sort of qualitative change ((X'? ) oiwat; )? The sense receives the sensible 
forms of the perceptibles without the matter: tiwv aia9rltiüuv ci& v ävEU TT I; 
That is, in the perceptual act the perceiver becomes like the perceptible in question qua 
sensible form. So, in the case of sight, the seeing faculty in some way takes on the 
colour of the object (6); KEXpwµäiiai(Xi)igs and so acquires the same sensible form. '86 
The objects of perception therefore, (in virtue of actually having a particular form) 
determine the perceiver's perceptual content, by determining its form. Such an account 
of aia9iv tc, as we have it so far, could therefore justifiably be called object oriented. 
For we are looking at a causal relation which consists of subjects and first-order object 
acting upon those subjects, assimilating the latter to themselves. 
II 
Affection: 
De Generatione et Corruptione 1.7 & De Anima 2.5 
If the perceiving subject is affected by the perceptible object, and if intellection is 
analogous to perception, a few remarks about the Aristotelian account of affection are in 
order. 
According to De Generatione et Corruptione 1.7, any sort of affection (n&Oog 
or do lrä(: rXEty) has as necessary conditions both likeness and difference between that 
182 This is what Hamlyn correctly refers to as Aristotle's general dictum. Hamlyn, Dc Anima: Books II 
and 111, p. 124. I say `correctly refers' because it enunciates a general causal principle of Aristotle's which 
is the mover and the moved are one as far as the number of events are concerned, assuming one is 
counting, and that the event is lodged in the moved and not the mover. This, of course, is crucial for 
Aristotle, otherwise his unmoved mover will be in danger of being moved. 
18312 F- DA. 426a5-6. One must remember that for Aristotle all na(M are ictvT a tg but not vice versa 
184 424a18-19. Also cf. 427a9. 
185 Although it is not directly relevant for my purposes, it must be noted that the manner in which one 
interprets the WS is open to great debate. Richard Sorabji interprets this to mean that the sense organ 
undergoes a literal physiological change, whereas Myles Burnyeat maintains that there is only a quasi 
change. See R. Sorabji, `Body and Soul in Aristotle', Philosophy 49 (1974), 63-89, `Intentionality and 
Physiological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of Sense Perception', Aristotle's De Anima, edd. by M. C. 
Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) pp. 194-255 and M. Burnyeat, `Is an 
Aristotelian philosophy of mind still credible? ', Aristotle's De Anima edd. by M. C. Nussbaum and A. O. 
Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), pp. 15-26. 
186 DA. 425b22. 
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which affects and that which is affected. Generally speaking Aristotle maintains that 
body, by its nature, affects body, colour affects colour and so on with other things of the 
same kind: 
ntcpvxc yap aa gev vnö a tacoq, xvµöc 8' vino, xvµov, xpc)µa 8' 
5. into xpuioµatioc ita etv, ox to; Se TO opoycvE% ; inno Tou ogoycvoi 187 
On the other hand, it is not the case that things which are the same as one another in all 
respects can affect each other. For something cannot become what it already is, since it 
already is what it is. 188 That is, it cannot take on the form, sensible (as we had it in the 
previous section) or otherwise, which it already actually has. 
Now as QC. pertains to the generation and perishability of sensible 
substances (impi 8F yevca&oS Kai (p8op(-XS)189 and is not specifically tailored to the 
epistemological arena, one cannot expect everything that Aristotle says about affection 
to be applicable to perceptual and intellectual affection. So, for example, the structure of 
affection here is one in which things are alike in yevO; but contrary in diöoS and, as a 
result of this contrariety, they act on each other in a reciprocal fashion. 190 Each contrary, 
and this need not only mean the extremes, assimilates its contrary counterpart to 
itself. 191 The hot thing qua agent heats and the cool thing qua agent cools. Yet in 
performing such an act, the agent is affected reciprocally by the patient. For as the cold 
thing cools the hot thing, it itself is warmed and vice versa. 
Despite the fact that Aristotle, in G. C., is looking at the relation between two 
physical bodies within the domain of physics, such a combination, with some 
modification, goes right to the heart of the sort of relation which is required for self- 
intellection. `Likeness' will obviously be too weak a relation but nonetheless, the 
epistemic subject, if it is to be an object which is capable of affecting the subject, it must 
in some sense be both different from and like (or in the context of self-intellection the 
`same' as) the subject. In Aristotelian epistemology, if something is going to affect 
187 Dc Generation et Corruptione 323b32-324a1 (Hereafter abbreviated as fjC. ). Trans: `For it is by 
nature that body is affected by body, flavour by flavour, colour by colour, and so in general what belongs 
to any kind by a member of the same kind. ' The Greek in this passage is taken from the Loeb edition, Qa 
Sophistical Refutation. On Coning-To-Be and Passing-Away. On the Cosmos, translated by E. S. Forster 
and D. J. Furley (London: Loeb Classical Library. William Heinemann Ltd, 1955). 
188 a. 323b21-22. 




something else, there is going to have to be something in common between that which 
affects and that which is affected, and self-intellection is no exception. 192 Now, if the 
epistemic subject and its object are coextensive, they are not contraries, and the subject 
and its object will not affect each other in the reciprocal manner of contraries. 
Otherwise, the agent, the perceived object, would be affected during the perceptual act 
in a reciprocal manner. But it would be absurd to maintain, for example, that in my 
seeing a coloured thing, the coloured thing itself undergoes a similar or analogous sort 
of change by virtue of my seeing it. 193 
However, what does carry over from the domain of physics to the 
epistemological domain is the need for some sort of likeness and difference between 
agent and patient. For without these notions, the epistemic subject's affection could not 
be explained. What is more, saying things are alike in genus but contrary in species is 
not adequate for the present epistemological purposes. Aristotle, appreciating this point, 
makes the following qualification at D. A. 2.5: 
o'l)K con S' &nk6v DÜSE 'CO n('oXEly, (x' ?, X& 'CÖ gc' v (poop(x' Tt; U7[o toi 
Evavtitov, TO S& Barn ipia iaA) ov iov Svväµc. ovtioS wto toi 
EvcceXexctct SvioS, Kai öµoiov ovtiwS wS SüvaµuS Cxet npO; 
194 EvtiEXCXF-tav " 
This qualified account, while satisfying the likeness/difference requirement, can 
accommodate epistemic affection. To speak of something as a certain sort of capacity 
that is capable of being realised by a certain sort of object is conditional upon likeness 
and difference in this sense: The perceiver or thinker -- that which is affected -- is 
potentially like the object of affection and thus is capable of being realised by it but prior 
to this realisation it is still actually unlike that object. However, once it has been 
192 Aristotle cites the example of how whiteness cannot be affected by a line and vice versa, because this 
is an instance in which there is nothing in common. In this discussion, it is assumed that we are speaking 
in terms of non-coincidental affection, QC. 323b24-27. 
193 However, this is not to say that the perceived object does not undergo any change whatsoever. For it 
was seen in the previous section to undergo a quasi change. Similarly, at the end of fLQ. 1.7 Aristotle 
speaks of an agent which, in a chain of affections, is itself unaffected (324a30-34). In this case, the agent, 
at least the initial one, is not reciprocally acted upon in acting because it is not per se or by definition 
embodied in matter (324a35). So, for example, when the art of healing causes or produces health, it itself 
is unaffected, as opposed, say, to the medicine which is used by the doctor; or when the idea of the house 
in the builder causes him to act upon some matter, viz. bricks and wood (324a34-b3). Although avoiding 
reciprocity, the account is inappropriate in that the perceptual agents -- the perceived objects -- are 
embodied by definition. 
194 DA_ 417b2-5. Trans: `Being affected is not a single thing either, it is first a kind of destruction of 
something by its contrary, and second it is rather the preservation of that which is so potentially by that 
which is so actually and is like it in the way that a potentiality may be like an actuality. ' 
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affected, acted upon, then it is actually like that object: 
Tö S' aiaog'rucöv SvväjEt Eatty oiov 'rb aiaNTÖV T'ISn EMTc%i¢, 
KaOänEp EtpIjTat. näaxEt µ¬V oüv ouX to totov 0v, nenovok S' 
(Oµoianat ica! catty oiov c ctvo. 195 
Its determinate capacity has been realised by its proper object. 196 Crucially, however, 
this account does not entail a reciprocal causal relation between the subject and its 
object, for it only refers to the subject undergoing any sort of change. If it were causally 
reciprocal, then we would have to maintain that the object underwent a similar or 
analogous sort of affection in being perceived. Thus the epistemological account of 
perception, and by extension intellection, as we have witnessed thus far would appear to 




De Anima 3.2 
But is the above account of perception sufficient? Does it explain all that is essential to 
the perceptual activity? The opening passage of D. A. 3.2 would appear, on the face of it, 
to indicate otherwise: 
Eý£i 8' aiaOavöµ£9a ötil öpwµ£v xai äxovoµ£v, äväyia ýj tij - It 'n öyr£t 
aiaOäv£aOal ötil öpä, itigpa. äXV Tl av, 1 eßtial tiilS öyr£wS Kai tiov 
vnoK£lµCVOV xpwµatioc. wati£ 1j 90 'rob avýcov eaovtial 1 al (XL)";. 
E'Ct S' £i Kat CtEpa £L1j + 'vf1 ÖlV£W; aloOiia c, fj £t'; anctpov Claw 11 
au'rll 'rt; catal a1)tfl; oat citt TINS 7Cporn 'Cou'ro 7totilccov. Ex£t S' 
äRo pt 197 av " 
195 DA. 418a3-6. Trans: `That which can perceive [sc. the faculty] is, as we have said, potentially such as 
the object of perception already is actually. It is not like the object, then, when it is being affected by it, 
but once it has been affected it becomes like it and is such as it is. ' Another type of affection that Aristotle 
discusses, although not directly relevant to the present discussion, comes with the object of desire, cf. 
DA. 3.10,433a13-19. Also see R. R. K. Sorabji, Matter. Space and Motion (London: Gerald Duckworth & 
Co. Ltd., 1988), p. 223. 
196 1 say proper object because we are talking about determinate capacities. So, for instance, audible 
things qua audible do not and could not have an effect on one's faculty of sight. Cf. Posterior Analvtics 
87b27ff. where Aristotle remarks that it is not possible to think perceptibles nor perceive demonstrations 
or arguments. 
197 DA. 425b12-17. Trans: `Since we perceive that we see and hear, it must either be by sight or by 
another (sc. sense) that one perceives that one sees. But then there will be the same [sc. sense] for sight 
and for colour, viz. the object of sight. So that either there will be two [sc. senses] for the same thing or 
the [sc. sense] must perceive itself. Further, even if the sense which perceives sight were different from 
sight, either there will be an infinite regress or there will be some sense which is aware (or perceives) 
itself; so we had better admit this in the first instance. But this presents a difficulty; ' 
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Judging by this passage, one could argue -- as some have done 198 -- that Aristotle is 
actually interested in giving an account of a `self-consciousness'; an account of 
perception in which the perceiving subject has a concomitant or second-order awareness 
of itself qua perceiving subject, when it perceives an object. Now, if this is the case, then 
the causal account which I have outlined is, at best, only a constitutive part of a full 
account of perception. For it cannot account for the self-consciousness which occurs 
during the perceptual act. Moreover, if, as I have assumed, intellection is analogous in 
structure to perception, then this sort of self-consciousness will have serious 
repercussions for Aristotle's account of how the intellect apprehends itself. Self- 
intellection -- as with self-consciousness in perception -- will consist of an awareness 
which the intellect has of itself when it thinks. Built into all of the intellect's acts will be 
a reflexive component. Self-intellection, in other words, will not be derived from the 
intellect having itself as an intelligible object like any other first-order object. And if that 
is the case, then the sort of theory of self-intellection which I have been trying to 
formulate will be irrelevant when it comes to Aristotelian epistemology. For the mind or 
the intellect can know itself but just not in the manner which I have been discussing. 
Catherine Osborne, however, has shown that Ross' view -- that D. A. 3.2 is 
advancing an account of self-consciousness -- is incorrect and misleading. Aristotle's 
focus in the opening lines of 3.2 is not on self-consciousness but rather the awareness 
that one is seeing as opposed to hearing. Aristotle, in other words, is not offering an 
account of self-consciousness but an account of the discrimination between the different 
senses and their proper objects, along with the awareness which accompanies this 
discriminatory act. Now this is not to deny that there is an awareness; there obviously is. 
But it is the awareness one has that he is seeing as opposed to hearing. 199 Theaetetus 
184bff. suggested there is a focal point upon which all data converge. Here, I think, 
Aristotle is offering us something very similar: a perceptual awareness of the differences 
between the various senses and their objects and not a reflexive awareness of oneself as 
198 Ross, for example, in his commentary tells us that 3.2 is the first articulation of self-consciousness in 
Western philosophy. Aristotle De Anima , edited with Introduction and Commentary by Sir David Ross 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), p. 35. Also cf. Hamlyn, De Anima: Books II and IIL p. 121. 
199 Catherine Osborne, Aristotle, `De Anima 3.2: How do we Perceive that we See and Hear? ', Classical 
Quarterly 33 (1983), p. 407. 
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the perceiving subject. In other words, it is a focal point which is not reflexive but looks 
outwards. 
In order to substantiate these remarks, let me briefly turn to the relevant 
passages, some of which have already been quoted and discussed. Aristotle begins this 
chapter with what he takes to be an empirical fact: ai68avöµc8(x iTt bp&)1EV x(xi 
äKovo Jev. 200 Focusing on sight, he outlines two alternative descriptions of how we 
perceive that we see: We perceive that we see i) either by another sense (&r pa) or ii) by 
sight itself ('r f öyJEt), i. e. the same sense. 201 In both cases, however, sight itself or the 
other sense will perceive sight along with the proper object of sight, the coloured thing 
(TfiS öi oc 1 a1 toi výoic t vOV xpcoµatioc). 202 Both options are problematic. The first 
option seems to be flawed because it is open to a regress, 203 coupled with the fact that 
there will be two senses for the same sense object. 204 The second option, that it is the 
same sense, seems on the face of it to fare somewhat better once Aristotle gets around 
the problem that the second seer need not necessarily see in the same way as the first. 
That is, perception by sight (tif &Vet) can be spoken of in more than one way. 205 Or 
even if it does see in the same way, that may not be an insurmountable problem because 
the original seer is coloured in some way (wc KEXp0)µäi1(yi(Xi, ). 206 So the second option 
-- seeing by the same sense -- can now be subdivided into two different options: We 
perceive that we see iia) by sight but not in the same way as seeing colour or iib) by 
sight in the same way. 
However, both iia and iib have their problems too. Firstly, they entail that 
each sense is not only responsible for perceiving its proper object (TSiov) -- in the case 
of sight, colour or the coloured thing207 -- but also the perception of itself. 208 That is, 
200 DA. 425b12. 
201 D. A. 425bl2-13. 
202 LIA. 425b14-15. Cf. C. Osborne, Aristotle, `De Anima 3.2: How do we Perceive that we See and 
Hear? ', p. 401. 
203 DA. 425b15. 
204 cf. L. A. Kosmau. `Perceiving that we perceive: On the Soul IH. 2', Philosophical Review 84 (1975), p. 
500. 
205 IIA. 425b20-22. 
206 D. A. 425b22-24. 
207 Aristotle discusses the sense of sight in DA. 2.7. 
208 This discussion of proper and common objects reminds one of the Kotvä passage in the Theaetetus, 
especially the account of the De Somno passage (hereafter referred to as De Som. ) quoted below (n. 210) 
in which Aristotle speaks of what each sense can and cannot apprehend. 
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each sense, contrary to what Aristotle said in the previous chapter (D. A. 3.1), would be 
responsible for perceiving more than one thing. 2® He would have to sacrifice the 
straightforward account of special sensibles. 
Secondly, at De Som. (455a 12-21) he says: 
Bitei 8' vnäpxet Ka8' EKäaTiiv alpoll tv TÖ }l£V TL i 8tov, Tö Be Tl 
KOLVOV, t&OV'ICV OtOV Tt O tEt TO OpaV, T7j S' ÖCKO1ý 'CO ÖCKOÜEIV, Kat 
v xi; LLS ä%1%1atS £KÖL6T, q Ka'r& TOV aÜTOV tp0itOV, £6Tt Be, TLC, Kat % KOLVT 
Uv(x 
. 
ÖCKOÄ. O )OOÜaa itÖ uaK, ?ý Kal ÖTt OpF Kai &KOU£t ataO&vETat 
(O-U' Yäp Sid 'q 'y "Vet opä öTt opä, Kai K tVEt Sid Svva'tat KptVEty OTt 
'TEpa Tä 'y? KCa Twv uKG V ovTc 'yEVGEt OSTE olvet MUTE äµcpoty, 
aXM Ttvt Kolvi µopiw r6)v aia&qTqpiwv änävtwv "210 
Now this passage states categorically that it is not by sight that one is aware or perceives 
that one sees. The senses strictly speaking are incapable of such a discriminatory act. 
Instead, there is some common thing (inS Kotyi'l Svv(xµt; ) in virtue of which one is 
aware that he is seeing as opposed to hearing. There is something over and above the 
five senses, which enables the perceiver to discriminate and judge. But is this passage 
relevant to D. A. 3.2? If it is, both iia and iib cannot be put forth as tenable options to 
account for the awareness which the perceiver has during the perceptual act. For they 
explicitly contradict the De Som. passage. Moreover, as the notion of a common sense is 
not unique to De Som. but also occurs towards the end of D. A. 3.2, the grounds for 
using it as a tool to shed light upon the account of perceptual awareness in 3.2 are very 
compelling. So, how should this De Som. passage be used? In short, as Aristotle has 
already dismissed i and the De Som. passage contradicts iia and iib, the best strategy 
would be to interpret the opening section of 3.2 as nothing more than a brief 
introduction, canvassing what initially appear to be the only options available for 
explaining how perceptual awareness occurs. 211 For, as we shall see, once the 
subsequent section (425b26-426b7) is taken into consideration, Aristotle then resolves 
the problem of perceptual awareness (426b8-427a16) in a somewhat different 
209 pes. 425a20. 
210 De Som. 455a13-21. Trans: `Now every sense has both a special function of its own and something 
shared with the rest. The special function, for example, of the visual sense is seeing, that of the auditory, 
hearing, and similarly with each of the others; but there is also a common faculty associated with them all, 
whereby one is conscious that one sees and one hears (for surely it is not by sight that one is aware that 
one sees; and one judges and is capable of judging that sweet is different from white not by taste, nor by 
sight, nor by a combination of the two, but by some part which is common to all the sense organs; ' 
211 C. Osborne, Aristotle. `De Anima 3.2: How do we Perceive that we See and Hear? ', pp. 402-3. 
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manner. 212 
The focus of the next section (425b26-426b7) is the objects of perception and 
their relation to the perceiver. Without rehearsing the arguments of Section I, Aristotle's 
point is that the essence of sight and the essence of visible things are so intertwined that 
one cannot properly discuss one without involving the other. Logically speaking, they 
are coextensive. Causally speaking, the subject's affection of which that subject is aware 
can only be properly understood, if the object, the agent, is also taken into account. Thus 
what this intermediate passage brings into clear focus is that the perceptual act is 
twofold in structure, and if perceptual awareness is an awareness of the perceptual act, 
then that awareness must make reference to or include the perceptible object. So, to say 
one is aware of his perception is to say one is aware of the object perceived. 
Now, if the opening paragraph is recalled, at 425b14 Aristotle includes to 
v7coxcipEvov xpwµa, i. e. the proper object of the visual sense, in his initial discussion of 
the perceptual subject's awareness. 213 It is now apparent why he would do so. 
Perceptual awareness is an awareness of perceptual objects. If Aristotle were simply 
concerned with outlining an account of self-consciousness, i. e. an exclusively self- 
directed awareness, he need only say that one is aware of his faculty of sight as such. 
Under those circumstances, only the subjective side is relevant. There would be no point 
-- as some have been keen to point out214 -- in mentioning the proper object of sight, 
unless, of course, one cannot properly understand what sight is without referring to its 
object. 215 Likewise, Aristotle's original question would probably have taken a different 
form, i. e. how is it that we perceive that we perceive (aia9avoge0a ött 
aiaOavöµc9a)216 and not how we perceive that we see and hear. 
According to Aristotle, therefore, one cannot properly look at the subject 
212 C. Osborne, ibli., p. 406. 
213 DA. 425b14. 
214 On this basis, Hamlyn argues that Aristotle is wrong to mention the proper object of sight in this 
context. He maintains that one can be aware of seeing without seeing anything. Of course, Hamlyn is 
right, assuming Aristotle's interest is to give some kind of account of self-consciousness. See Hamlyn, I 
Anima: Books II and III, p. 121. 
215 cf. R. R. K. Sorabji, 'Aristotle on Demarcating the Five Senses', Philosophical Review 80 (1971), p. 
55. 
216 It is noteworthy that Aristotle never says anywhere in his entire corpus: 'aiaOavöjEBa öTt 
aiaOavöpcOa'. See C. Osborne, Aristotle, 'De Anima 3.2: How do we Perceive that we See and Hear? ', 
p. 406, n. 2,5. 
94 
without immediately addressing the objective side, since the two are causally related, the 
latter acting upon the former. Perception and the subject's perceptual awareness is 
structured in such a way, therefore, that there is no room for a purely inwardly self- 
directed awareness. Accordingly, Aristotle concludes the chapter (426b8-427a16) with a 
discussion which focuses on being aware that one is seeing a coloured thing as opposed 
to tasting a sweet thing. 217 He concludes, in other words, by looking at the awareness 
which is concerned with the discrimination between the various senses and their objects, 
something which the senses themselves are incapable of doing. 218 Does this mean that 
the common thing by which we discriminate seeing from hearing is itself open to an 
infinite regress? That is, does the act of discriminating seeing from hearing necessarily 
imply an awareness of the act? Perhaps, although Aristotle restricts himself to the claim 
that the common faculty is aware merely of the various senses at its disposal, not of 
itself. 
To conclude, Aristotle's account of a'aOrjatq is centred around relations, 
perceiving subjects, perceptible objects, patients and agents. He is interested in how 
objects affect subjects. Now, if intellection's structure is analogous, self-intellection 
will, like perception, be intrinsically bound up with the objects of the intellect. Thus let 
us now address that and related issues of intellection. 
IV 
The Intellect and Intellection: 
De Anima 3.4 
My motivation for discussing aiaOiißtc was to find the insights that it might offer into 
the nature of v ov S and the sort of relation it has with its objects. Thus far, the 
epistemological/psychological account has at its centre a causal relation in which the 
perceiving subject is focused outwards upon the agents which affect it and not upon 
itself. Next at D. A. 3.4 Aristotle initiates his discussion of vovg. 
217 D. A. 426b8-15. 
218 VA. 426b17-22. The transitional movement of this chapter, it could be argued, mirrors the 
'through/with' debate from the icotvä passage in the Theaetetus. For, here too we begin by exploring `with 
the senses' and conclude with `through the senses'. Of course, the crucial difference is that by the time 
Aristotle comes to discuss this question, the proper objects of the various senses are already in place. That 
was the task of D. A. 2.7-11. 
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After a programmatic statement about this chapter and the next (429a10-13). 
Aristotle outlines what would be the case if voiS were like ato$r at1 (429a 15-18). It too 
would have its own proper objects and they would affect it in a analogous manner, i. e. it 
would be receptive of form (SExitxöv SE tiov EiS(M; )219 and, in the process, become like 
them (oRo{o ; EXEty) qua form, since they, both it and its object, have or take on the 
same form: 
SExitxöv Se rob E 6ovS icai Svväµ&L tiotobTov dUM µiß tiovtio, icai 
ogoiwS Excty, cýiancp iö at, olhttxöv npo; Tä aiaOgth, 0-, UT(i) Töv vovv 
npoS va voflta 220 . 
Now the question whether voi S actually enjoys a relationship with its objects which 
mirrors that of ati68 rna is central to my enterprise. For the answer will give us a clear 
idea of how the epistemic subject stands in relation to its objects, which in turn will 
reveal whether or not the subject itself can be its own intelligible object. But, obviously, 
before these questions can be answered, I must sketch out Aristotle's account of voi S. 
The rest of 3.4 can be divided into two parts: i) 429a18-429b22 sets out what 
vou; is, along with some of the characteristics which distinguish it from the perceptive 
faculty and ii) 429b22ff. presents us with two aporiai which the rest of the chapter then 
attempts to solve. 
i) can be further subdivided in the following manner: a) 429a l 8-429b5 b) 
429b5-b9 and c) 429b10-b22. a) focuses on defining what sort of thing voi S is, i. e. 
something which has no relation to the body, and some of the implications of that 
position. Having some notion of what vob; is, b) touches on the sort of relation which 
voi S has with its objects. And, finally, c) discusses the sorts of things voi g has as its 
objects. 
Aristotle's central point in a) (429a18-429b5) is that voi S is something 
which is unique in nature. It is unmixed (äµtrjS). 221 There is nothing alien or foreign 
(äXXöttptov) present to it which would in any way hinder it. 222 From this Aristotle 
concludes that vovS has no nature outside of being a capacity (Suv(xröS), a capacity 
219 DA. 429a15-16. 
220 429a15-18. Trans: '[Sc. It must then be unaffected] but capable of receiving the form, and potentially 
such as it, although not identical with it; and as that which is capable of perceiving is to the objects of 
perception, so must be the intellect similarly to its objects. ' 
221 12A. 429a18. 
222 pes. 429a20. 
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which is nothing actual until it thinks: 
coo , re gq8' airrov Eivat cp atv gilSgµiav äAA' A Tavýv, oTt Suvatoc. 
ö äpa xaA. oI Lcvo; TTiq Wuxi1S voS (""") ov6Cv cacty E'vEPycia Twv 
10 o 223 vticov npty voeiv. 
Why does Aristotle take these claims to be his starting point? There are two reasons, I 
suggest. Firstly, by describing voi S as he does, he distinguishes it from its sister faculty 
in a radical way. Unlike ai6& at;, it is in no way blended with the body. 224 It lacks any 
sort of organ in which an ä? oiwatS of a physical sort can occur. 225 Hence we know 
from the outset of the discussion that we are dealing with something that is separate 
from the other psychological faculties and has a nature that is unique to itself. Secondly, 
the picture of voiS as it now stands, i. e. as something unmixed and devoid of any type of 
nature save being a capacity to think, is what it looks like at its simplest or most basic 
conceptual level. In Aristotelian terms, this is voi S qua first potentiality. It is in virtue of 
such a conceptually simple state, according to Aristotle, that the noetic faculty can think 
all things. For it is not yet any of those things which it could think, whereas if it were 
then it could not think them. 226 
Having distinguished vo^K from ai00ijatc on the grounds that the former has 
no connection with any sort of physical organ, Aristotle offers us an illustration of the 
sort of implication such a difference entails. When the perceptive faculty perceives a 
very intense perceptible (Ex iov a(po pa ab 0tyrov), it is weakened by the encounter 
(429a29-b5). The intellect on the other hand is strengthened by the experience: 
ä?, X 
,'ö V6; 
ötiav tit voiiap a pö6pa vorJtiöv, ovx ijtitiov voEt tiä 
vnoSCEßtiýpa, &), X& xai L&? ov . 227 
Now it is clear that Aristotle does attribute this difference to the fact that one has a 
physical component whereas the other does not: -To' µEv yäp ai 8iititicov oüx &vEv 
223 D. A. 429a21-24. Trans: `Hence it must have no other nature than this, that it is potential. That part of 
the soul, then, called intellect (... ) is actually none of existing things before it thinks. ' 
223 DA. 429a24-25. 
224 DA. 429a24-25. 
225 D. A. 429a27. Cf. Physics 247b1 and 248a5-9. 
226 cf. ". 2.11,424a1ff. In this passage on the sense of touch, we have the perceptual analogue to 
intellectual blind spots. Aristotle argues that because the organ of touch has the näOoq of being to some 
extent hot, cold, hot and soft, it is blind to those particular näOi1, because it cannot become like (since it is 
already like) those degrees of relevant quality. 
227 pes. 429b3-4. Trans: `But when the intellect thinks something especially fit for thought, it thinks 
inferior things not less but rather more. ' 
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a paiog, ö Se xwptaTÖS. 228 So what does this tell us about the noetic faculty? Why does 
not something intensely intelligible destroy or damage the intellect? 
Aristotle began the argument by saying that the intellect is unmixed (dcptA) 
and there is nothing alien or foreign (äX, t pi, ov) to hinder it in any way prior to 
thinking. However, are we to think that, as a result of the intellectual process, the 
intellect does become mixed or meshed together with something foreign? I think the 
answer is no. For if the things which the intellect thinks were foreign and, as a result, 
brought about some sort of mixture in being thought, then there would be an argument 
for saying that the intellect was not strengthened but weakened by the intellectual 
experience or event. For a consequence of the intellectual process on this reading would 
be that the intellect is rendered incapable of being able to think all things. 229 So if we are 
to regard the intellect as being strengthened from thinking its objects, it seems that the 
things which it thinks cannot be viewed as foreign. And if there is nothing foreign 
(aXXötptov), it would be quite natural to infer that in some sense what the intellect 
thinks is itself (perhaps with, say, a difference of disposition and, as a result, intention230 
or definition231). 232 I think, therefore, it would be fair to claim that from a rather early 
stage of his account, Aristotle is interested in how it is that the intellect is its own object 
of thought. But how this can be the case obviously requires much explanation. As yet, it 
is very unclear how something can simultaneously fill both the role of agent and patient. 
Rather, all we have at this stage is that the intellect thinks nothing foreign. Yet, it is 
precisely what it means to say this that the latter part of 3.4 is going to work out, once 
the sort of relation which the intellect and its objects enjoy has been examined. 
228 D. A. 429b4-5. 
229 This is by no means meant to imply that while the intellect is actually thinking some `x', that it can 
think all things during that particular time. However, to say that the intellect can only entertain one 
thought at any one particular time, is not the same as saying that the intellect has or acquired a blind spot. 
230 By `intention' in this context I have the standard sense of `aboutness' in mind. However, I would be 
just as comfortable with `sense' (in the Fregean sense), i. e. one referent with two different senses. The 
classic example being Venus as the evening star and as the morning star. Gottlob Frege, `On Sense and 
Reference', Meaning and Reference, ed. A. W. Moore (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 24. 
231 Definition or definitional, I think picks out the same nuance as intention or sense. Ultimately, these 
terms are translations of Tö ¬tvat in the context of Aristotle saying thinking and thought are one but 
different qua co eivat. Cf. Me"yT 1074b38 (hereafter referred to as Metaph. ) and Physics 202b12- 
13. Also cf. 1111.176 and 249. 
232 Of course, all this implies that there is something alien in the act of perception which weakens the 
perceptive faculty. The sense in which this is true is that if sensible form is too extreme, it causes damage 
to the organ which is a necessary condition for perception to occur successfully. 
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To understand b) (429b5-9), the intellect's relation to its objects, we have to 
keep before ourselves the Aristotelian doctrine of first and second potentiality and 
actuality. This is to be expected for two reasons: firstly, we are working under the 
assumption that the intellect is analogous, at least in some ways, to perception and, 
secondly, we have already seen what the intellect is qua first potentiality. Aristotle's 
thesis here is that the knower (b 1tta µ(Ov)233 is said to be an actual knower when he 
has become (yEVrlti(xt) each of the intelligible objects in question. Intellectual affection, it 
would seem, results in some kind of identity relation, whereby the epistemic subject 
actually becomes the object it thinks. 234 Once the epistemic subject has reached that 
stage, it is able to think these objects through itself (St' al ), Col-)), i. e. without anyone's 
assistance, because by having become them at some point it has acquired a certain 
disposition, a 4t;. 235 When the intellect has this disposition, it is at the level of first 
actuality, since it is in possession of some sort of knowledge (e. g. mathematical 
knowledge) which is part of the intellective soul's furniture. On the other hand when the 
individual is actually exercising his knowledge he is at the level of second actuality. He 
is actually thinking the things which he knows and so actually is them. 
The point of this brief passage is to disclose how the knower, b Eiriatiijµwv, 
stands in relation to the things which it knows. The yEV1i(xi at 429b6, I suggest, is 
indicative of two relations: i) a causal one, for the intellect as a potential knower comes 
to know -- resulting in the acquisition of a specific disposition, a E4t; -- and this occurs 
because its intellectual capacity is acted upon in some way and ii) an identity relation, 
because the knower, by becoming its objects, is in some way identical with those things 
which it knows. Yet the latter claim, prima facie, is problematic, because if the subject is 
233 DA. 429b4-6. It important not to confuse the knower with, say, the thinker. For all knowledge 
presupposes being able to think but it is certainly not the case that thinking presupposes knowledge. 
Thinking is not necessarily knowing but one would certainly say that when he or she is in the act of 
knowing something, they are thinking. 
234 How the act of thinking, and therefore knowing, comes about at all is a question which will be 
addressed in Section V. 
235.429b7. The phrase SL' aVcov appears again at 429b9. I accept Bywater's emendation of the text 
from BE =, m' v. Kahn, I think wrongly, argues that the Bywater emendation is wrong because it is a 
pointless repetition. However, a result of Kahn's interpretation is that suddenly we are talking about the 
intellect being able to think itself. The problem with such a view is that it calls into question the structure 
of the chapter. For one thing self-thinking or self-intellection at most has thus far only been alluded to. But 
more importantly, it would make no sense for Aristotle to want to discuss self-thinking yet, since it is one 
of the aporiai which he himself raises in this very chapter at 429b26. See C. Kahn `Aristotle on Thinking', 
Aristotle's De Anima. edd. M. C. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), n. 29. 
99 
identical with the object, then what happens to it qua subject? How can it remain a 
knower, if it is supposed to be identical with the thing known? For, presumably, the 
identity relation entails that it be the object, i. e. that thing with which it has become 
identical. 
At c) (429b10-429b21) Aristotle takes the proper objects of voiS, the vonth, 
to be separable immaterial essences ('co' ii rev dual) -- the formal principles of things 
both material and abstract236 -- as opposed to the things of which they are the 
essences. 237 Now, Aristotle insists that only inasmuch as these things are immaterial are 
they the objects of vovS: 6.4); äpa wS xwpi6tiä iä zcpäYµaia -rijS SXT1S , oviw xai iä 
ircpt tiöv vovv. 238 There are, I think, two reasons for this. Firstly, we are working under 
the assumption that the intellectual faculty is analogous to the perceptive one, so it is 
only fitting that it too have proper objects which are capable of affecting it: 
EL 811 Cm 'CO vociv (ba16Ep 'CO aia avca al, Tj it&a) clv 'LL av ELTT {nth 
'LOÜ VOTi' au 1 'CL 'COLOR COV £'CEpOV. 
239 
That is, they are going to have to be intelligible or thinkable, and this, according to 
Aristotle, entails immateriality: 
Ivviv ti ti 
E v se, tioig Exovßty &S? v Svvaµct Exaatiov Catit tiwv voiiiwv. wac, 
F-ieivotg µev ovx vtäpýct vob; (ävco y&p SAxr Svvaµtg ö vob; rö v 
'totovtiwv), Eucivcp SE do vorjtiov `napýct. 240 
Both the subject and object are essentially alike in that they are both immaterial. The 
second reason, which is really a corollary to the first, is that because knowledge entails 
the knower actually becoming the thing known and not just, say, assimilated to it, 
presumably those objects cannot be embodied. 241 For if they were, it is hard to imagine 
how one could ever know anything, if knowing requires becoming the thing known. 
236 cf. Jonathan Lear, Aristotle: the desire to understand (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 
121-2. 
237 Also cf. DA. 417b22-23 where Aristotle talks of individuals ('Kuaa ta) as the objects of perception 
and universals (tiwv uaOöiwv) vob;. Of course, this also what the Posterior Analytics, tells us, cf. 8lblff., 
86a30,87b30ff., 88b30ff. and 100a4-b5. Also cf. Topics 105a13-14. 
238 DA. 429b21-22. 
239 429a13-15. Trans: `Now, if thinking is akin to perceiving, it would be either being affected in 
some way by the object of thought or something else of this kind. ' 
240 D. A. 430a6-9. Trans: `In those things which have matter each of the objects of thought is present 
potentially. Hence they will not have the intellect in them (for intellect is a potentiality for being such 
things without their matter), while it will have what can be thought in it. ' 
241 In this sense knowing something and perceiving are disanalogous. For the perceptual process does not 
entail the perceiving subject becoming identical with the thing perceived but rather like it. For a detailed 
discussion of the difference between becoming like and identical, see R. Sorabji, `Intentionality and 
Physiological Processes: Aristotle's Theory of Sense Perception', pp. 211-13. 
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Upon concluding his initial outline of the intellect at 429b22ff., Aristotle 
raises two aporiai: i) If thinking is a passive affection, how can voI S be something 
änkoi v and äUa9ES? ii) Is voi S itself a voiiöv? 242 The reason for Aristotle raising 
these aporiai is because the account of the intellect offered thus far is at best a cursory 
sketch. To say that the intellect is äµtß jS is not going to suffice as a proper account of 
the intellect. It might serve as a first step in drawing the general boundaries between 
vol); and the other faculties but it does no more than that. It does not, for instance, 
specify or differentiate between the different levels of actuality and potentiality which 
both the faculty and its objects are capable of realising; nor does it make clear what it 
means for voi S to become its objects. 243 For there are two different relations at work 
here. There is the causal one in which the intellect is affected by its objects and the 
identity claim which maintains that the intellect is identical with its objects. Exactly how 
both of these relations can coexist within the intellect is in need of some explanation. 
The task of the aporiai, therefore, is to specify clearly and fully just how the intellectual 
process operates with respect to the way in which the epistemic subject and its objects 
relate to one another, and in what sense is the former to be thought of as identical with 
the latter. 2' Only when the exact nature of their relationship has been disclosed, will the 
essential nature of the intellect be understood. 
First aporia: 
änopiia£L£ S' äv tins, et o voüS altA, ovv eßtii Kai änauES Kai µrl6£vi 
µ, q6£v £x£L Kotvov, wß7t£i gilc; iV Ava ayopaS, x&g voga£L, £t do 
VOEIV 7taax£LV 'n catty (n yap tit xotVOV aµ(poiv 1) apx£L, do µ£v 
7LOL£1V SOx£l to SE itaa £LV) , ... 
245 
242 DA. 429b22-26. 
243 Apart from the explicit reference to Anaxagoras in this chapter (429a19; 429b24), also cf. J. 
405b19-21. This in effect is what Socrates accuses Anaxagoras of in the phaedQ, see Phaedo 97b9-99d2. 
244 Richard Sorabji has suggested to me in conversation that the two terms (änaovv and änaOES) of the 
first aporiai refer to v6; prior to it thinking. I disagree with this interpretation for structural reasons. 
Namely, I think the structure of 3.4 much better served if the first aporiai is taken to refer to the actual 
intellectual process itself. My reasons are as follows: Firstly, by the time we get to the aporia, Aristotle 
has already outlined all the components involved in the intellectual process, so it would seem odd at that 
point to raise a problem that did not involve them and the process of which they are but rather to go back 
and examine the intellect qua first potentiality. Secondly, I think the two aporiai hang together much 
better if the first one is concentrating on problems that arise from that process and the second one then 
explores what follows from such a process. Moreover, on Sorabji's interpretation one must take ä71Aoi v 
and &gtYliS to denote the same attribute, which I think is also problematic. See n. 247. And finally, given 
the nuances that two aporiai bring out on my interpretation, I think they lead into the tablet analogy much 
better than they would otherwise. 
245 D. A. A429b22-26. Trans: `Given that the intellect is something simple and unaffected, and that it has 
nothing in common with anything else, as Anaxagoras says, someone might raise these questions: how 
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i) Is the intellect something simple? ii) Is the intellect something impassive? Aristotle 
answers both questions, characteristically, with an affirmative that is qualified. 246 
Taking these questions in order, unlike äµty 1q, ankobv refers to the internal structure of 
the intellect. 247 This attribute picks out the need for the intellect's internal distinctions to 
be drawn properly. For axkovv in its strongest possible and unqualified sense, i. e. 
&ic2 ovv simpliciter, would entail that the intellect has only one internal state, whatever it 
may be. But, as is already obvious from what has been said, this is not the case. Yet the 
intellect at the level of first potentiality is certainly &nA ovv. It is nothing but a capacity 
to think. However, such a claim does not prohibit the intellect being able to realise other 
internal states or levels of actuality, such as acquiring a E4iS or actively thinking some 
intelligible object. In other words, the intellect is not simply something äiXovv. The 
intellect, after all, is not reducible to any one particular level or state. If it were, then the 
entire potentiality/actuality schema would cease to be a tenable account of the intellect's 
internal structure. Finally, the intellect must be distinguished from what it thinks. So, 
while being able to become the voith, it is not identical with those objects simpliciter. If 
it were, a consequence of such a thesis would be that each of the voiiä can themselves 
vocIv. 248 Again its internal structure would be rendered untenable and it would be 
something äiXovv simpliciter. Although the identity relation between the epistemic 
subject and object is crucial, the causal relation is as well. Thus certain distinctions 
between thinking and being thought must be retained. That Aristotle was sensitive to the 
need for this distinction is clear from elsewhere: ovöE yäp ia&th to civat voijßE i Kai 
voovgcvw. 249 Thus the question whether intellect is something simple demands that we 
make the necessary logical distinctions to accommodate the intellect's internal structure 
in such a way that various states can be realised with respect to itself and the objects it 
thinks. Thus vovS is ä7c, %ovv but not &it? ovv simpliciter. 
will it think, if thinking is being affected in some way (for it is insofar as two things have something in 
common that the one is thought to act and the other to be affected), ... 246 Aristotle actually mentions three if you include µq9Ev . µý9Ev Xet Kotvov. However, that is just a 
reiteration of the intellect being unmixed. It is the äxArovv Kcal änaNg with which he is now concerned, 
because it is through answering them that the intellectual process will be understood. 
247 äµty is does not refer to the internal structure of the intellect but rather the intellect's relation to the 
body and how it is not a composite. Unlike particulars, it is not a tö & ev Tc SE, see J. 429b 14. 
248 cf. the discussion of Plato's P 132c9-11 in Chapter II. 
249 MeLoh. 1074b38. 
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ii) Why might the intellect be something äna9ES? Unlike the previous 
attribute which emphasised certain logical distinctions which are necessary for the 
internal structure of the intellect, äiraOc brings out the causal dimension. Intellect is not 
the sort of thing which can be affected by anything. For instance, qua intellect, it cannot 
be affected by sensible properties, i. e. the sensible form, of sensible objects. Thus there 
is some sense in which the intellect is something äita9E-'S. The intellect at the level of 
first potentiality is not just any sort of capacity but a capacity to think that which is 
intelligible as opposed, say, a capacity to perceive. It is only receptive of intelligible 
form. 250 Thus the intellect can become anything as long as it is anything intelligible. On 
the other hand, if it were something &=9E; pure and simple, then we would either have 
to maintain that we are not capable of thinking or that we are always thinking. For this 
view entails that the state of v01); is unaffectable and, as a result, can only be understood 
as having one particular unchanging state, be it thinking or not thinking. 251 Hence the 
intellect is something which is both impassive and passive. 252 
So how has the discussion of äirXovv and äita9ES advanced the argument? 
The first of the two attributes emphasised the need for certain logical distinctions within 
the intellect's structure. The second brought to the fore the causal relation between the 
epistemic subject and its object and, with it, the identity relation that holds between 
them. The intellect can be affected by its proper objects because it is same as them 
potentially. Yet prior to being affected by them, the intellect is different because it is 
only potentially the intelligibles: 
'j t JEV tcäo £iv Ka'tä icolvöv U &fjpiitiat itpöti£pov, 6n Svväµ£t 71c; 
Eatiti'ca voila o vovq, aU' evti£k£x£u ouöcv, npty av vor "253 
Aristotle compares this intellectual process to a writing tablet: 
Suva tct S' OS TO); wait p ev ypaµµatiEt( w µ7j9Ev Evvnäpxet 
vov. 254 ivti¬ýxE{c yEypaµ t vov " öncp avµ(3aivEt ini 'COIL) 
250 cf. n. 184. 
251 For similar sorts of puzzles cf. Plato's Sophist 248eff. and Crates 440aff. 
252 Of course, this is not meant to include Aristotle's divine intellect, which is always in a state of 
thinking. 
253 DA. 429b29-31. Trans: `Now being affected in virtue of something common has been discussed 
before, to the effect that the intellect is potentially the objects of thought, although it is nothing before it 
thinks; ' 
254 DA. 429b31-430a2. Trans: `Potentially in the same way as there is writing on a tablet on which 
nothing actually written exists: that is what happens in the case of the intellect. ' 
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The intellect on this analogy is änXovv in the same way that a blank writing tablet has 
the capacity to be written upon. Yet, neither is &nkoüv simpliciter; they both admit of 
internal distinctions. For what it is to be a tablet is never simply either reduced to being 
in a state of `blankness' or to what is written upon it. Rather the tablet always retains the 
capacity to be written upon, even once it has been written upon. Likewise, there is the 
distinction between the tablet and the writing which is on it, the latter not having the 
capacity to be written upon, just as the intelligibles qua intelligible do not have the 
capacity to think. The difference and distinction between that which has the capacity to 
be written upon and the content which is written upon that thing is never simply 
obliterated. Moreover, this analogy brings out the intellect's impassivity in virtue of the 
fact that it can only be written upon by a certain type of thing, intelligibles, whereas its 
passivity is manifest through the fact that it can be written on at all. Finally, this analogy 
also captures the sense in which the intellect is äµtyA;. For the tablet is one 
homogeneous thing with or without content. The combination of the tablet and the 
writing on it does not create a composite or heterogeneous entity. Likewise, the intellect 
at every one of its conceptual stages is exclusively intellectual in kind. 
But what does it mean, or rather what does it entail, for the intellectual part 
of the soul to become the things which are written on it? Aristotle has from the outset of 
his discussion of the intellect -- recall the material about nothing being äXX6, cpiov to the 
intellect -- spoken of or implied that the epistemic subject, the intellect, and its objects 
are in some sense identical. It is for this reason that he is now forced to raise the second 
of his two aporiai: Can the intellect be its own object? 
Second aporia: Etii S' Ft' voTytiöS uai avtiO;. Is vol-); itself also a vorliöv? His 
answer is yes: 
xai avi0S Sý vorlti0S ýatiiv anEp iä vogth. ii xEv yäp ti DV ävev 
v wll; do avtio CGtt To WOW xat TO voovµevov "1 yap cntati u ii 
'CO catitiv. Oewpituai uai do owto S Eniairtiöv TO au 255 
According to Aristotle, thinkin g and, consequently, knowing things entails that the 
subject actually become them. The epistemic subject, vobq, becomes that which it 
255 DA. 430a2-5. Trans: `And it is itself an object of thought, just as its objects are. For, in the case of 
those things which have no matter, that which thinks and that which is thought are the same. For 
contemplative knowledge and that which is known in that way are the same. ' Aristotle also makes the 
same point in the h. about the lack of matter enabling a sort of identity, 1075a3-5. See Section V, 
especially n. 272. 
104 
thinks, i. e. the object. Now the reason it can, at least in part, do so, according to 
Aristotle, is because its objects are immaterial. For the absence of matter allows for 
numerical identity between thinker and object thought. Of course, immateriality by itself 
is insufficient to explain the intellectual process. But immateriality, coupled with the 
causal relation between the epistemic subject and the intelligible object, along with an 
identity claim, is sufficient to explain how it is that the epistemic subject actually 
becomes what it thinks. For we are not dealing with two independent entities, the 
intellect and the intelligible object. Yet all of this only explains the mechanics of the 
intellectual process, i. e. knowing things involves becoming them in some sense. 
However, it does not necessarily explain why the subject has to become a voliöv. Nor 
does it explain what it means to become the object. For one must be careful to avoid the 
fallacy which claims that when I think a horse or a triangle, I am then a horse or a 
triangle. Thus why and in what sense does the epistemic subject, the intellect, become 
what it thinks? 
To begin, only the intellect is capable of an actual independent existence. 
That is, the actual existence of its intelligible objects depends on their inherence in the 
intellect. 256 The writing tablet, for example, is not a composition that is composed out of 
two separately existing entities. 257 The writing on the tablet does not enjoy an actual 
existence outside of that thing on which it is written. Thus, if the intellect's objects -- the 
intelligible forms or intelligible essences -- are to attain any sort of actuality it will have 
to be through their inherence in the intellect. This, of course, is not to say that they do 
not exist outside of the intellect qua first potentiality, nor that the essences of things 
exist out there in the world in the many individual substances which are their 
instantiations. 258 But rather the intelligibles or the intelligible form of things qua first 
and second actuality had to have been thought or actually be in the process of being 
thought by the intellect, and thus inhere in it. So the intellect in thinking its objects is 
256 At this point the situation becomes disanalogous to perception in that the intellect's objects do not 
reside outside of the intellect in an actual sense as they do with the perceptive faculty. This is not meant to 
imply that essences do not exist outside of the mind, they do. They exist in all the individual instantiations 
of them, such as with the essence of horse and the many horses. However, the intelligible form of the 
essence must inhere in the thinker. 
257 Now, of course, the tablet does not do the writing but that will be accounted for when the active 
intellect establishes the right conditions for the intelligibles to be impressed upon the tablet, which will be 
discussed below. 
258 cf. n 256. 
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capable of becoming them. For these objects are really just another aspect of this 
intellectual faculty, along with the capacity to think and the realisation of that capacity. 
(Just as the written letters on the tablet are another aspect of the tableL)259 
If these intelligible objects inhere in and are part of the overall structure of 
the intellect, why does it then follow that the intellect is or becomes an object, a voiitöv? 
And in doing so, why does the intellect not become a horse and gallop off when it thinks 
about a horse or a triangle, making it pointy, when it thinks a triangle? Why just an 
intelligible object, a voiiöv? In other words, what exactly does the identity relation or 
saying the intellect is the same as its objects entail? 
Beginning with the second of these two questions, as it is the case that the 
things thought are part of the intellect and that the intellect is a homogeneous entity, it 
follows that whatever properties these objects have they will be intellectual. Now, 
according to Aristotle, being part of or inhering in the intellect entails immateriality. 
Thus when I think a horse or a triangle, given that these objects of thought inhere in the 
intellect, I shall not take on any of their extensional properties. 260 However, as for their 
intensional261 properties (by which is meant the essential or definitional properties in 
their intelligible form), as they are intellectual in kind, I shall take on those properties in 
thinking the intelligible object. For these are compatible with the intellect's 
homogeneous nature, i. e. they are intellectual. As a result, when the intellect thinks 
horse, it does not become one. 
As for the first question, one of the intensional properties of these objects, if 
not the most fundamental one, is being intelligible or thinkable. Thus the intellect, given 
that it does take on the intensional properties and, in so doing, becomes identical with 
them, must itself become intelligible. And to say it becomes intelligible, is the 
equivalent of saying the intellect has become an intellectual object or a vontiöv. For that 
is what intended by volts v, i. e. being intelligible. Intelligibility is `objectibility'. 
Thus one could now state the matter as follows: Just as the intellect's 
capacity to think is one of its dispositions or states, so too is its thinking an intelligible, 
259 cf. 417b23-24 where Aristotle remarks: il S' 'ntat1 n1 TWv xaOöXov - rab-a S' Ev ainil >r EaTt t 
vvxý. Similarly, at IA. 429a27-28, Aristotle says the intellect is the Tönog eiöwv. 
260 Extensional picks out those properties which particular horses have, such as fury, four legs etc. 
261 The term `intensional' must not be confused with `intentional' which I used earlier to denote `sense' 
or `aboutness'. 
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and, as a result, being that intelligible or von rov. Hence it is not as if in becoming a 
volltiöv, vovS is becoming something other than itself. 262 Instead, it is simply the full 
realisation of what it is to be intellect. It is the essence or end of the intellectual soul or 
epistemic subject, just as actually seeing is the essence of what it is to be an eye. 263 For 
the faculty prior to thinking is just the potentiality to think those intelligible things, and 
the subject's essence is only realised when it becomes these intelligible objects. Thus 
voi S, in becoming these objects, is still itself, but its disposition is intellect qua object. 
And as its disposition has changed, so it is different intentionally264 from what it was 
previously when it was intellect disposed as a subject, i. e. that thing which can think. So 
to say that it is differently disposed is simply to say that it is at a different level of 
actualisation, i. e. its full actualisation. Thus the relation between the epistemic subject 
and its object is one in which that subject has as its end to become an intelligible object 
when thinking. 
The second aporia, therefore, cannot be avoided, if one is to give an account 
of thinking (or at least the Aristotelian account). For the essence of voi ; is to become 
fully actualised as a voii röv. Hence the relation between the subject and object is such 
that by thinking a vowröv, vob; de facto becomes a voiiöv. Of course, the intellect 
throughout must be carefully qualified; otherwise we could end up in an absurd situation 
where once vob; has become a voltöv it is no longer able to think, since intelligibles as 
such are incapable of thinking, just as the writing on the tablet could not be written 
upon. For vovS might be capable of becoming a volltiöv but it is not exhausted by doing 
so. The intellectual faculty itself is not simply reduced to its objects by becoming them. 
In other words, despite its being able to become a von cOv it can still voeiv, just not qua 
vol töv. For the essence of a vo'ntiöv is not to think but to be thought. (Aristotle raises 
%- IV It this point in a problematic manner at 429b27ff., I 'fl ioiS CCXXot; voi S vtäp4Et, £i p 
262 In the context of the intellect becoming it objects Sorabji, I think rightly, makes much of the `road to 
Thebes' analogy from ply. 3.3. To quote: `One difficult saying of Aristotle is that the act of thinking is 
identical with the object of thought. The basis of this idea can safely be traced (although this is not always 
recognised) to a discussion in Physics 3.3. ' R. R. K. Sorabji, Time. Creation and the Continuum (London: 
Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1983), p. 144. Here too we have something which is accessible from 
different perspectives. However, this analogy (just as was the case with perception) falls short on the 
symmetry issue between the two sides. 
263 cf. n. 178. 
264 cf. n. 230. 
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Kai' äý, ý1, o a&thS voijTÖS, .... ) The point about voiS' capacity to become a voll rov 
without losing its capacity to voF-iv is easily illustrated with a further reference to the 
tablet analogy. The writing tablet is never simply reduced to what is written on it. It is 
always something over and above the things inscribed on it and thus is capable of having 
more things inscribed on it. 
Having seen how the epistemic subject stands in relation to its objects and 
what its identity with those objects entails, in what sense does the epistemic subject have 
itself as an object of intellection? What sort of account of self-intellection is Aristotle 
offering his reader? Given that the primary function of the subject is to become an 
object, an object whose intensional content is not -- at least not transparently -- that 
thinking subject, the subject will not grasp itself as that object; at least not in a 
transparent manner. For although the epistemic subject by thinking object `x' becomes 
that object and, as such, is identical with it, the subject does not recognise itself in that 
object or as that object. Instead the subject only apprehends itself in an opaque manner. 
For it thinks `x' and becomes `x' and so `x' is coincidentally itself. But thinking `x' does 
not entail the epistemic subject thinking itself transparently. Thus, despite it thinking 
itself when thinking its object by virtue of becoming those objects, the subject, does not 
grasp itself as that object. Unlike Plato's account of the subject in which an account 
could not be given of objects (Chapter III), with Aristotle we have an account in which 
the subject is subsumed by the object. Thus, the subject in thinking its object does not 
transparently think itself as that object. Rather it has an apprehension of that object, 
which by coincidence happens to be itself. On the Aristotelian account, therefore, the 
intellect only has itself as an object of intellection in an non-transparent manner. And the 
reason for this opacity, I think, ultimately can be traced to the emphasis which Aristotle 
places on the subject's identity with the object. As a result, we do have an account of 
self-intellection but in a rather odd guise. The subject only thinks itself incidentally. 
Aristotle, unlike Plato, has offered us an account of how the subject relates to objects 
and how the subject can have itself as its own object of intellection, yet in such a way 
that that subject does not grasp itself as the object. Whereas Plato's objects were 
eclipsed by the subject, now we have a scenario where the subject is eclipsed by the 
object. A coherent or adequate account of self-intellection requires that neither side 
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eclipse the other. 
V 
Some Objections 
Metaphysics 12.7 & 12.9 & De Anima 3.5 
Before concluding, I must address two obvious objections to my conclusion that for 
Aristotle the intellect only opaquely or incidentally grasps itself as its object: namely, 
the account of God's self-thinking thought in Metaphysics 12.7 and 12.9 and the active 
intellect of De Anima 3.5 acting upon the passive intellect. 
Taking them in order, one could argue that in the case of God alone, one does 
have an instance of an intellectual subject thinking itself in a transparent manner, 
because God is self-thinking thought: F'-arty 'n voirtc vo7i6£(OS VÖ'natc. 265 He is not 
incidentally his own object but intrinsically. He has himself as a transparent object. 
However, when one actually looks at the manner in which Aristotle discusses the issue 
of divine self-contemplation, it becomes apparent, I think, that the thinking subject here 
too is subsumed by the intelligible object. 
Beginning with 12.7, the first part of this chapter (1072a19-1072b14) 
concentrates on establishing the Aristotelian prime mover, God, as a final cause in virtue 
of the fact that it is good and an object of desire. From 1072b 14-30, however, Aristotle 
addresses the intellectual activity of his prime mover. In short, he says, the prime mover 
has for an eternity what we have for only a short time, a life of theoretical thought. 
According to Aristotle, that is the best and most pleasant activity. 266 Thinking in this 
divine context deals with that which is best, and this happens to be itself, thinking. 267 
Thus we read: 
aüTÖV SE voEi ö vovS KaTä µeTä? iyrty Toi) vollTOV " vorlTÖS yäp 
yi^yvETat O y6vwv Kai vowv, ciaTc TavTÖV voug Kai vomov. TO yap 
S&KTLKÖV Toi voi toi Kai 'r% of ataS voüS, £vepyeI SE Exwv, u&aT' 
FlKCtvou g&XkoV TATO Ö SOKE i Ö vo 3S 
OEIov £xcty, Kai 11 OEwpia Tö 
1i&Latov Kat aptatov. 
268 




267 h. 1072b 18-19. In this chapter, 12.7, Aristotle does not really argue for God having the best or 
most noble object, viz. himself, rather he just infers it from his most pleasant existence. The argument for 
that, i. e. the proper object for God's intellection, actually comes in 12.9 (1074b15-34). 
268 Me". 1072b19-24. Trans: `And thought thinks itself because it shares (partakes of) the nature of the 
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Now what is striking about this passage is that divine thinking is, structurally speaking, 
no different from our own. If anything, it would seem that in outlining this divine 
activity, Aristotle is simply outlining the generic abstract structure of thinking which is 
based upon the causal and identity relations which holds standardly between the subject 
and the object. The fact that God qua that which thinks is the object seems to be of 
secondary importance. 269 What is of primary importance is that the thinking subject 
become identical with the object. Given the abstract and formulaic nature of this 
passage, it on its own is insufficient as a means of judging whether or not Aristotle is 
saying that the epistemic subject has itself as the object of thought in a transparent 
manner. For the object of the intellectual activity is expressed in such way that what is 
thought just so happens to coincide with the thinker. But it is unclear whether that 
subject has itself as an object in a transparent manner. If anything, the fact that we can 
partake of this activity is indicative of this not being the case. For when we mortal 
beings contemplate, we do not think of ourselves as God. 
In 12.9 (1074b 15-35) Aristotle (re)affirms that God has itself as its own 
object of thought on the grounds that it is the only suitable object for it, God, to have: 
avtiov apa vo£i, £tit£p £atit do Kpaitatiov, Kat £6TtV 11 VoiiatS VOTj6£Uc 
V011otc. 
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The second section (1074b35-1075a5) then raises and responds to the objection that 
God, since thinking always has something else as its object, will be hard pressed to think 
itself: 
cpaivctat S' &Ei &? of 11 Eitteng'Cý Kai '11 aiaOrgatS Kalt 1 66 a Kai TI 
SLävoLa, ubifi; 6' iv iapEpyq . 
Ett Ei äxiw 't vociv uai tio, vociaO(xt, 
xata nötiepov avtiw to ei) vnäpxeL; ouS& yap taco do civat vorlaci 
271 Kai voovµEVCp. 
object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking its objects, 
so that thought and the object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving the object of 
thought, i. e. the substance, is thought. And it is active when it possesses this object. Therefore the latter 
rather than the former is the divine element which thought seems to contain, and the act of contemplation 
is what is most pleasant and best. ' 
269 cf. Richard Norman, `Aristotle's Philosopher-God', Articles on Aristotle: Vol. 4 Psychology & 
Aesthetics, edd. Jonathan Barnes, Malcolm Schofield and Richard Sorabji (London: Gerald Duckworth & 
Co. Ltd., 1979), p. 97. Norman states the matter well: `And when it is said that the Prime Mover `thinks 
itself', what is meant is not `self-contemplation' but simply that identity of intellect and object of thought 
that characterises all abstract thought'. 
270 Melah. 1074b33-35. Trans: `Therefore it must be itself that thought thinks (since it is the most 
excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking on thinking. ' 
271 h. 1074b35-38. Trans: `But evidently knowledge and perception and opinion and understanding 
always have something else as their object, and themselves only by the way. Further if thinking and being 
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Aristotle gets around this problem by pointing out that in the theoretical sciences the 
thinking and the object of thought are one and the same: 
er? to r ei er w ovx EtiEpov ovv ovTog TOI) voovµevov xat toi vov, oaa µil 1S iiv Exec, 
272 To airrö carat, uai i1 voTlalc i4 voov hvcp p ta. 
Now Aristotle might have rescued God from thinking about things that are not worthy of 
itself but at a price. For in doing so, the divine intellect grasps itself as the object of 
thought in a non-transparent manner because the divine intellect in thinking thought (and 
this is why the mention of humans being able to partake of this divine activity is very 
revealing) is really just thinking the intelligible structure of reality. 273 God does the 
same as we do, or rather we perform his divine activity, when we perform, i. e. 
contemplate, the theoretical sciences. But to say the Aristotelian God thinks the entire 
intelligible structure of reality in performing its divine activity is at best only implicitly, 
i. e. non-transparently, claiming that it has itself before itself in the sense of thinking 
itself as a thinking subject. Thus to cite the divine activity as a counterexample to my 
account of self-intellection in Section IV, I think falls short. For the `itself', when 
spelled out, does not immediately or directly make reference to the thinking subject as 
the object in question. The epistemic subject, divine or otherwise, is subsumed or 
eclipsed by its intelligible object. 
The second objection I want to address pertains to the active intellect of D. A. 
3.5. One could argue that as the active intellect acts upon the passive intellect, the 
subject, the intellect itself is directly and transparently the object of intellection. For 
Aristotle tells us that just as with all of nature, there is an agent/patient structure with the 
soul as well. 274 Without such a structure, we would have difficulties in accounting for 
thought are different, in respect of which does goodness belong to thought? For being an act of thinking 
and being an object of thought are not the same. ' 
272 etanh. 1075a3-5. Trans: `As, then, thought and the object of thought are not different in the case of 
things that have not matter, they will be the same, i. e. the thinking will be one with the object of its 
thought. ' 
273 cf. Jonathan Lear, Aristotle: the desire to understand. pp. 316-17 for the view that the Aristotelian 
intellect thinks all of intelligible reality in thinking itself. Also see Richard Norman, `Aristotle's 
Philosopher-God', p. 100. Norman sums up the matter as follows: `The difference between self- 
contemplation and the Prime Mover's self-thinking is the difference between intellect whose object is 
primarily itself and intellect whose object is only incidentally itself. ...: in so far as it has become the 
objects of thought it thinks itself incidentally when it thinks the objects of thought. But it (Prime Mover) 
does not think itself as such. ' Given that 12.7 has shown the subject-object distinction to apply to God, I 
think Norman is wrong, to make such a distinction. For God acts upon himself qua intelligible reality. 
Also cf. Norman, ibid., p. 98. 
274 D A. 430a13-14. 
111 
how the intellectual process began in the first place. Thus there can be little doubt that 
the active intellect does bring about thinking and for that reason is a crucial part of the 
Aristotelian metaphysics and epistemology. 275 What is of concern, however, is whether 
such an account affects my interpretation of self-intellection. I think it does not because 
if one follows Aristotle's analogy through, the active intellect itself is not the primary or 
first-order object: 
... 
ö SE A, nävtia no¬iv, in tS TLS, oiov TO qg" tponov yap Ttva Kai 
do qowitot t Tot Svvapct ovtia xpwµata Evcpycta xpwµaTa. 276 
Rather, according to this analogy, the active intellect acts as a light which in turn allows 
the passive intellect, the subject, to apprehend (i. e. be acted upon by), the intelligible 
objects. 277 Such an account suits my object oriented version of things because the active 
intellect itself is not the object but that which creates the right conditions for the objects 
to act. On this analogy, one does not see the light but what the light illuminates, i. e. the 
intelligibles. It is like the sun analogy in Plato's Republic in that one sees what the sun 
illuminates and not the light which it emits. Thus the account of the active intellect in 
D. A. 3.5 does not alter or endanger my interpretation of the way in which the intellect 
grasps itself as an object. If anything, the present image only enhances my view that the 
intellectual subject, divine or otherwise, is eclipsed by its objects. 
VI 
The Emergence of the Problem 
I hope by now it has begun to become apparent why the first part of the dissertation 
(Chapters I-IV) has the title it does, `The Emergence of the Problem'. My aim is to 
investigate a theory of self-intellection which has at its foundation the relation between 
the subject and the object such that the subject can be its own object. We began with a 
position that asserted the indiscernability of the epistemic subject and its object. It was a 
position which, if allowed to stand, would have destroyed any intelligible epistemology, 
275 It must be noted that it is unclear whether the active intellect properly belongs to the human intellect 
or not (and for our purposes irrelevant as we are looking at the intellect purely from a formal point of 
view). For Aristotle concludes that this active intellect is eternal, immortal and unaffected. 
276 D. A. 430a15-17. Trans: `... and there is another (sc. intellect) which is so by producing all things, as a 
kind of disposition, like light does; for in a way light too makes colours which are potential into actual 
colours. ' 
277 DA. 430a15. 
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let alone a theory of self-intellection. For it did not tolerate coýcxtensivity or any sort of 
causal relation between the epistemic subject and an intelligible object. But the 
Parmenidean account did not go unchallenged. Plato's response was to reinstate the two 
sides, the subject and object, as coextensive relata. Such a move ,, crvcd well as a 
beginning but it was just that, a beginning. A theory of self-intellection requires that 
what the subject is, if it is to have itself as object of intellection or cognition, be known. 
Chapter II did not address this issue. Plato's account of the epistemic subject in the 
Theaetetus, on the other hand, did. In that dialogue, there was a rich account of what it is 
to be a epistemic subject. However, it could not give an account of how that subject 
relates to intelligible objects because none of the objects canvassed could withstand 
philosophical scrutiny. And as self-intellection is a relation in which the subject has 
itself as an intelligible object, if there are no objects, then a fortiori a theory of sell'- 
intellection is out of the question. Thus enters Aristotle. For he does offer us an account 
of how the subject relates to objects and how it itself is its own object. However, the 
Aristotelian account of self-intellection is structured in such a way that, to all intents and 
purposes, the subject gets subsumed by its object. Aristotle's account leans so much in 
favour of the object or is so object oriented, that there ceases to be a place or role for the 
epistemic subject. For the intellect focuses on the object, which coincidentally happens 
to he itself, in such a way that it does not focus on the object as itself, a thinking subject, 
except opaquely. Hence the problem that has emerged could be articulated as follows: 
We either have an epistemic subject without an intelligible object or an intelligible 




The Problem and its Resolution 
V 
Sextus Empiricus and the Stoics 
on Self-Intellection 
The problem of setting out a theory of self-intellection is essentially one of finding a 
balance between the epistemic subject and the intelligible object. The source of 
imbalance rests upon the incompatibility between, on the one hand, the identity relation 
of the subject and object and, on the other hand, their coextensive and causal relations. 
For the coextensive and causal relations allow for a difference between the subject and 
object, while the identity relation entails their identity. In this fifth chapter. I want to turn 
my attention to two things: (i) To examine the force of the paradox raised by Sextus 
Empiricus about the possibility of being able to give a coherent account of self- 
intellection; (ii) to return to an analysis of Stoic epistemology, focussing upon the 
manner in which they addressed the issue of how the epistemic subject might take itself 
as an intelligible object. My reason for doing so is not simply because the Stoics had 
some interesting things to say about how the epistemic subject might take itself as an 
object of thought but because Sextus articulates his paradox in response to Stoic 
epistemology. For his paradox incorporates one of, if not the, most basic presuppositions 
of Stoic epistemology -- materialism. The intellectual act, according to the materialist, is 
such that the intellectual content (or object known) comes to inhere in the mind in such a 
way that the mind either contains or becomes identical with that intellectual content. The 
full force of Sextus' attack upon the Stoics can, therefore, only be properly appreciated 
within the context of Stoic epistemology. 
I 
Sextus Empiricus' Paradox: 
The Rejection of Self-Intellection 
\Vith his paradox, Sextus sets out exactly why it is that self-intellection -- a theory in 
which the e pistemic subject has itself as an object of intellection. and, as such. 
presupposes the sub cct/ohjcct relation -- is inherently flawed. His criticisms bring to 
I15 
light why it is that either the subject cannot have itself as an object or that it has itself as 
an object but it qua subject is subsumed by that object. Either way, self-intellection 
comes undone as a theory, and, as a result, the intellect is rendered anomalous. 
At Adversus Mathematicos 7.303ff., Sextus launches into his criticism about 
the notion of the intellect (& vota) discerning (yvwpiý£t) either the body, i. e. the 
outward body, 278 the senses or itself: 
vat, cpaaiv, of SoYyµatitxoi, äA. A. ' + Su vota xai Töv öyncov Kai Taq 
aia6iioctc Kai Eao rT v yvwpiýEt. 279 
As for whom Sextus intends by of Soyµanxoi, I think there are three very good reasons 
for interpreting his tripartite attack to be orchestrated against the Stoics: (i) terminology, 
(ii) topic and (iii) the presupposition of materialism -- a Stoic doctrine -- which is central 
to Sextus' argument, especially as far as the third part of his attack is concerned. 
Taking these points in order, (i) Sextus throughout his tripartite attack 
employs Stoic terminology. For example, in the passage just quoted, we have such Stoic 
terms as ala8ijactc and öyxoS. 280 Yet more telling than these terms is Sextus' constant 
use of xatiaXa L 3ävw, the verb from which xathA, 'nyrI; is derived (cf. passages quoted 
below). Thus, at the very least, there are terminological grounds for considering Sextus' 
opponents to be the Stoics. 
(ii) Now, of course, Sextus' use of terminology is by no means conclusive 
proof. However, if one combines terminology with issues which were of interest to the 
Stoics, then one's case for claiming that Sextus is directing his energies against the 
Stoics becomes all the more stronger. For questions about how the intellect or 
intellectual part of soul might apprehend either the outward body (rev ("yyxov), the senses 
(thS aic Oi act; ) or itself (Eauty) were the sort of issues with which the Stoics, more so 
than the Epicureans or the Peripatetics, were concerned. 281 The oiKEiwß1S theory, for 
278 The term 'yKo; strictly speaking means weight or volume. However, in this context Sextus is clearly 
using it to denote the outward physical body, as opposed to, say, the pneumatic body which is the intellect. 
279 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos. VII 303. Trans: 'Yes, say the Dogmatists, but the intellect 
discerns both the body, the senses and itself. ' All Sextus passages, unless stated otherwise, are based upon 
the Bekker text, Sextus Empiricus, Opr, , ed. I. Bekker (Berlin: Reimer, 1842). All other passages (and 
translations) in this chapter, unless otherwise stated, are taken from or based upon A. A. Long and David 
Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1987) which I shall 
hereafter refer to as . 280 However, it would be misleading to imply this terminology is exclusively Stoic. For instance, the term 
orco; is also used by Epicurus, see LAS 7B and 12D. 
281 1 restrict my claim to 'more so' because it would be untrue to say that the Epicureans and Peripatetics 
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example, examines the manner in which animals, human or otherwise, are aware of 
themselves, with special emphasis on their outward bodies. Epictetus, in his Discourses, 
explores how it is that the intellectual faculty can be its own object. And, finally, the 
paradox of the sage (the elusive argument) centres around how the sage's knowledge can 
itself be an object of knowledge. So the issues which Sextus' touches upon in his attack 
are issues which are not in any way alien to Stoic epistemology. 
As for (iii), Sextus' presupposition of materialism, this can be discerned from 
all three parts of his attack. However, it is most apparent with, and central to, the third 
and final part. Nonetheless, I must say something about the two previous parts, the 
intellect knowing the outward body (tio'v o'yicov) and the intellect knowing the senses 
(, Tä; (xi69i a£t; ), because the manner in which Sextus dismisses both will, in part, recur 
in the third part. For in the third criticism, as in these two, Sextus makes much use of the 
identity relation between the intellectual subject and its object. (And, as we shall see, it 
is just this relation which undermined the coherency of the Stoics' account of the 
intellect. ) According to Sextus' argument, such a relation entails that the thinker or 
thinking part of the soul become identical with its object and, as a result, ceases to be 
rational. 282 For the objects in question, the outward body or the senses, are non-rational. 
That Sextus emphasises such an identity relation between the intellectual subject and its 
objects, something which has Aristotelian and Peripatetic echoes, does not tell against 
my claim that it is the Stoics to whom he directs his criticism. For the context in which 
he deploys this identity relation between the subject and object (i. e. the intellect 
becoming the outward body or the senses) is one of materialism, and to that extent Stoic. 
For an Aristotelian might worry how the intellect could become identical with its proper 
objects, the intelligibles, but he would not be concerned with whether or not the intellect 
could become identical with the other faculties or the body. However, for the Stoic, 
were not interested in these sorts of issues simpliciter. For Alexander of Aphrodisias in his De nima 
Commentary (86,17ff. ) discusses how the intellect incidentally thinks itself (Kath ßvgOePgic6; ) in 
thinking its proper objects. For a discussion of this point in relation to Plotinus, see Gerard J. P. O'Daly, 
Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self (Shannon: Irish University Press, 1973), pp. 79-80. As for Epicurus, he 
discusses how the soul requires the body, or rather must be part of the aggregate of atoms, if it is to think 
or have sensation. The only incorporeal is the void and that cannot be thought. However, his primary 
interest in that passage from his Letter to Herodotus is to explain how the soul must be corporeal and not 
how it knows itself or the senses. See L&S 14A. 
282 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, VII 304-5. 
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Sextus' concerns do pose a problem because all three (intellect, the senses and the 
outward body) are bodies, material masses, just differently qualified. Thus an identity 
relation between different bodies would entail one body taking on all the attributes of the 
other, and, in the process, losing its own, assuming they were different from those of the 
body with which it has become identical. 
Yet, as I am primarily interested in the intellect's grasp of itself qua intellect 
and not the awareness it has of the outward body or the other faculties, those attacks 
which were premised upon the intellect's acquisition of non-rational or non-intellectual 
properties are not relevant. For the third part of Sextus' original attack concentrates on 
the intellect knowing itself (F(xut v yvwpt Et). However, Sextus demands that the 
identity of the subject with the object entails that the subject take on all the properties of 
its object of thought, and this includes the generic property of being an `object'. Thus, 
according to Sextus' argument, a consequence of the subject becoming identical with its 
object (regardless of whether that object is rational or not) is that it, the subject, ceases to 
be a subject: 
&A. X' Etile e ltEp TI yvwptcouaa'cäg aiaOtjaEtg Stävota cüpiaKctat ¬ig tv 
CKEivwv µetiaßEßilxvia cpuaty, ov&EV 'amt E ht vnoxeiµEvov tä 
ýýqtiovv ti(g ataOi aetg -o yap vne ege a ýlyreiv, tioi to avanecMvc do 
, 
ýov tiov Katiaxrlyr- auto zotig ýrgcoupevatg, Stä 6c tiouco xat xpfi 
opEvov. 283 
This aspect of the identity relation (the subject ceasing to be a subject by becoming an 
object) carries over from the first two parts of Sextus' attack to the third. It is a problem 
which goes right to the heart of any account of self-intellection: Is it possible for a 
theory of self-intellection to incorporate an identity relation between the subject and 
object and survive as a coherent theory of self-intellection? If it cannot and if this 
problem, as outlined by Sextus, is insurmountable, then any theory of self-intellection is 
in serious trouble, with the result that the intellect becomes an anomalous entity. 
Now the manner in which Sextus deals with the problem of self-intellection 
betrays, more than his previous two attacks, his presupposition of materialism. For the 
force of this attack is most effective against an opponent who adheres to such a view. 
283 Sextus Empiricus, ibid., VII 306-7. Trans: `But if the intellect that discerns the senses is found to have 
passed over into their nature, there will no longer exist any subject which seeks to know the senses; for 
that which we assumed to be seeking has turned out to be identical with the senses sought, and 
consequently in need of something to apprehend it. ' 
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The critique itself is twofold: There is the part/part scenario and the whole/whole 
scenario: 
cin¬p yäp ö voi S iavTÖv Karcck(xg 3ävEtat, ijtot ö. og µßv cavtÖv 
xwrccx wvrat, 1j O, og µEV of & ii S gipEt S& rlvt bavcoü npbS ToiTo 
xpwµEvog. 284 
Either way, Sextus maintains, the intellect cannot sustain a relation in which it has itself 
as an object of intellection. But as the part/part account is premised upon the objection 
just raised about the identity relation between the subject and object, it is the more 
appropriate of the two with which to begin. 
According to Sextus, the problem with the part/part account is that it is 
vulnerable to an infinite regress: 
Ei SE µtpci titVi, Excivo nOCXty irwg Eawcö yvwßeTai; xai ovto S EiS 
ä 285 rctpov. 
His reasoning for such a claim goes something like this: When the thinker thinks its 
object, it, the thinker, becomes identical to that object. Now unlike the earlier instances 
in which the object of the intellect was of a different nature, or at least differently 
qualified, (the outward body or a different faculty), here one part of the intellect thinks 
another part, and thus there is no danger of the intellect ceasing to be intellectual. But 
can the intellect, when viewed as parts, both satisfy the subject/object distinction and 
think itself? According to Sextus, it cannot. For he takes the view, as already noted, that 
when intellect becomes identical with its object, it ceases to be a subject altogether. The 
apprehendor and its act (xatiaX(xtf k vov) collapse into the apprehended (xatiaxaµßav0- 
µcvov). 286 And if that is the case, then another part of the intellect, i. e. another thinking 
subject, will be required to think the object into which the previous subject collapsed. Of 
course, that part too will suffer the same fate and so on ad infinitum. From this Sextus 
infers that no first subject will be found or if there is, given the transition involved in the 
intellectual process, it will not be able to entertain an object. And so the process of one 
part of the intellect apprehending another part of itself is insufficient to accommodate a 
theory of self-intellection. 
284 Sextus Empiricus, ii'., VII 310-311. Trans: `For if the mind apprehends itself, either it as a whole 
will apprehend itself, or it will do so not as a whole but employing for the purpose a part of itself. ' 
285 Sextus Empiricus. jW., VII 312. Trans: `while if with a part, how will that part in turn discern itself? 
And so on to infinity. ' 
286 Sextus Empiricus, ibid., VII 309. 
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But is Sextus right to hold such a view? He is if both parts are placed on the 
same ontological level and subject to an identity thesis in which the subject-part 
becomes identical with the object-part, i. e. is subsumed by the latter. In other words, he 
is treating the parts in exactly the same way as an out and out materialist would treat 
them. Each part is a separate and distinct material entity, a body, and one of them, i. e. 
the subject, is supposed to become identical with the other (including in number and 
place). Of course, at that point there will only be one body, the object, and thus the need 
for another subject, so on ad infinitum. By treating the epistemic subject and object as 
two distinct entities which are on a par and which are subject to an identity relation 
within the intellect, Sextus makes it impossible to accommodate self-intellection. For 
one of these entities in thinking the other ceases to be. 
Now, if a part of the intellect cannot think another part without inviting a 
regress, at least the way in which Sextus treats the parts, let us see if the whole/whole 
account of self-intellection fares any better. On the face it, the whole/whole reading 
looks rather promising. For presumably, if qualified properly, a plurality of epistemic 
dispositions, such as being an intellectual subject and an intelligible object, could inhere 
in and permeate throughout the intellect simultaneously. This is how one might describe 
the manner in which the several faculties permeate throughout the entire soul. Or to take 
a more mundane example, this is the manner in which yellow and sweet simultaneously 
inhere in and permeate the entire body of honey. 287 However, according to Sextus, the 
whole/whole account cannot tolerate that sort of mutual compatibility or cohabitation, at 
least as far as the epistemic dispositions of subjecthood and objecthood are concerned. 
Instead our author takes the view that the whole/whole reading entails a thinker, a 
subject, which does not have anything, i. e. an object, to think. For unlike the part/part 
account which ended with the demise of the subject in favour of the object, now we have 
a subject which, because it is the whole, has nothing to think: 
% 
)cat % öý. o; µE% v tavt v xaraXaµßäveaOat oüu äv 8uv-q9Eirl. Ei y&p 
oAoS cavtiöv Kara? aµßäveTat, oA, oS carat xaTäkllyrtS Kai 
Kattakaµßävwv, ökov 8' övtoS Toi Kara? aµßävovtoc oü8Ev ctt 
Eßtiat TO Kcata%, aµßavöµcvov " Twv S£ &A, ayot twv EaTt Tö cIvat µEv 
xaIC, Xi iS. ¶0V Kataýlaµßävovta, µiß eivat SE TO oü caTiv Ti 288 
287 cf. L&, i 53K. 
288 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos. VII 311-12. Trans: `Now it will not be able as a whole to 
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According to this account, as soon as the subject is posited as the whole, the object is 
ruled out. Hence, the whole/whole account might prevent the subject from being 
subsumed by the object, but it does so at the expense of having an object. 
But is Sextus fair to claim this, i. e. that as soon as the subject is put forth as a 
whole, the object is ruled out? In other words, is Sextus correct to claim that the subject 
and object cannot coexist qua wholes? Again, Sextus' argument is valid within the 
context of materialism. For if one treats the subject as a material entity which is on the 
same ontological plane as its opposite and is supposed to be the whole, then the subject 
qua whole is exclusive of the object qua whole. For the notion of there being two things, 
i. e. two bodies, each being equal in ontological status, each being a whole and each 
being in the same place (which is required since the intellect is a body), is incompatible 
with the idea of their coexistence. 289 
Thus what allows Sextus' attack to work in both of its guises is his treatment 
of the epistemic subject and object as two distinct entities which exist on the same 
ontological level. Again, this is exactly what one would expect from a strong or extreme 
materialist. That is, someone who holds the epistemic subject and its object to be 
physical entities, with the result that either the subject is eclipsed by the object 
(part/part) or the object by the subject (whole/whole). In the case of the former, one part 
becomes the other; and in the case of the latter, the object gives way to the subject 
because only one physical body can occupy a place at any given time. Sextus' paradox, 
therefore, employs a basic assumption of a strong materialist: there is only one 
ontological level. Consequently, a coherent theory of self-intellection is ruled out 
because the only possible identity relation is that of simple self-identity, i. e. the trivial 
relation in which something is identical with itself, as opposed to, say, the relation in 
which the subject has itself as an object of thought. 
apprehend itself. For if as a whole it apprehends itself, it will be as a whole apprehension and 
apprehending, and, the apprehending subject being the whole, the apprehended object will no longer be 
anything; but it is a thing most irrational that the apprehending subject should exist while the object of the 
apprehension does not exist. ' 
289 cf. Aristotle 1 h. 1039a2-14 on the impossibility of one substance existing or being in the same 




Having stressed the materialism and the Stoic background which underlies Sextus' 
paradox, an examination of Stoic epistemology is now necessary. 290 For only when their 
epistemology, along with its materialistic core, is accounted for, can one fully appreciate 
why the Stoics approach intellectual self-apprehension in the manner that they do and 
why the notion of the sage's self-knowledge is a paradoxical one. 
The Stoics regard the soul, including the intellect, as a corporeal entity. 291 
Their adherence to such a materialistic view is, at least in part, motivated by their causal 
account of things. Only corporeal things, according to them, can act or suffer affections, 
while incorporeal ones cannot: 
TO yap aawµaiov KaT avtioDS ovtic notEiv tit nccpvxcv O WEE 
292 7E«ßxety. 
So if, as the Stoics go on to argue, the soul is capable of undergoing affection, it will 
have to be somatic. And, likewise, as it is only the corporeal which can act, any object 
which affects the soul or the body must also be corporeal: 
e91 rt [Sc. Cleanthes] cpr atv " ovSEv &a atiov au thaXu awµatt, oü6E 
äawµau) awµa, &A. A. & awµa awµa'ct" avµnaaxet SE 71 iyvxiI tiW 
awµatt voaovvtit xai tiep. vop. v p, xai TO awµa T! yrux1l 
aiaxvvoµEVrtc yovv EpvOpöv yivetiat xai (Popov jEviic ci pöv "a to 
a pa 1 Vvxl . 293 
Given the materialistic setting in which this causal relation is located, the relation entails 
that there be two distinct and separate bodies, one acting and one being acted upon. 
What are the objects of the intellectual part of the soul, iö ilyegovtKöv? The 
most obvious candidate is sensible substances out there in the world: 
290 I must stress that although much of what the Stoics have to say about the intellect generally is situated 
within an ethical context, it does not follow from that that the Stoics have nothing to add to the present 
epistemological enterprise. If anything, much of their ethical interests are actually driven by 
epistemological ones. Cf. A. A. Long, Hellenistic Philosophy (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd, 
1974), pp. 185-6 and M. M. Mackenzie, `The Virtues of Socratic Ignorance', Classical Quarterly 38 
(1988), pp. 148-150. 
291 Cicero, DeNatura Deo um Academica 1.39 (Hereafter referred to as Academica. ) 
292 L&S 45B (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos VIII 262-263). Trans: `According to them [the 
Stoics] the incorporeal is not of a nature either to act or be acted upon. ' 
293 L&S 45C (Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, 1.518, hereafter referred to as S . 
YE. ). Trans: `He 
[Cleanthes] also says: no incorporeal interacts with a body, and no body with an incorporeal, but one body 
interacts with another body. Now the soul interacts with the body when it is sick and being cut, and the 
body with the soul; thus when the soul feels shame and fear the body turns red and pale respectively. 
Therefore the soul is a body. ' 
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of ETwtxoi Tä µ&v nhOi ev ToiS nenovOöat Toirotg, t&S SF ai0*(; EtS 
L 294 v Tc) hYEµovtxüp. 
Sensible objects, or rather their sensible content, act upon the intellect by means of 
cpaviaaiai. However, aisthetic cpavtaaiat -- those which convey sensible content -- are 
not the only type of cpavtiaßiai, which the intellect encounters. There are dianoetic or 
intellectual ones as well: 
tiwv Be cpavtaatwv scat' aü'co6S ai µE-'v eiaty aiaOllttxat, ai S' oü 
aiaOiicucc i pAv ai St' aiaO'ntirjpiou ij ai. oOi ptwv XaµßavöpEVat, 
ovx ata6Trrucai S' at Stä 'r jg SLavotaS xa0ancp cwv aao to cwv xat 
tiwv ä%? uwv tiiov & ycp ?a4 avopAVwv. 295 
But let me stay with the aisthetic or sensory cpaviaaiat for the moment, not only 
because they play a more obvious role in the causal relation which has been outlined 
thus far but also because they take priority over the intellectual cpaviaafat both 
temporally and logically. 296 
Sensible objects through kataleptic (cognitive) impressions affect the 
intellect. A kataleptic impression imposes an accurate representation of the sensible 
object upon it, the intellect, resulting in some sort of physical alteration of the latter. 297 
For the object, the cpavtiaaiöv, 298 fully impresses itself in such a way that its unique 
combination of properties is felt by the intellect via the impression. 299 Without entering 
the debate over whether or not kataleptic impressions are distinguishable from non- 
kataleptic ones and whether they can be used as the criteria for true perceptual 
statements, the point I want to emphasise is that it is the kataleptic impression itself that 
does the work. 30° For it arises from or is caused by an existent somatic entity and is 
294 L&I 53M ME. 2.854). Trans: `The Stoics say that [bodily] affections occur in the affected regions, 
but the sensations in the commanding faculty. ' 
295 LAS 39A (Diogenes Laertius, Vitae, VII 51). Trans: `They divide impressions into those which are 
sensory and those which are not. Sensory impressions are ones obtained through one or more sense- 
organs, non-sensory are ones obtained through thought such as those of incorporeals and of the other 
things acquired by reason. ' 
296 cf. L&J 39A and E. Also cf. A. A. Long, `Language and Thought in Stoicism', Problems in Stoicism. 
ed. A. A. Long (London: Athlone Press, 1971), p. 94. 
297 As for the ancient debate between Chrysippus and Cleanthes over the exact the nature of the physical 
alteration, cf. Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, VII 227-331. 
298 L&S 39B (5SVF. 2.54). 
299 cf. M. Frede, `Clear and Distinct Impressions', Essays in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1987), p. 167. This need not mean that all the properties of the object are felt but just a sufficient 
number so that the uniqueness of the object is impressed upon the perceiver. Cf. Cicero, Academica. 1.42 
and J. Annas, 'Truth and Knowledge', Doubt and Dogmatism. edd. M. Schofield. M. Burnyeat and J. 
Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), p. 88. 
300 As Annas points out, the problem with attributing a coherence theory to the Stoics is that, despite 
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stamped and impressed in exact accordance with that entity: 
KaTaXnn'ctldl SE iatty il änö vnänaPxovto; Kai KaT' aüTÖ tö 
vnäpxov ManoµEµWyµMi icai EvaneßcppaytaµEVT), önota 00K äv 
yevot'ro omo µiß vnäpxovwc "301 
As a result, it is not a question of the perceiver discerning that cpl is a kataleptic 
impression and cp2 is not. Rather cpl, in virtue of the accurate manner in which it depicts 
the object (i. e. acting as the perfect vehicle), impresses the perceiver's fiy£µovtxöv in 
such a way as to reveal its "katalepticity" to him or her. 
Although, prima facie, cognitive or kataleptic impressions are about 
perception and perceptual content and not about how the intellectual part of the soul 
relates to purely intellectual objects, it is still relevant to my study of the intellect 
because it is the intellectual part of the soul which is undergoing these affections. For the 
rlygµovuxöv is one of the necessary conditions for the occurrence of this perceptual 
phenomenon: 
tva ye µ11v atuo'nuKý yevT tat cpavti(Xata xat avtio );, otov opatitKr , 6e nEVtiE ßvv6paµeiv, TO tie aiaOiti ptov uai TO ata8n' öv icai iöv 
tiOItov K (XI TO 7tO) Kai. tflV &aVOtav, WS Cäv'WV 'XXwv napov'cwv ev 
µövov ä7rfi, Ka6äREp 8tävota napä q atv xovßa, ov ao Oi ETat, 
cpaaiv, 71 ävttiXrýync. 302 
Thus two relations hold between the intellectual part of the soul and the perceptible 
object(s). (i) This part of the soul is an intellectual subject because it is that thing which 
undergoes the affection and does the apprehending. And being in such a state entails that 
it is related to objects. Moreover, the same applies to the object. For the object is only 
such when it is working upon a subject. Thus the subject and object enjoy a coextensive 
relation: The subject is only such when it is being acted upon by an object and vice 
versa. (ii) The perceptual content of the objects in the world -- with the assistance of the 
solving certain problems, the external world drops out. This is not to say that the correspondence theory 
has no problems either. Its shortcomings, for instance, can be felt when dealing with the question of öpOög 
)4yo;. See J. Annas, `Truth and Knowledge', p. 93. 
301 L&d 40E (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos. VII 248). Trans: `A cognitive impression is 
one which arises from what is and is stamped and impressed exactly in accordance with what is, of such a 
kind as could not arise from what is not. ' In the face of the Sceptics' attack on the kataleptic impressions 
and whether they were properly distinguishable from non-kataleptic impressions, the Stoics added the 
further proviso that the perceiving subject be in a normal state capable of proper perception, e. g. not be 
insane or inebriated. 
302 L&, S, 40L (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos. VII 424). Trans: `For a [cognitive] sense 
impression to occur. e. g. one of sight, five factors in their [the Stoics'] view must concur: the sense-organ, 
the sense-object, the place, the manner and the mind: since if all of these but one are present (e. g. if the 
mind is in an abnormal state), the perception, they say, will not be secured. ' 
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cpavtiaata -- act upon, i. e. causally affect, the intellect. Thus there is also a causal 
relation between the two, the intellect and the perceptual content. 
However, to say the rlYcµovtKOV is an intellectual subject and that it is 
affected by perceptual content is by no means a complete account of the role of the 
q, yeµovixöv. Attention should also be drawn to the distinction which Diogenes Laertius 
introduces on behalf of the Stoics, after his two-fold description of cpaviaaian (quoted 
above, L&S 39A, n. 18). Here he remarks that the Stoics regarded all human 
impressions, aisthetic or otherwise, to be rational and thus involve the intellect in some 
way: 
ETt Twv cpavTaßt(1)V ai µEV Eißt AOytxai, ai SE & 0-fot " iw7txai gEV ai 
TWV A, 07ytxwv Whv, äA, o-foti SE ai Twv äA. öywv. ai g£V oüv ÄO7lxai 
Vo116£LS £LLV, at S' a? o'yoI ou TE'CUxnlcaaty ovo . ta'ro x. 
303 
So just as animals are divided into the rational and the non-rational, so too are 
impressions. And we, as rational animals, are incapable of entertaining exclusively non- 
rational impressions. 304 It would seem, therefore, to follow that all our aisthetic 
impressions are rational (Xo'ylxai). 305 Diogenes' proof for such a claim takes the 
following form: The only likely candidate for non-rational impressions from all of our 
impressions is the aisthetic impression. But it does not qualify since it has a name, i. e. 
aisthetic. For non-rational impressions, according to Diogenes, do not have a name (ov 
tieti i x(mv ovöµatio; ). So either our aisthetic impressions are not exclusively non- 
rational or Diogenes will have to revise his original claim and say that non-rational 
impressions can sometimes have a name, i. e. aisthetic. 306 This view (i. e. that the Stoics 
considered all human impressions, aisthetic or otherwise, to be rational) can, I think, be 
further substantiated from a passage in Cicero's Academica: 
atqui qualia sunt haec quae sensibus percipi dicimus talia secuntur ea 
303 LAI 39A (Diogenes Laertius, Vitae. VII 51). Trans: `Furthermore, some impressions are rational, 
others are non-rational. Those of rational animals are rational, and those of non-rational animals are non - 
rational. Rational impressions are thought processes; irrational ones are nameless. ' 
304 For a different view cf. A. A. Long, `Language and Thought in Stoicism', p. 83. 
305 When I speak of aisthetic impressions in this context, I am excluding children and their impressions, 
since the Stoics maintain that under the age of seven or fourteen (depending on whom you read) humans 
are not rational animals. Cf. B. Inwood, `Hierocles: Theory and Argument in the Second Century AD', 
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, vol. II (1984), p. 174 and S. Pembroke. `Oikeiosis', Problems in 
Stoicism, ed. A. A. Long (London: Athlone Press, 1971), p. 117. 
306 I am not trying to imply that animals do not have structured impressions but simply that their aisthetic 
impression, albeit structured or not, are different from our aisthetic ones. 
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quae non sensibus ipsis percipi dicuntur sed quodam modo307 sensibus, 
ut haec: `illud est album, hoc dulce, canorum illud, hoc bene olens, hoc 
asperum': animo iam haec tenemus conprehensa non sensibus. 308 
For this passage would seem to imply that no matter how basic one of our perceptions 
might prima facie appear to be, in fact they are of a rational (? ('yud) structure. In the 
case of adult humans, it is always the mind and not the senses (animo ... non sensibus) 
by which grasps things. But what does mean it to say they are rational or grasped by the 
mind? It means, I think, all of our impressions come before the fycµovtxöv or affect the 
ýyEµovucv in a conceptualised form. 309 Thus, given the type of animal the human being 
is, whenever it has an aisthetic impression -- no matter how primitive -- the relevant 
concepts from his set of concepts31o automatically take effect, with the result that the 
objects of our impressions affect the perceiving subject in a rational form. In other 
words, perception is cognitive activity. In virtue of this conceptualised form, 
impressions naturally lend themselves to being thought and articulated. 311 
Given the above account, it is clear the intellectual part of the soul is acted 
upon by the perceptible object. The i ycµovtxöv is affected by external perceptual 
objects. It is not, I stress, identical with those objects out there in the world but rather 
307 In recent scholarship, there has been some debate as to the proper rendering `quodam modo'. Richard 
Sorabji, for example, takes the view that `quodam modo' means the senses can perceive `in a way' that 
something is white in such a way as to exclude reason altogether. He takes this line to defend the view that 
animals can and do have structured perceptions despite the fact that the intellect is not actually present. Cf. 
R. R. K. Sorabji, Animal Minds and Human Morals (London: Duckworth Books, 1994), p. 25. Long and 
Sedley, however, maintain that the `quodam modo' is referring to proleptic cpav'raa(at. This account runs 
as follows: The mind develops proleptic cpavtaa(at from a plurality of kataleptic (pavraa{at. Hence when 
it employs the proleptic cpavtiaatat, inasmuch as it is focusing its attention upon them, it is not focusing 
its attention on a direct and immediate external sense object. Although, indirectly or `in a certain sense' 
(hence the `quodam modo'), it is using external sense objects insofar as proleptic cpavtaa at are based on 
previous perceptions of those external sense objects. Now if such a reading is the correct one, there would 
be no need to claim, as Sorabji does, that this passage is not Stoic. 
308 L&S 39C (Cicero Academia, 11.21). Trans: `Those characteristics which belong to the things we 
describe as being cognised by the senses are equally characteristic of that further set of things said to be 
cognised not by the senses directly but by them in a certain respect, e. g., "That is white, this is white, this 
is sweet, that is melodious, this is fragrant, this is bitter. " Our cognition of these is secured by the mind not 
by the senses. ' 
309 See L &S, p. 240 (vol. I). Gisela Striker speaks of our aisthetic impressions as being transformed into 
propositions by an automatic translation. G. Striker, `Epicurus on the Truth of Sense-Impressions'. Archiv 
für Geschichte der Philosophie Band 59 (1977), p. 134. Also cf. Julia Annas, `Truth and Knowledge', p. 
88. 
310 These would be our proleptic concepts which are developed from our kataleptic impressions. We 
employ the former in all of our aisthetic impressions. 
311 cf. L&S 33C, D and F. There is some debate as to whether these impressions are articulable but not 
necessarily so or that, in fact, language is necessarily presupposed. For the former view, see C. Gill, `Is 
there a concept of person in Greek philosophy', Companions to Greek Thought. II Psychology ed. S. 
Everson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 187-8. For the latter view, see A. A. Long, 
`Hellenistic Philosophy', p. 124 and L&, ý, p. 240 (vol. I). 
126 
has its physical pneumatic disposition altered by them. The reason I stress identity in the 
context of the intellectual part of the soul and its impressions is that if there is to be an 
account of self-intellection, i. e. an account in which the intellect is its own object of 
intellection, it, the intellect, will somehow have to be identical with its own object. And 
since its objects take the form of impressions, it is at least likely therefore that it will 
have to be an impression. That said, let us now refocus on intellectual impressions and 
see what sort of relation holds between the intellectual subject and these objects. 
Now the type of cpavia6ia I have in mind by intellectual is the Xcxiöv, the 
sayable. According to the Stoics, the ? Kt v appears concurrently and subsists 
(vcptatiä. cvov) in accordance with the rational impression. 312 The former supervenes on 
the latter. Given the causal constraints which were laid down at the outset, the Xcxiöv as 
an asomatic cpavtiaaia is itself incapable of acting upon or being acted upon by the 
intellectual part of the soul. It cannot bring about an affection in the 7j7£µovtxöv. 
However, simply because it cannot enter into a causal relation with the intellect, it does 
not follow that the intellect has absolutely no relation to these impressions. For Zeno 
does say that while the intellect cannot be acted upon by them (ovx ün' (x&r v), it can 
act in relation (en' ai toIS) to them: 
... Evta 
SE tiotai triv exet cpvaty, toi flyEµovticov En' a&roIS 
rfeferr 
cpav'caßiovµCVOV Kati OUX vt, avtiwv, 071016 £rß'ct Ta a"ßcoµaTa 
Xeictiä. 313 
nt'? It is used differently from the way Plato How are we to understand the force of `E11 
uses it in Republic Book V (Chapter II) because there the objects in question were 
capable of directly affecting their appropriate faculty. In this context it would seem that 
the intellect, having been affected by a somatic entity, in the process of fully 
apprehending that object makes reference to the XF-xiä that subsist in accordance with 
that entity. And so it, the intellect, can be said to act in relation to the asomatic entity. In 
other words, it is part of the process of the intellect's apprehension of the somatic entity 
to refer to the XeKr which map onto that causally related impression. 
Given that the relation between the intellect and the Ai th is a referential 
312 cf. j 33C and F. 
313 27E (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos VIII 409-410). Trans: ` ... whereas others have 
a nature like that of the incorporeal sayables, and the commanding-faculty is impressed in relation to them 
and not by them. ' 
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one, it, like its sensory counterpart, does not tell us too much about identity. 314 The 
intellect might be identical with the physical -- pneumatic -- alteration (which is simply 
to say that the intellect qua pneumatic body is identical with itself) but it is not identical 
with the A, £xiä, just as much as it is not identical with the object which caused the 
sensory impression. The only identity relation that is even remotely discernible thus far 
with respect to the intellectual subject is the trivial identity claim that the intellectual 
subject is self-identical. 315 As it stands, the account of the intellect is such that the 
intellect does not become identical with its object and, consequently, self-intellection is 
not a relation which the above epistemological account can accommodate. 
III 
Self-Awareness and Light 
Perhaps, self-intellection with respect to the Stoics is a misplaced theory or notion. 
Perhaps, the intellect or the intellectual part of the soul, instead of having itself as a 
direct or first-order object of thought, has some sort of concomitant or second-order 
awareness of itself, in which it is not an object of knowledge like other objects of 
knowledge. Now, if such a view can be shown to be Stoic, then Sextus' paradox will be 
entirely spurious, since it assumes the intellect knows itself as a first-order object. 
With a view to discerning this second-order awareness, I want to turn to two 
passages in particular, one by Aetius and another by Antiochus, an Academic who is 
said to have held Stoic views. 316 For these passages, prima facie, actually do seem to 
attribute a second-order or concomitant awareness to the fryEµovtixöv. Taking Aetius 
first, we read: 
cpavtiaßia pEv ovv Eatit thOoS E'v j yruxý ytTvö vov, Ev&ucvvµEvov 
avtiö tie uai h nEnotirjlcöc " otov EnELSäv Si' 'VEWS OewpwµEV TO 
314 As noted by A. A. Long, for the Stoics, the intellect's knowledge does not involve identity. See A. A. 
Long, `Language and Thought in Stoicism', p. 83. 
315 As for other mental entities, such as concepts or universals (Evvo1jgat(x), they do not even qualify as 
gavtaa(at but are instead cpavtäaµara, i. e. figments, quasi-real entities. (L&S 30A-C. Also cf. A. A. 
Long, `Language and Thought in Stoicism', p. 110. ) According to the Stoics, they are the `intentional 
content' of conceptions (Evvotat), the latter being physical/pneumatic dispositions of the intellect. (For the 
distinction between Evvoia [conception] and the concept [Evvoijµa], see A. A. Long, `Language and 
Thought in Stoicism', p. 110. ) Like ?º KTa, ivvoijµata would also seem to supervene upon the physical, 
in this case the cvvotat. Hence here too, the only identity relation that can be discerned is the intellect's 
self-identity with its physical dispositions. 
316 Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pmhonism. I 235. 
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XEVxöv, Ott näOog Tö eyy¬ycvrlitvov Stä Ti-1S opäac Ev tf ymxTI. 
KOLL (K(L'C&) '[oi: to TÖ n&OoS EL7[EIv £XogEV, Ött 1)7toKELtat %l£vKOV 
KtV6V dµ&; "317 
And similarly with Antiochus we get the same two-fold account: 
Kara µ. Evtot v iv TotaüTrly äk%, oiwty S&Eiv &vttil, aµßav6µ£6a, jvög 
µev a&r g TjS &? ou ewg, ro- wicnt tj; q avtaata;, SevTipov SE 
tob v äß, i ouoaty Eµltotý aavcoc TovTea'ct TO-0 opaTov 318 
According to both passages, it would seem that the perceptual act consists of a two-fold 
awareness. 319 First there is the awareness of the content of the impression, i. e. the object 
which originally activates the impression. And then comes the awareness of the 
impression itself, which is an awareness of oneself qua intellectual patient. For 
awareness of the impression involves being aware of the intellect disposed in a certain 
manner, namely impressed upon or affected. To be aware of the impression entails being 
aware of oneself qua affected intellectual subject. The perceptual act, therefore, could be 
said to involve a concomitant or second-order self-awareness in which there is an 
awareness of the object and a simultaneous awareness -- to which the first-order 
awareness gives rise -- of oneself as the intellectual patient. 320 And if that is the case, 
then one might very easily argue that the notion of self-intellection, at least as far as the 
Stoics are concerned, is superfluous and that Sextus has attacked a straw man. 
I would argue, however, that, as with the earlier discussion of self- 
consciousness (De Anima 3.2, Chapter IV), here too we have an object-oriented 
awareness in which any second-order or concomitant awareness (in this case the 
awareness the intellect has of itself qua patient) is really nothing over and above the 
first-order awareness, i. e. the awareness of the object. For the cpaviaaia, if it is to be a 
cpav'taßia in the proper sense of the word, must be a perfect, fully effective, vehicle, 
317 L&a 39B (SVF. 2.54). Trans: `An impression is an affection occurring in the soul, which reveals itself 
and its cause. Thus, when through sight we observe something white, the affection is what is engendered 
in the soul through vision; and it is this affection which enables us to say that there is a white object which 
activates us. ' 
318 L&S 70A (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, VII 162). Trans: `But on the basis of this kind 
of alteration we register two things: one, the alteration itself, i. e. the impression, the other thing which 
produced the alteration in us, i. e. the object seen. ' 
319 Regardless of whether one takes Antiochus' account as an accurate portrayal of the Stoic position, 
AMtius is usually considered to be a pretty safe Stoic source. So we at least know that such a view is 
authentically Stoic. 
320 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos. VII 236. This is one reason Sextus says we are not aware 
of ourself because if we were, we would know where the affection occurs, meaning where the intellect is. 
But since some say the head and others the heart, it is obvious that we do not actually know the place and 
thus are not properly aware of ourself. See Sextus Empiricus, ii.. VII 312. 
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caused by and acting in exact accordance with some externally given object. In virtue of 
the role allotted to the cpavtaaia, the awareness which the subject has of itself amounts 
to nothing more than the fact that it, the subject, is conscious of perceiving an object. In 
other words, this supposed second-order awareness, which is constitutive of the soul's 
awareness of itself qua intellectual patient, is really just an awareness of the content of 
the cpaviaaia. Thus the self-awareness in question is in fact an awareness of the 
representation of the external object that is conveyed by the cpav raaia. 
This line of interpretation is borne out, I think, if one continues with the two 
passages just quoted. For they both go on to make the same point with the help of the 
light metaphor. Taking Aetius first, we read: 
Et flt t Sc 1 cpavtiaaia änö TOI-) 9WTO " icauait p yap TO (P (J); auto 
SELxvuat Kali tiä &? a r& Ev ai t4 it ptcxöµ¬va, Kai i1 cpavTaßia 
SEixvuaty Eav, rl, ly Kai 'CÖ itcitou p hS a&'Cnv. 321 
And so too with Antiochus: 
R/ f\e/\/%fff\ 
waltop ovv do cpwg cavtio tic oEucvvßi xat navTa Ta Lv avtiw, ovTCo xat 
71 cpavtiaaia, äpxrJyö; ovßa T71S it pi Tö ýwov Ei6rjaEwS, cpo töS 5iK71v 
Eavrcijv tic gµcpavt etiv o peiXtL xat toi notljßavtioS avty Evapyovg 
EVBEtlcttU11 uatcatavat. 322 
Because the cpaviaaia is supposed to be like or to enjoy the same status as light in the 
visual process, the point of the metaphor, it could be argued, is to emphasise that one is 
aware of it, the cpavtiaaia, inasmuch as one is aware of the content which is conveyed 
by it. That is, the awareness of the light is constituted out of and defined by the content 
which it conveys. For the primary awareness is of the content. Moreover, just as light 
does not constitute a second visual object which acts on the faculty of sight, likewise the 
awareness of the cpav'taaia does not constitute a separate object-oriented awareness in 
its own right, say a self-awareness. For that awareness is inextricably tied to the 
awareness of the object which the cpaviaaia, if it is doing its job properly, conveys. 
Hence to be aware of the cpavtaaia is to be aware of the object for which it is acting as 
a vehicle. All this is to say that the act of perceiving an object has built into it, or has as 
321 L&IS 39B (SV_F. 2.54). Trans: `The word `impression' [phantasia] is derived from `light' [phös]: just 
as light reveals itself and whatever else it includes in its range, so impression reveals itself and its cause. ' 
322 L&S 70A (Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, VII 163). Trans: `Hence just as light shows up 
both itself and all things in it, so too the impression, as the prime mover of the animal's knowledge, must 
in the manner of light both show up itself and be capable of revealing the self-evident object that caused 
it. ' 
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an intrinsic element, the awareness or consciousness that one is perceiving something, 
without creating a second distinct concomitant awareness. 323 
Having deflated the role allotted to light as a proper distinct object of 
awareness, this much must be said in favour of their use of light. These examples go 
farther than Aristotle's use of the light metaphor in De Anima 3.5 (Chapter IV). For 
there, Aristotle spoke of light as simply being that in virtue of which potential colours 
were able to have their potentiality qua visible objects realised. Here, the Stoics actually 
speak of an awareness of the light itself. However, they only posit the awareness in 
relation to and define it by the content conveyed, and do not pursue it as a serious means 
through which to give an account of intellectual self-apprehension, thereby undermining 
its significance. Thus, Sextus' paradox, at least as far as this sort of concomitant 
awareness is concerned, is not misapplied. However, the paradox which arises from the 
combination of trying to give an account of self-intellection within materialism was not 
only recognised as a problem by Sextus. The Stoics were also sensitive to there being a 
problem; a problem which took the form of the elusive argument. 
IV 
Paradox of the Sage 
This paradox asks whether or not the Stoic sage can have self-knowledge; whether or 
not the state or disposition of the sage's f'YFgOVtxöv, i. e. the body of his knowledge, can 
itself be an object of the IJyEµovtxöv. Now, when the wise man has amassed the entire 
body of knowledge, i. e. when his knowledge is complete, 324 at that point he is supposed 
to switch from being ignorant to being wise. 325 But as the Stoics regard the wise man's 
knowledge of his own wisdom to be a piece of knowledge like any other, i. e. a 
perceptible object, if his body of knowledge is to be complete (which it must be if he is 
323 A comparison with the Cyrenaics proves interesting at this point because they maintained that the 
criteria of truth have nothing to do with objects out there in the world but rather are based upon the 
affections in us. (See Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, VII 191. ) In other words, their primary 
objects are not the things out there in the world but the affections themselves which inhere within us. In a 
sense all they have done is moved the objects within but at a price, viz. the loss of the external world. The 
relevant point for us, however, is that whichever way you choose, there can only be one object. 
324 cf. SVF. 3.548. 
325 cf. L &J 61T (SV E. 3.539). 
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to be wise), then his self-knowledge will have to be included in that body. 326 But it 
cannot. For if it is the last truth (keeping in mind that two pieces of knowledge -- two 
perceptible objects -- cannot be acquired simultaneously), it would not be true because it 
is only true once all the other pieces of knowledge (including itself) are in place. And if 
it is not one of the truths, then the wise man is not wise because the body of his 
knowledge is incomplete. 
The Stoics could obviously avoid this paradox, if the sage's self-knowledge 
were not a piece of knowledge like any other, i. e. first-order, and so not constitutive of 
that overall body. In other words, if the wise man's knowledge of his mental condition 
enjoyed a parenthetical or concomitant status in relation to the rest of the body of 
knowledge -- if it were a second-order piece of knowledge instead of a first -- then the 
paradox of the sage could be circumvented. For it would be possible to maintain that two 
things (presumably proper perceptible objects, i. e. first-order things) cannot become 
known at once. 327 But if there were more than one epistemic level in play, then the wise 
man might be able to know two things at once, because one could, for instance, 
supervene on the other. However, the paradox holds because the Stoics want this last 
piece of knowledge -- self-knowledge -- to be a piece like any other. 
Thus the paradox is revealing on two fronts: (i) The Stoics treat the 
disposition or state of the fiýyEµovixöv as an object like any other. Whether self- 
referential or not, the objects of the fryegovtKov are all on a par. (ii) In addition to Sextus 
actually attacking the Stoics, he was actually correct to do so, at least with respect to 
self-intellection. 
Having outlined the problem, I want now to conclude my examination of the 
Stoics with what, it could be argued, are two attempts at formulating a feasible account 
of the how intellect could be its own object of thought. 
V 
Hierocles' 'H6i 6'LOl ýiwßi 3.56-4.53 
Hierocles' version of the oixcür1S theory is of direct relevance because with it one has 
326 cf. Plutarch, De C^ m 1nibus Noti üs contra Stoicos, 1062B-C. 
327 5ff. 3.541 and M. M. Mackenzie. `The Virtues of Socratic Ignorance'. p. 148. 
132 
an attempt at outlining how the intellectual part of the soul could apprehend itself as a 
first-order object. However, before going directly to Hierocles' account, some 
background about the oixEi oatq theory is in order. The obato atg theory had a bipartite 
development: one strand developed egoism, the other altruism. 328 The former focused 
upon self-perception and self-preservation, while the latter social justice. For obvious 
reasons, I will concentrate solely on the former theme. 
The earliest discussion we have of the oixc ox nS theory comes from 
Chrysippus: 
ti1v Se irpcniv öpµujv (paßt tiö ýwov 'axcty bid 'cö iiipeiv £avcö, 
oiKeto6a1; avtiö tifiS cpva&o; än' äpxig, xß06C cplßty ö XpvßinztoS & 
tiw npoxc) IIEpi tiEXwv, lrpoTOV otKEiov AZywv etvat zrav' n ccxcp TI'jv 
avtiov ßvatiaaiv Kai tcjv Tavtiiic ßvvcISrjaty " Oi CE Y&p äXA. oiptwßat 
dicb; ýv aMti 'c6 cwov, ovtie itou aaaav auto µnjt' ä%. Xotptwaat g TIT' 
[ovx] oiKcü)aat. 329 
His objective in this context is to demonstrate that the primary impulse (np(&iil opµfj) of 
all animals is for self-preservation and not, as the Epicureans maintain, pleasure. 330 
Hence the first thing to be said about the oiic oxni theory is that its scope is not limited 
to the epistemology of rational creatures. Now given that the end of all animals, rational 
or otherwise, is self-preservation, it is obviously going to inform their actions, i. e. they 
will avoid things which are injurious to their well-being. Despite the fact that this 
passage of Chrysippus does make reference to self-perception (avvEi&iatv), 331 that is 
not its primary focus. Self-perception might be a necessary condition for self- 
preservation, but it is the itp" bppij, the desiderative aspect, in which Chrysippus is 
primarily interested. 332 
Cicero and Seneca offer us a somewhat similar picture. For Cicero, the 
sentient creature (animal) from birth has the immediate desire to preserve 
(conservandum) its own constitution (suum statum); something which again is only 
328 cf. B. Inwood, Hierocles: Theory and Argument in the Second Century AD, p. 155 and G. Striker, 
Oikeiosis in Stoic Ethics, p. 146. 
329 57A (Diogenes Laertius, Vitae, VII 85). Trans: `They [the Stoics] say that an animal has self- 
preservation as the object of its first impulse, since nature from the beginning appropriates it, as 
Chrysippus says in his On Ends Book I. The first thing appropriate to every animal, he says, is its own 
constitution and the consciousness of this. For nature was not likely either to alienate the animal itself, or 
to make it and then neither alienate it nor appropriate it. ' 
330 Diogenes Laertius, ibi., VII 86. 
331 Inwood reads a vataOijaty instead of the MSS. reading. Either way. the meaning is clear from the 
context. See. B. Inwood, Hierocles: Theory and Argument in the Second Century p. 155. 
332 cf. B. Inwood, ihk , p. 155. 
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possible in virtue of an awareness of that constitution (nisi sensum haberent sui). 333 
Seneca334 also speaks of animals having a consciousness of their own constitutions 
(constitutionis suae census est). Like Chrysippus, he too is rejecting the hedonistic 
account of behaviour in favour of an account which is driven by the desire for self- 
preservation. 335 
Unlike his predecessors who do not emphasis the self, save as a necessary 
condition, Hierocles does concentrate on it. This is not to imply that Hierocles does not 
have his fair share of zoological stories or that he neglects the theme of self- 
preservation. 336 Nonetheless, he does place much more emphasis upon how the intellect 
can be its own object and, as a result, how it can, from a Stoic materialistic point of 
view, affect itself. 337 
Up until 3% of his 'H8tK11 atotx£lwcn6 , Hierocles concentrates upon the 
perception of the self in its relation to the external world or other members of that world. 
However, the subsequent discussion from 3.56 to 4.53 focuses exclusively on the 
creature's perception of itself. 338 The external world or other members of that world do 
not enter the picture. In this section, Hierocles attempts to demonstrate that animals 
continually perceive themselves: 
eiEd I 'co[ivvv iý &p p]otiip[wv iar Tb ] ýwiov ... avv8E'rov, 
bx 
aw[µ]aItoS [Kai] yruxf S, äµcpw S' iatii 6[ix]ti6C Kai itp6a3Xfrra MAT p 
I ipe{[aEt] S]h vit&mrona, E'C[t SE] SL' öawv 1cExpaiat, icai [O ]ITep[ov] 
µ6v Eatity avtiwv Svväµ[tc ai]aOgtucij, do S' av'c[o] I Tob co icai 
tipönov, öv [v]itE8Ei4[aµev, ic]Etveitiat, Sf A, ov 6ct S[t]IavEic S 
aiaOävott' &v [tie ý6Lov] iavtiov 339 
333 De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum, 3.16. See B. Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), p. 192-3. 
334 Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, 121.1 (Hereafter Epist. ) With Seneca, in this context, we should 
include Posidonius and Archimedes, because he begins the letter by telling us that they are on trial along 
with him as far as instinctive behaviour in animals goes. 
335 To illustrate what he means, Seneca says the child, despite the pain it experiences when it first 
attempts to stand, learns to walk because this is what nature demands (natura poscit, Seneca, F. V1, S, 
121.8. ). By `nature demands', I understand the creature's natural desire for self-preservation. 
336 L&! i 57C (Hierocles, 'H6txn otowEiws, 2.1-9) and 6.53-7.48. 
337 As this theory is about all living creatures, in the case of non-rational animals the intellect obviously 
would not be affected but rather, as Inwood points out, some analogous part. See B. Inwood, Ethics and 
Human action in Early Stoicism, p. 196. 
338 One might object to the relevance of this argument as far as self-intellection is concerned because it is 
not exclusively about rational animals but inclusive of all animals. In response, I think it is relevant to the 
extent that human beings are included, and so in their case it is a question about how the ily¬µovmov 
grasps itself. 
339 L&a 53B. Trans: `Since an animal is a composite of body and soul, and both of these are tangible and 
impressible and of course subject to resistance, and also so blended through and through, and one of them 
is a sensory faculty which itself undergoes movement in the way we have indicated, it is evident that the 
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This perception arises out the belief that the two parts, the soul and the body (the 
constituents of the avvOviov), relate to one another causally; being somatic entities, they 
physically affect one another. According to Hierocles, they can impress themselves upon 
one another because they are mixed through and through (Et[t SE] St' 3Xu)v 
KEKp(X'LOCl). 340 Given this complete and perfect blending, if one then tosses in the 
premise that one of the two bodies involved, i. e. the soul, is a sensory faculty, then the 
conclusion that the other body is perceived immediately follows. 
As it stands, Hierocles' demonstration of the animal's continual perception of 
itself, at least as far as the outward physical body is concerned, seems pretty 
straightforward. However, Hierocles thinks himself not only to have given an account of 
how the soul perceives the body in which it resides but also of how the soul -- in the 
case of humans, the intellectual part -- perceives the soul in its entirety. 341 For the 
conclusion of the passage immediately below explicitly remarks that, as a result of this 
interaction, the intellect (tö T"jYcµovucöv) is aware both of all the parts of the body and all 
the parts of the soul: 
rEtvogmj yap E"140) , 71 4rvx[l1 µEti'] äcpEaEwS [npoßßäX]? t näßt 'cob 
ßwµatioS trot; I µEpEaty, C[7E]töil Kai l Kpatiat näßt, npoa Xa, ovaa 
SC äv[tit]7tpoa[P(*XXk]Etiat. ävtitßatitxöv yäp Kai TO, awµa, I 
[x]aOäic[Ep] icai [li] yrvxij " Kai 'rö thOoc avvEpetaitx[öv] I öµov xai 
äv'ccpEta'ttKoV dMOTEXCitiat. K[at änö Twv äxpotiä] I cow µEpwv craw 
vE[vo]v Eiei TT'Jv lyEµoviav c ..... 
I Gov; a.. ävaq p[ccat], 0 ävciXrJynv 
yivEaO(Xt (tiwv) I µEpü)v [ä]7Eä[v]ccwv tiwv [tie c]ov ßwµ(XcoS xai tiwWcijS 
vl)xý ; -342 
This conclusion -- the commanding part's perception of all the parts of the soul ((tiwv) I 
µcpwv [ä]iä[v]ti(Ov ... tiwv tidjc yrvxfic) includes itself -- is more problematic than the 
perception of the outward body for obvious reasons. 343 Up until now it has been 
animal perceives itself continuously. ' 
340 For an account of the Stoic discussion of mixture (xpäßtq), cf. L&S 48A-C. By through and through, 
i. e. blending, the Stoics take the view that the properties of the bodies in question permeate the whole, 
they are coextensive with one another while remaining distinct. This is obviously stronger than touch in 
which just the surfaces of the bodies are in contact; what the Stoics refer to as juxtaposition, cf. L&S (vol. 
I), pp. 292-3. This idea of the soul permeating the body is certainly not unique to Hierocles. Calcidius, for 
example, speaks of the soul as pneuma filling the limbs of the body and ruling over it with different 
powers such as nutrition and sensation etc. See L&S 53G. 
341 cf. n. 338. 
342 L&S 53B. Trans: 'For by stretching out and relaxing, the soul makes an impression on all the body's 
parts, since it is blended with them all, and in making an impression it receives an impression in response. 
For the body, just like the soul, reacts to pressure; and the outcome is a state of their joint pressure upon, 
and resistance to, each other. From the outermost parts inclining within it travels ... to the commanding- 
faculty, with the result that there is an awareness both of all the body's parts and of the soul's. ' 
343 Pembroke also notes that this is a problem for Hierocles. See S. Pembroke, `Oikeiosis', p. 119. 
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assumed that the intellectual part of the soul (as far as humans were concerned) is that 
which undergoes the affection and is not one of the objects which brings about the 
affection, at least not the affection which occurs in itself. The latter role was allotted to 
the outward body. Yet, the intellectual part of the soul must in some way also be that 
object which affects, if Hierocles is to maintain that it is perceptive of itself. 
It would seem from the passage just cited that the way in which Hierocles 
tackles the problem of how the soul, in our case the intellect, apprehends itself is 
through this notion of complete and perfect xp&at; between the soul and the body (SL' 
öW v ithUpati(Xi). For he certainly holds that the intellect apprehends itself and that 
apprehension occurs through this mixture, so it follows that the intellect somehow 
apprehends itself through this mixture. One possible but rather unsatisfactory construal 
might be that because the xpäat; between the entire soul and the body is St' öA, wv, the 
commanding faculty in acting on something with which it is inextricably bound is in a 
sense acting on itself. Inasmuch as the intellect affects the entire mixture, it affects 
itself. 344 Such a claim, however, would either entail an identity relation between the 
intellect and that which affects the intellect or a confusion in scope. 
Let me start with the identity relation: Presumably one way for the intellect 
to affect itself is if it were somehow to become identical with that which affects it. 
However, the Stoic notion of xpäat; (as noted, n. 340) is such that the things involved, 
be it water and wine or body and soul, have a coextensive relation and not one of 
identity. For if they were identical, then it would no longer be a mixture or blend of two 
things but one thing which is simply self-identical. Hence within the confines of a 
xpäatq theory, the identity relation is not plausible. 
If, on the other hand, one takes the line that the intellect, by being a part of 
the mixture, affects the mixture and thereby affects itself because it is part of that 
mixture, then one is guilty of committing a confusion in scope. The intellect might affect 
the mixture but it is the mixture, and not the intellect, which affects the intellect. At best, 
the intellect might affect itself very indirectly. Thus, as noted by Pembroke, there is a 
problem in Hierocles attempting to argue that in virtue of the body and the soul being 
blended together through and through, the commanding faculty of soul perceives 
344 cf. B. Inwood, Hierocles: Theory and Argument in the Second Century AD, p. 163-4. 
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itself. 345 For the intellect does not have itself as the object. Hence the Hierocles' account 
of how the intellectual part of the soul apprehends itself falls short. For his materialism 
requires two distinct bodies, if there is to be apprehension. 
VI 
IIEpi iov X you no)g aüTOÜ O opfliixöc eaity 
(How the Reasoning Faculty Contemplates Itself) 
Epictetus' Discourses I. XX. 1-6 
Epictetus also attempts to give an account of how the intellectual part of the soul 
apprehends itself. He opens this short chapter of the Discourses by discussing the 
various objects of the arts (tExvat) and faculties (8uv('Xµ£t; ). His initial point is that 
when the object of either of these is of a like kind (OgoEt6ij ), the contemplator 
inevitably becomes self-contemplative (ävayKaiwS Kai avirfS yIvci(Xt 9Ewp71tuc' ). 346 
On the other hand, if the object is different, then it is impossible to become self- 
contemplative. 347 To illustrate what he means by the latter, Epictetus gives the example 
of leather working. The art of leather working has as its object hides, not the art of 
leather working itself. 348 However, the relation between the intellectual part of the soul 
and its object, being ö tont5iI;, does entail self-contemplation: 
ö ovv Aöyo; npo; tit notE v7tö iijg cpvßcwS napEt? fl7ttat; npo; xpfiaty 
cpavtiaßtwv oiav Sei. auto; oüv Ti Eatty; avatiTIµa Ex notwv 
cPavtaatwv " ov-to 'ytvctat cpuGEt xat autov 8&wprltitxoS. 
349 
Self-contemplation is secured ((xvtiov OEwprltiuco; ), because the intellect, by 
contemplating its object(s), becomes them and, as a result, contemplates itself. 350 What 
appears to be driving Epictetus' account, as was the case with Hierocles, is the need for 
an identity relation between the subject and object, in addition to the causal one. Yet, 
unlike the Hieroclean account which bases its argument on a Kpäa1S theory, Epictetus' 
345 cf. n. 343. 
346 Epictetus, The Discourses, I. XX. 2. Text of Epictetus is taken from the Teubner edition. Epictetus, 
Epictet Dissertations ab Arriano Di sa., ed. H. Schenkt (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1844). 
347 Epictetus, I. XX. 3. 
348 Epictetus, I. XX. 3. 
349 Epictetus, ii., I. XX. 5-6. Trans: `Well then, for what purpose have we received reason from nature? 
For the proper use of external impressions. What, then, is reason itself? Something composed out of a 
certain kind of external impressions. And so it comes naturally to be also self-contemplative. ' This 
translation is not based upon jam. 
350 Epictetus, Ibi ., 
I"XX"6. 
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position is closer to the Aristotelian one. For identity is achieved when the irygµovtxov 
is acted upon by the cpawcaaia. Given this affection, the reasoning faculty becomes a 
(TI)Orj µa EEC noiwv cpaviaatwv. 
However, what does it mean to be a avatqµa (composition or ordered 
structure)? 351 At this point, it might be helpful to make use of a passage from Stobaeus 
in which he speaks of how the Stoics understood the relation between the irygµovtKöv 
and the avatirlµa which, at least in part, is constitutive of it. According to his account of 
the Stoics, they took it, the 6ü atir µa, to be an organised or structured group of 
cirtati iai,: 
eivati SE 'r v &iriaiijµrIv Kai OCkll nv &a paA, ij uai äµETänTanov vntö 
? 4yov " ETEpav Si Cntati tiiv of ati is Cý C7EtaTjµüiv totovTCwv, oiov f 11 
'cwv uaTa pepog aayuai cv tq aicovöaüp 1)7Eapxovaa"352 
But what are these Entati at? From the passage just quoted, it would appear to be a 
plurality of cognitive impressions of particulars which, with the help of reason, have 
become a secured and impregnable part of the i- y£µovtxöv, or to be more precise, the 
fryEµovtxöv disposed in a specific manner. 353 A. A. Long describes them as a collection 
(&8potaµ(x) or system (avati1Iµ(x) of truths. 354 And what makes them a system is the 
way in which reason binds them together, i. e. as an unmoveable whole. The body of 
truths, i. e. scientific knowledge, is just what the T"JyCµovtKOV of the wise man is. 
Given Stobaeus' account of the relation between the rl'yeµovucov and the 
avatinµa, does it shed light on Epictetus' version of things? I think the answer has to be 
yes. For the passage quoted from the Discourses does speak of the reasoning faculty (ö 
Xöayo; [i. e. Xoyucrl 8uvaµtg]) as that which is composed out of a certain kind of external 
impressions (i. e. kataleptic ones). This composition, in turn, goes to making up the body 
of truths which reside within the i1 yegovuthv, thereby determining its disposition. Now, 
351 This term avatiýµa occurs in a passage from Zeno when he remarks that TEXvri caci avxtrlµa Fu 
uatakýyrcwv a'uyycyugvaagEvwv, SVF. 1.21. For more general use of the term auatrlga in which it 
means any ordered structure such as a group of premises or virtuous actions, cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vitae, 
VII 45 and SVF. 111.293 respectively. Also cf. A. A. Long, `Language and Thought in Stoicism', p. 112. 
352 L&. a 41H (SVF. III. 112). Trans: '[The Stoics say] Scientific knowledge is a cognition which is secure 
and unchangeable by reason. It is secondly a system of such epistemai, like the rational cognition of 
particulars which exists in the virtuous man. ' 
353 cf. (vol. I), p. 257. 
354 A. A. Long, `Language and Thought in Stoicism', p. 100. For a discussion of the difference between 
true (äkn&q) and truth (äMOcta), see L&a 33P (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pytrhonism, 2.81-3). In 
short truth is corporeal. It is scientific knowledge which in turn is the ilycµovixöv disposed in a certain 
way. 
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I would argue, it is by determining the disposition of the rlyF'µovtKov, that the 
irycµovtKov becomes a 66ß µa cpavtaai v. For the latter determine its disposition 
inasmuch as they are that from which it, the iryEµovucöv, is composed. They are what 
the fryEgOVIKov becomes. Given this identity, the hyEpovucOv is supposed to be self- 
contemplative. 
But is this determining of disposition sufficient to account for self- 
intellection? In other words, how does Epictetus get from the intellect being aa auµa 
cpaviaaiwv to the intellect contemplating itself? Presumably his answer goes something 
like this: As the fyFgovuxöv contemplates the body of truths out which it is constituted, 
it contemplates itself, because it is identical with that body of knowledge. But there is a 
problem. Assuming the fryEµovuxöv is properly disposed, i. e. has been affected in such a 
way as to become that body of truths, this is its state qua intellectual subject. For this is 
how it has been affected and, as a result, this is the disposition it has acquired. It is what 
it has become. Yet how could such a qualified body in turn become its own object, while 
still remaining the subject which is supposed to be doing the contemplating? If the body 
were, say, to split up into two parts, the part which played the role of subject would not 
be self-contemplative because it had not as of yet become the other part, the body of 
truths. But once it did, we would be back to an object devoid of a subject. In other 
words, this pneumatic body can only take on one epistemic role at a time, either it is the 
subject disposed in a certain way or the object, but not both. We are left with one of two 
alternatives: Either abandon the identity relation between the subject and object and with 
it the notion of self-contemplation, or keep the identity relation at the price of triviality. 
The disposed pneumatic body in question is simply identical with itself. It simply is 
what it is. Epictetus, more so than Hierocles, gets the full force of Sextus' paradox 
because the corporeal entity with which Epictetus is concerned can only fill out part of 
the equation required for a coherent account of self-intellection. 
VII 
Sextus Revisited 
In the end, both the accounts of Hierocles and Epictetus fall short as far as theories of 
self-intellection. For as Sextus rightly brought out, their materialism is such that it does 
139 
not allow for all the required relations. It can accommodate coextensivity and causality 
but when it comes to identity, it self-destructs. For the latter undermined Hierocles' 
xpäat; theory, at least with respect to the intellect grasping itself. And with Epictetus, 
we were left with a trivial identity relation, the self-identity of the i EgOVixöv. For any 
other manoeuvre left him vulnerable either to Sextus' part/part attack or his whole/whole 
attack. 
Sextus' paradox forms the perfect counterpart to the strong monism of 
Parmenides, as far as the epistemological relation between the epistemic subject and its 
object is concerned. For both positions have a lethal effect on the relation between the 
epistemic subject and its object: They are prohibitive of it, rendering the epistemological 
terminology of subject and object entirely inappropriate. Having seen the development 
of the dilemma about whether the subject can or cannot have itself as an object of 
thought, let us now see whether it can be solved. 
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VI 
Plotinus' Response to Sextus' Paradox 
With Sextus' paradox, an impasse in setting out a theory of self-intellection has been 
reached. Either the subject becomes the object (the part/part account) or there is no 
object at all but just the subject (the whole/whole account), thereby making any account 
of self-intellection impossible; at least an account in which the subject has itself as its 
own object. However, Plotinus has a response to Sextus' paradox. 355 With his account of 
the intellect -- the second hypostasis -- I shall argue that we have the setting out of the 
structure of self-intellection in such a way that the epistemic subject and its object do not 
eclipse one another. Rather, they have a coextensive relation qua wholes, and yet are 
still able to meet the identity condition in such a way as to guarantee self-intellection. As 
a result, with Plotinus we have for the first time an adequate account of self- 
intellection. 356 
355 This claim is by no means novel. For comments on the influence of the sceptical arguments on 
Plotinus, cf. J. Pepin, `Elements pour une histoire de la relation entre l'intelligence et l'intelligible chez 
Platon et dans le neoplatonisme', Revue Philosophiaue 146 (1956), pp. 54-5, Richard T. Wallis, 
`Scepticism and Neoplatonism', Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt II. 32.2 (1987), pp. 922-25, 
E. K. Emilsson, `Plotinus on the Objects of Thought', Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie Band 77 
(1995), p. 32-3,36 and Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus (London: Routledge Publishers, 1994), p. 248, n. 46. 
356 In part, the aim of this chapter will be to challenge two of the most recent views about the manner in 
which the Plotinian intellect thinks itself. E. K. Emilsson takes the line that the subject-object distinction is 
incompatible with self-knowledge, and I quote: `Thus, we have a claim to the effect that even a subject- 
object distinction in the intellect is incompatible with its self-knowledge. The subject, what we have called 
the thinker-side, must immediately know itself. ' E. K. Emilsson, `Plotinus on the Objects of Thought', p. 
32. This is a much stronger claim than, say, that of O'Daly, who takes the line that self-knowledge 
presupposes a unity of subject and object. See Gerard J. P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self 
(Shannon: Irish University Press, 1973), p. 70. Also see Edward W. Warren `Consciousness in Plotinus'. 
Phronesis 9 (1964), p. 83 n. 1. The motivation for Emilsson's strong claim is the Sextus material, which 
holds that the subject is the whole and thus there is no room for an object, thereby ruling out self- 
knowledge. I shall attempt to argue that although Plotinus does take the `whole' route -- and thus is 
responding to Sextus -- this does not necessarily rule out the subject-object distinction. 
Rather, self- 
intellection, if it is to be successful, requires it. It just will not be along the lines of the part/part reading. 
The second view about self-intellection which I shall try to dispense with is Gerson's. He claims that the 
intellect's self-knowledge comes about because there is no difference between the intellect knowing and 
the intellect knowing that it is knowing: sKp and sKsKp are mutually implicative. Although disproving 
this second interpretation is not nearly as important to my enterprise as disproving Emilsson's, I shall 
attempt to show below why it too does not do justice to the Plotinian account of self-intellection. 
For, I 
think, it derives self-knowledge in the wrong manner. See L. Gerson, Plotinus, pp. 545. 
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I 
The Discursive Intellect's Relation to Objects 
To understand the Plotinian account of the intellect, it must be viewed in the larger 
Plotinian psychological/epistemological context. For Plotinus held there to be two, not 
one, intellectual activities, the discursive or the dianoetic (8tavoi(X)357 and the noetic. 358 
However, let me begin by stressing a central point which is common to both of these 
intellectual activities. According to Plotinus, any sort of intellectual act, discursive or 
otherwise, is a process in which the thinking subject comes to think some kind of object: 
Sei Toivvv ytyvwaKcty CntaTi c avta, Wg VOTjatg it&aa EK TtVOS E6Tl 
Kai Ttvög. 359 
All thinking (vöiatc) must have some sort of object or content about which to think 
(itvög). If not, the act itself will be rendered vacuous. 360 Thus, understanding the 
differences between these intellectual acts will lie in the type of objects each faculty has 
and in the type of relations the subject has with that object. (A proper grasp, therefore, of 
the difference between these two intellectual activities is required, if we are to 
understand fully how it is that the intellectual activity with which I am concerned, voi S, 
357 cf. 5.3 [49]. 3.35. For a discussion of the terms Plotinus employs when discussing discursive reason 
such as cö 6tavoT ctxöv, ?, oytßtitxöv or Xo'ytogo;, cf. John Rist `Integration and Undescended Soul in 
Plotinus', American Journal of Philology 88 (1967), p. 416 and L. Gerson, Plotinus. p. 250, n. 63. 
358 For that matter, in the Plotinian world one could make a case for considering sense perception to be an 
intellectual process, given that at 6.7 [38]. 7.30ff. Plotinus remarks: &Sace etvat tiäcg atoOijactg cavcag 
äµv8päg voijaetg, cäg Be EICFA voi a tg Evapycig at'aOijactg. ('So that these sense perceptions here are 
dim intellections, but the intellections there are clear sense-perceptions. ') However, this sort of 
interpretation will depend in part on how one takes 111.8 [30], a treatise in which Plotinus goes so far as to 
argue that nature itself is capable of contemplation. Whichever route one opts for, one has to be careful 
how he interprets r(; SE Exci vo1jßetg &vaPyeIS aiaOrlaEtg, for Plotinus is explicit that the intellect does 
not see the sorts of things which we are accustomed to think of when it comes to seeing, i. e. the seeing of 
colours or forms which one has in physical bodies: noIov Se it 6p? 'Co' voq rov 6 vovg, uai no ov -tt 
Muc6v; Tj TO gev voI1tiöv ov8ir &i ýtlcEiv, oiov 'TO uni TOI; ßWµaßt XPwµa " 11 ß' x11µa " npty Yap TaüTa 
Elvat, Eatity Eueiva " xai ö ?. öyog SE 6 Ev Tot; ankpµaat cot; tiavia notovaty oü cabTa " ('But as what 
sort of thing does Intellect see the intelligible, and, as what sort of thing does it see itself? As for the 
intelligible, one should not look for something like colour or form in bodies; for the intelligibles exist 
before the existence of these; and the rational forming principle in the seeds which produce these are not 
form and colour. ' 5.3 [49]. 8.1-5. ) Text and translations, unless otherwise stated, are based upon A. H. 
Armstrong's Loeb edition. The Enneads. 7 vols., trans. A. H. Armstrong (London: Loeb Classical 
Library. William Heinemann Ltd, 1966-88). Cf. Emilsson's response to Dillon for some insightful remarks 
on the topic of intellectual perceptions. E. K. Emilsson, `Commentary on Dillon', The Boston Colloquium 
on Ancient Philosophy, (New York: The American Press, 1987), pp. 359-63. 
359 6.7 [38]. 40.5-6. Trans: `It is necessary to know and understand that all thinking comes from something 
and is of something'. The fact that Plotinus thinks that all thinking is of something, which presumably 
includes self-intellection, does not help Emilsson's thesis as discussed in n. 356. 
360 Such vacuity, as was witnessed in the first chapter, was the sort of consequence one had with the 
strong monism of Parmenides. 
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operates. ) 
According to Plotinus, the part of the soul that reasons discursively combines 
(avv(X'yov), divides (Statpovv) and compares incoming impressions (TVnot or d8o)ka) 
which it receives from both the sensory and noetic worlds with ones which it had 
previously received. 361 So, for example, one recognises an individual, say Socrates, by 
comparing an incoming impression of that individual with an earlier impression of 
him. 362 In the case of normative judgements, such as Socrates is good, one can pass this 
type of judgement in virtue of what Plotinus calls the rules (x(XvövES) embedded in the 
rational part of the soul. However, these rules too, like the images, do not have their 
point of origin in the rational part of the soul. Rather the discursive subject acquires 
them through the intellect's illumination. 363 The soul `is written upon by the 
intellect'. 364 So the xavovES can also be grouped with the mnot inasmuch as they form 
part of the overall body of content which is given to the rational part of the soul, 
differing only in function: the soul employs them as a means of passing judgement on 
other things. 
What conclusions can be drawn from the discursive activity as outlined? The 
fact that the dianoetic faculty or subject is receptive of tivnot or EiSwXa is crucial. For it 
implies that this faculty focuses upon objects which enjoy a separate, independent and 
external existence. The discursive subject's relation to its objects is mediated by the 
images which resonate from these objects. The discursive subject does not have direct 
contact with the objects themselves. Even the xavövES which reside in this faculty are 
only images, images of that which, strictly speaking, exists in the noetic world. 365 Now 
as the faculty requires external data in order to perform its discursive function, it can be 
inferred that the faculty itself is not generative of its own content but rather is structured 
in such a way as to look outwards, away from itself: 
Toütio ioivuv 'TO, Stavo ttxöv TINS'v xfjc &pa EmaTpVcEt Ecp' iautö 
icai av cö; 11 O1 U- &W wv Seefiat t ito v Ecp' kK6tepa 'njv ßvvcaty 
10 t 366 axet. 
361 5.3 [49]. 2.7-14 and 5.3 [49]. 3.35-40. 
362 5.3 [49]. 3.3-7. 
363 5.3 [49]. 3.10-12 and 4.15-19. 
364 5.3 [49]. 4.22. No doubt Plotinus has Aristotle's De Anima 3.4 in mind here. 
365 5.3 [49]. 4.21-23. 
366 5.3 [49]. 2.23-26. Trans: `Does then this reasoning part of the soul return upon itself? No it does not. 
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In virtue of this relation, the discursive subject directs its gaze exclusively towards 
external objects. 
Two very important consequences follow from discursive reason being 
disposed in this way: Firstly, it is fallible because its relation is mediated by impressions. 
Here Plotinus is responding to the Sceptic attack on impressions and their unreliability. 
However, he limits fallibility to the discursive level. 367 His answer to the Sceptic about 
the fallibility of impressions thus determines his account of the structure of the noetic 
intellect, which will in turn have an effect on how Plotinus responds to Sextus' paradox. 
For the infallibility of the noetic intellect rests upon the claim that it does not deal with 
impressions. And this, as we shall see, is because of Plotinus' doctrine of internality. 
The second conclusion to be drawn from the disposition of the discursive 
intellect is that the type of relation in which the subject has itself as an object of 
intellection does not arise at the discursive level. For the relation between the subject 
and object at this level does not involve an identity relation. It is only at the noetic level 
that the identity relation becomes an issue, and along with it self-intellection: 
(X (X St& 'C'I ov iovtiw tiw [sc. Siavoýtitxw] µepet SövtcS tiö voeiv 
Eavtiö anou% 
, aýöµcOa; il' 
ö'cti eöoµcv c tj tiä etw auoneioOat xai 
itoA. wtpayµoveiv, vw Se a toi iev i apxtty Tä autou Kai TOE Ev aucq 
ßuoneiaOat. 368 
So with a view to developing this notion of self-intellection, let me now turn to the 
noetic intellect. 369 
Rather it has understanding of the impressions which it receives from both sides. ' Also cf. E. K. Emilsson, 
`Plotinus on the Objects of Thought', p. 32. 
367 To quote Emilsson, `So, rather than attempting to show where the sceptic goes wrong, Plotinus sees it 
as his task to find adequate assumptions that provide a foundation of knowledge that is immune to 
sceptical attacks. ' E. K. Emilsson, `Plotinus on the Objects of Thought', p. 36. 
368 5.3 [49]. 3.16-19. Trans: `But why do we not give self-thinking to this part, and finish with the subject? 
Because we gave this part the task of observing what is outside it and busying itself with it, but we think 
that it is proper to Intellect to observe what belongs to itself and what is within itself. ' Also cf. 5.3 
[49]. 7.25-26. In this passage, the part of the soul directed inwards does not affect my argument because, 
for all intents and purposes, it is the intellect. This has its origins in the Plotinian doctrine that the entire 
soul does not descend from intellect; a doctrine which subsequent Neoplatonists go on to reject, cf. 
Proclus, Elements of Theology, §§ 211. 
369 However, it would be wrong to infer from this account that the dianoetic faculty is unreflexive 
simpliciter. It does have some sort of self-knowledge. For instance, it knows that it is discursive reason 
and that it has a grasp of the world around it which acts upon it. As Plotinus puts it, it thinks itself as 
belonging to another (cf. 5.3 [49]. 6.3-6, quoted below), and thus is not directly self-reflexive. Cf. E. K. 
Emilsson, `Plotinus on the Objects of Thought', p. 32. 
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II 
The Noetic Intellect's Relation to Itself 
The noetic activity, if it is to qualify as an intellectual activity, must also think about 
something. It must have some intellectual content. Now, in order to appreciate Plotinus' 
account of the intellect and its relation to what it thinks, the formal structure of the 
intellect's activity must first be set out. There are two phases or logical moments. 370 The 
first is that of an inchoate and undefined intellect which has not yet turned towards its 
source, the One. Plotinus compares this stage to that of unformed sight. 
ovtiog SE iro), eý Evog EyEveio, xai ovtiwS yvovS c öev aino, Kal TOTE 
EyEvetio i8ovßa Sync. Tovýco SE T91,811 vob;, öTe CxEt, Kai wS Vol); xct 
st;. 371 lrpo SE tiovcov ccpEal; Lovov Kat a'cvnwTOS it 
The second phase is both the act of conversion (iniaip£cpEly) itself and what results 
from such an act. It is in this second phase that the intellect's true form is realised: 
tiö SE yevöµEVOV Etc avtiö EnEßtipäcprI xai ýnÄllpwOi Km EyevETO npoS 
auto ß? Eiuov xai vouS oüioS. Kai. 11 pv npOS Exeivo ataatg aü'coü do 
Sv Ficoirýaty, ý Se npOS aiTÖ 9Ea %V vovv. Firth ovv Eati npOS a&rÖ, 
372 tva tön, opov v64 yiyvctat xat 0v. 
and, as a result, self-intellection occurs: 
to vveI%%t%vIr 
-- (j)ßT6 c it p Ev Eavtiw patt xat avv Eavtiw xat tiovtio, onEp Cßtit, voi S 
Eatity (avöitoc se, vob; of äv ROTE Eire) äväyici avvcivat aüTf Ti? v 
yvwßty Eavtiov -- 
373 
For thinking itself is, at least in part, the function (tiö Fpyov) of the intellect. 374 Thus a 
370 cf. 5.9 [5]. 8.20-22. Here Plotinus explicitly remarks that it is our thinking which places these stages in 
temporal succession, when strictly speaking they should not be. Rather, they are the structure of the 
intellectual activity, an activity which is eternal. Also cf. Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus, p. 45. 
371 5.3 [49]. 11.10-13. Trans: `But this impression became many out of one, and so intellect knew it and 
saw it, and then it became a seeing sight. It is already intellect when it possesses this, and it possesses it as 
intellect; but before this it is only desire and unformed sight. ' For a discussion of the inchoate intellect, see 
J. Bussanich, The One and its Relation to the Intellect in Plotinus (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988), pp. 11-14. 
372 5.2 [11]. 1.10-14. Trans: `This, when it has come into being, turns back upon the One and is filled, and 
becomes intellect by looking towards it. Its halt and turning towards the One constitutes being, its gaze 
upon the One, intellect. Since it halts and turns towards the One that it may see, it becomes at once 
intellect and being. Also cf. 5.1 [10]. 5.18-19,5.3 [49]. 11.26-31. and. 5.6 [24]. 1.5-6. However, it should be 
noted that the last of these passages has proved most troublesome for modern commentators. The 
difficulty centres around whether the proper subject of EWpa is the One or vovg. I follow Armstrong, 
O'Daly and Schroeder who take it to be vob; instead of the One because the One is beyond any sort of 
activity, including self-intellection or awareness. See Armstrong, Plotinus: Enneads, vol. 5 (London: 
William Heinemann Ltd., 1984), pp. 34-5, n. 1, G. J. P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self. p. 72 and 
F. M. Schroeder, `Conversion and Consciousness in Plotinus, `Enneads' 5.1 [10], 7 Hermes 114 (1986), p. 
187. 
373 5.3 [49]. 6.32-34. Trans: `-- so that if it [sc. intellect] is in itself and with itself, and that which it is, is 
intellect (there could not even be an unintelligent intellect), its knowledge of itself must necessarily 
accompany it --' Also cf. 5.3 [49]. 6.39-42. 
374 5.3 [49]. 6.35. 
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crucial, if not the most crucial, difference between two faculties can be now discerned. 
One is entirely orriented towards itself, while the other is not, with the result that the 
noetic subject always has itself as its object of intellection: 
TI ýLV yocp yrvx11 E9 01 voct ýa1)t V Ött äxxol), ö& VA o, Ct ainbg Kai oioc 
avtioS xat oa'ttS scat £1c T% EavToü cpvaEwS uat enuatpepwv FiS 
avtiöv. 375 
The noetic intellect cannot intelligise without intelligising itself. The content of its 
thought is itself. They are in some sense identical with one another. 376 Thus, on the face 
of it, self-intellection is secured because the subject is the same as its object, since that 
object is itself. 
However, this is an over-simplification. At the outset of this section, it was 
said the realisation of intellect came about through its directing its attention towards the 
One. The One is that in virtue of which the intellect is what it is. Thus, on the face of it, 
it would seem somewhat misguided to say that the intellect is exclusively self-directed, 
i. e. only has itself as an object of intellection. For such a claim would seem to be 
incompatible with the claim that the intellect gazes upon the One, i. e. has it as an object, 
assuming, of course, that we do not equate the One with the intellect. Certainly Plotinus 
does not. 377 So there would seem to be a case for saying that the activity of the intellect 
is not exclusively self-directed. Plotinus' response to such a claim would, I think, be the 
following: The intellect never strictly apprehends the One. 378 Even in its inchoate state, 
the intellect only has some kind of image or impression ((pävýtaaµä tit) of the One. 379 
Keeping to the sight imagery, Plotinus does not say that the intellect, when fully 
articulated, sees an independent external object different from itself, something which 
one might expect if it saw the One. But rather, he says, it sees the seeing itself, i. e. its 
own activit &ßtit ä`v' at ö aßt b waa äw tiE Ev. 380 The u ose of the One Yý YP TI rl SPSP µýP P rP 
375 5.3 [49]. 6.3-6. Trans: `For the soul thought itself as belonging to another, but intellect did so as itself, 
and as what and who it is and [it started its thinking] from its own nature and thought reverting back upon 
itself. ' 
376 cf. 3.8 [30]. 3.19. 
377 cf. 6.7 [38]. 41.12-22. 
378 cf. 5.3 [49]. 11.10-12 (quoted above) and J. Bussanich, The One and its Relation to the Intellect in 
Plotinus, p. 14. 
379 5.3 [49]. 11.7. 
380 5.1 [101.5.19-20. It should be noted that there is some question about the `tce' in the manuscripts. I 
follow Armstrong and Henry and Schwyzer in retaining the See A. Armstrong, Enneads vol. 5, p. 28 
n. 1 and Henry and Schwyzer, Plotini Opera. vol. II (Brussels: L'Ed. ition Universelle, S. A., 1959), p. 272. 
As for the `seeing the seeing'. I shall return to this notion at the end of my study, since it is of pivotal 
146 
in this context is to cause the intellect to turn towards itself; to take itself as an object, 
thereby attaining its proper intellectual self-directed relation. The intellect's 
apprehension of the One is really the intellect's apprehension of itself. 381 It sees the One 
qua intellect: 
1j &tt oüx'V 9cwpEi. e7tEi Kai ö'cav Tö 'v Ouopfj oiix &q E"v " Ei Se µßj, oü 
382 yivcTat vovg. 
The intellect's relation to itself, therefore, is not in any way hindered or made opaque by 
the One in this context but instead is realised with the help of the One. The intellect still 
has itself as an object of intellection: 
'16 divot [sc. Tov vociv] oüv EVE"cta, iced of v, npOq öf EvEp"ycta 
irpO; avtiw apa. Cavtiov apa vowv ottw npoS cthc iced et; EavTOV tv 
EVEpyEiav t 383 OXEt. 
The sketch thus far of Plotinus' position is such that the epistemic subject is clearly 
identical with its object, given that that object is itself. However, having said all this, it is 
still very unclear as to how and whether such an account will suffice as either an 
importance. 
381 This sort of account presupposes a crucial Plotinian principle: in order for anything, be it the soul or 
the intellect, to know itself properly, it can do so only by turning towards its source. It might be said that 
the intellect sees the One inasmuch as it sees the effect of the One on itself, its intellectual or epistemic 
unity. 
382 3.8[30]. 8.30-2. Trans: `Because what it contemplates is not the One. For when it contemplates the 
One, it does not do as one: If it did, it would not become intellect. ' 
383 5.3 [49]. 7.18-21. Trans: `The being of intellect, therefore, is activity, and there is nothing towards 
which that activity is directed; so it is self-directed. Thinking itself, it is thus with itself and holds its 
activity directed to itself. ' As we shall see in the next section, there is another very good reason why the 
intellect cannot have the One as a proper object of thought. Namely, all the objects of the intellect are 
internal to it. Consequently, the One would have to be within the intellect itself, a point which Plotinus is 
aware of and rules out: µövov yäp 'ev &xCivo - xai ci µEV nävtia, Ev tioiS ovate äv ijv. Stä Toüto &KEivo 
ov6ev Rev tiwv Ev tiw vw, ... (Trans: `That 
One is one alone: if he was all things, he would be numbered 
among beings. For this reason that One is none of the things in intellect, ... ' 5.1 [10]. 7.21-23). Having said 
this, I must make some mention of 5.6 [24]. 5.16-17, a passage in which Plotinus speaks of the intellect 
thinking the One first and foremost and itself only incidentally (xar& (Yvµßeßr11C0c). Does this undermine 
all that has been said and entail that the intellect is not directly reflexive? I would say no it does not. Two 
points must be made to defend this claim: First, it could be argued that in this middle Ennead. [24], 
Plotinus was still under the sway of Alexander of Aphrodisias much more than by the time he came to 
write 5.3 [49], his last Ennead. For as 0' Daly has pointed out (Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, pp. 79-80) 
Plotinus gets this notion of ua'ra migpeß11x6S from Alexander's Commentary of Aristotle's De Anima 
(Alexander of Aphrodisias, De Anima, 86,17ff. Bruns). For there Alexander, developing Aristotle's 
doctrine of the intellect, also speaks of the thinker knowing itself incidentally (KaTä avµßF-ß1JK0s). 
Secondly, there is the issue of topic. 5.6 is specifically about how and why the intellect must focus on the 
first principle. Whereas, 5.3 is specifically about self-intellection. So if one had to chose, 5.3 would be the 
safer of the two as far as self-intellection is concerned. As Emilsson says, with 5.3 we have Plotinus' most 
thorough and authoritative account of self-intellection. Thus, the worst case scenario for me is that 
Plotinus did not hold the intellect to be directly self-reflexive early on in his philosophical career 
(although even in the early Enneads there is evidence to the contrary). Whereas on the best case scenario, 
given the difference in topic between the two Enneads, one should be cautious with 5.6 when it comes to 
how the intellect's self-relation should be understood 
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adequate account of self-intellection or a response to Sextus' paradox. For the claim that 
the intellectual subject is identical with its object and thus thinks itself is, on its own. 
sufficient for neither. 384 The crux of the matter will come down to how Plotinus deals 
with the relation between the intellectual subject and its object(s) and whether the 
intellect can have itself as an object, while still retaining the subject-object distinction. 
III 
The Noetic Intellect's Relation to its Objects 
In order to begin to understand how Plotinus' account might form an adequate basis for 
a theory of self-intellection, and, by extension a response to Sextus, I obviously must do 
more than just outline a formal sketch in which the Plotinian intellect is shown to be 
self-directed. I must properly address what that content is and how it is that the intellect 
relates to it. To begin, that we are not dealing with an entity which is absolutely simple 
and self-identical is clear from the fact that Plotinus speaks of the intellect as a one- 
many ('CV no? X ), as opposed to the One which is just one, i. e. is absolutely simple. 385 
The intellect, if its self-relation is not to be jeopardised, must see itself transparently in 
the `many'. Otherwise, Plotinus' account of the intellect will fall short of the claim that 
the intellect is directly self-reflexive, i. e. has itself as a transparent object of knowledge. 
The way Plotinus deals with the intellect having many objects and yet 
remaining self-directed is to locate the objects within the intellect. They, the objects, are 
somehow part of the intellect: ... v4 
SE & tovµ£v ütäpxEty tiä aviov Kai iä Ev aviw 
(xo1tEiaOat. 386 The intellect's thinking is focused within and not outside: xai 6) vowv 
384 We have been here once before with Aristotle, and there can be little doubt that Plotinus' account of 
the intellect does take much from Aristotle's. On this point cf. R Wallis, `Scepticism and Neoplatonism', 
pp. 923-4 and L. Gerson, Plotinus, p. 243 n. 7. 
385 In this regard, Plotinus sees himself as adhering to the second hypothesis of Plato's dialogue, the 
Parmenides (144e5; 145a2). Cf. 4.8 [6]. 3.11,5.1 [10]. 8.27,5.3 [49]. 15.11ff., 6.2 [43]. 2.2,6.2 [43]. 10.12, 
6.2 [43]. 15.14-15,6.2 [43]. 21.7,6.2 [43]. 22.10,6.5 [23]. 6.1-2,6.6 [34]. 8.23,6.6 [34]. 13.52-4,6.7 
[38]. 14.11-12 and 6.7 [38]. 39.11-14. Also cf. M. Atkinson, Ennead V. I: On the Three Principal 
Hypostases: A Commentary with Translation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 196-8 and L. 
Gerson, Plotinus, pp. 44-5. 
386 5.3 [49]. 3.18-19. Trans: ` ... but we think that it 
is proper to intellect for it observe what belongs to 
itself and what is within itself. ' (quoted in full above, n. 368). This epistemological reason, i. e. the 
intellect being self-directed, is by no means meant to be the only reason why Plotinus would want to 
locate the objects of the intellect within it. There are several other reasons (epistemological, metaphysical 
and even cosmological) which are just as, if not more, central to his philosophy which would motivate him 
to place the intellect's objects within it. For a start, we have already seen that it, in part, is a refutation of 
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ýv ýavtiW Kai. ovx "40). 387 Thus by being part of the intellect, the intellect in a sense is 
thinking them in thinking itself. But just how it thinks itself needs to be clearly set out. 
As it stands, it is not obvious how the intellect can have itself as a transparent object and 
yet relate to the many which are supposed to be part of itself. 
For a start, let me be clear what is intended by objects in this noetic context. 
According to Plotinus, the objects of the intellect are the forms or ideas: 
Ei oüv i1vo atg EvovtoS, excivo do eiSoS Tö Evov " Kai iliöEa aüTq. Tt 
ovv cob ro; vob; xai q voepä ovaia, ovx VTepa tiov vov £xä an i&m, 
OR O; '%" '" 389 aXX c aatirJ vouS. Kalt oA. o; pev o vau; ca navta d8il, ... 
What sort of relation do these objects enjoy with the noetic or intellectual subject? For 
instance, which side (i. e. the intellectual subject or the intelligible object), if any, takes 
priority? Is there a causal relation between the two sides, or is it simply logical, i. e. 
simply coextensive? 
There is evidence, I think, to show that they, the intellectual subject and its 
object(s), enjoy a reciprocal causal relation. The two sides entail one another in the 
following manner: The intellect, unlike its dianoetic counterpart, by its very act of 
thinking establishes the existence of its objects: 
1j Sý Xov Ott V013; owv ovtwS voct '[(X ovta scat wpta 390 v ßtv. 
the Sceptic on the issue of the fallibility of impressions. There is also the following metaphysical 
motivation: As the intellect is the most unified principle after the One, it should, after the One, be the most 
unified. One way to accomplish this is to make its objects internal to it, thereby making it more unified 
than, say, the soul whose objects are external to it. Cf. 5.4 [7]. 2.1-3. Placing the objects within the intellect 
is also conducive to his cosmological account. For it is not the case in the Plotinian cosmos that the 
intellect transcends the soul in the sense that it is outside of it. Rather, Plotinus speaks of vobq being a 
circle around the One which in turn is contained by a larger circle, the soul (cf. 4.2 [1]. 1.25ff. and 5.1 
[10]. 7.45). Thus, the noetic faculty is to be regarded as being inside (iwravOa) or within the soul and 
discursive reason, affecting, i. e. illuminating, the latter by flowing outwards. (Dillon draws our attention to 
this point, remarking that 'the intellect presides over soul and the world transcendently within'. J. Dillon, 
`The Mind of Plotinus', The Boston Colloquium on Ancient Philosophy (New York: The American Press, 
1987), p. 351. ) Such a picture helps to explain why when Plotinus, discussing the two intellectual 
processes, refers to the dianoetic process as a superstructure (F-1uKEI vov) over or around the noetic (6.7 
[38]. 40.5-19). However, as I am looking at the intellect from the point of view of self-intellection, I shall 
not concern myself either with the metaphysical problems which surround emanation from the One and 
how and why the three hypostases and the physical world have the hierarchical structure that they do. The 
only issue with which I am concerned is self-intellection as a response to Sextus' paradox. 
387 6.2 [43]. 8.11-12. Trans: '[Intellect is a thought] that thinks in itself and not outside. ' 
388 The Armstrong edition misprints this as 'Xog. 
389 5.9 [5]. 8.1-4. Trans: 'If then the thought [of intellect) is of what is within it, that which is within it is 
its immanent form, and this is the Idea. What then is this? Intellect and the intelligent substance; each 
individual Idea is not other than intellect, but each is intellect. And intellect as a whole is all the Forms, 
... '. Also cf. 
5.9 [5]. 3.4-8. The Middle Platonists, such as Albinus, spoke of the forms as the ideas of God. 
For a thorough study of the Middle Platonic tradition, see J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists (London: 
Gerald Duckworth & Co. Ltd., 1977). 
390 5.9 [5). 5.13-14. Trans: 'It being clear that, being intellect, it really thinks the real beings and 
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It is generative of them. 391 As a consequence, these objects -- the intelligibles -- do not 
enjoy an independent existence outside of the intellect. Their ontological status is 
dependent on their being thought by voi q: 
[äýý' eatty ävAa] ä S' carty 6uA. a, ci vcv& tat, Toil' EaTty a&roi; 
TO 392 ctvat. 
Of course, this is to be expected given that these objects are internal to the intellect. 
However, such an account, if taken out of context, eclipses what is, in fact, a reciprocal 
relation. For these objects by being thought confer existence upon that which thinks 
them. In a sense, they make the intellect the intellect: 
Exaßtov (SE ai c 6v voi g KU öv CaTt xai Cö aÜ ti av thä V6; Kai 7[6cv 
öv, ö µev vob; xatiä to, vociv vcptat&S TO öv, Tö Se ov Tap voeiGOat Tw 
vcp otoov do VOEtV xai'tO civat. 393 
and at 5.4 [7]. 2 we read: 
vörl0 Se tiö vorIi0 öpwßa xai itp0 Tovtio entatpacpcIaa xai än' 
Exeivov oiov 0C1t0tiEXEt01)Ev xai IC tov ev '' µ rý [µ rý], aoptßtioS µßv avA 
coaitep ovnt 
, 
öptýoµFvr, & vnö'[ov voýtiov. 394 
There are two reasons for Plotinus to place so much emphasis on the ontological status 
of the intelligibles: Firstly, the objects which the intellect thinks are intended to be real 
living entities, as opposed to what Plotinus sometimes calls the lifeless abstractions of 
the Stoics (, Cä Xcxtiä) 39s What subsists (vcpiatirlßty) for the Stoics exists (üc cni ßtv) 
for Plotinus. Secondly, Plotinus is a good Platonist in the sense that these objects are 
supposed to be causes of the many particular instantiations of them in the spatio- 
temporal realm. 396 As for the nature of this reciprocal relation between the intellect and 
establishes them in existence. ' Also cf. 6.7 [38]. 2.25-27. 
391 cf. 6.7 [38]. 40.11-15. 
392 6.2 [43]. 8.4-5. Trans: `But if things which are without matter have been thought, this is their being. ' 
Henry and Schwyzer delete äAA. ' Eatty &ua, a. See Henry and Schwyzer, Plotini Off, vol. III, p. 65. 
393 5.1 [10]. 4.27-30. Trans: `But each of them is intellect and being, and the whole is universal intellect 
and being, intellect making being exist in thinking it, and being giving intellect thinking and existence by 
being thought. ' Cf. 3.8 [30]. 8.7-9 and 6.7 [38]. 41.18-21. 
394 5.4 [7]. 2.4-7. Trans: `Thinking, which sees the intelligible and turns towards it and is, in a way, being 
perfected by it, is itself indefinite like seeing, but is defined by the intelligible. ' Yet, by the same token, at 
5.4 [7]. 2.44-47 Plotinus explicitly rules out the objects of the intellect taking priority and coming first. For 
Plotinus is explicit in this matter: vob; 8h uai 8v TaütÖv. oü yäp Twv npayµäcwv -- &Sanep il aiaOrlat; 
Tä)v ai(YN-Twv -- npoovcwv, äXV a&TÖS voig Tä npäyµata, eincp µi1 E18TI airc)v KoµiýETat. (Trans: 
`Intellect and being are one and the same thing; for intellect does not apprehend objects that pre-exist it -- 
as sense does sense-objects -- but intellect itself is its objects, granted that it does not get their forms from 
somewhere else [for where could it get them from? ]. ) 
395 cf. 5.4 [7]. 2.43 and 5.5 [32]. 1.38-9 Also cf. E. K. Emilsson, `Plotinus on the Objects of Thought', p. 
40. 
396 cf. 6.3.9.249. Also cf. L. Gerson, Plotinus" pp. 45-6. 
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its objects (i. e. whether it is causal or logical), I think the answer would have to be that it 
is stronger than simply a logical relation. It is not mere coextensivity. However, one 
hesitates to speak of it in causal terms because both the intellect and its object are 
eternally coexistent. 397 Each side acts upon or makes the other what it is. 398 
Given such a dynamic relation, my next task is clear: to explain how this 
dynamic relation between the intellectual subject and its object(s) is compatible with the 
identity condition which is supposed to hold between both sides. To put it another way, 
how can Plotinus hold these two apparently incompatible theses: The intellect and its 
objects form a complex dynamic whole -- what he refers to elsewhere as avµna, omil icat 
a vOwwt; -- and yet they are identical. 399 
To be able to understand how the relation between the intellect and the ideas 
can allow for both complexity and identity, it is necessary to have a sense of how the 
intellect is occupied by these objects. How exactly do the ideas, the intellect's objects, 
inhere in it? 400 According to Plotinus' account, the intellect is not filled with discrete 
objects, like a Trojan horse filled with a group of warriors. The ideas do not constitute 
discrete parts within the intellect. For that matter, the notion of parts, in this noetic 
context, is entirely misplaced: 
ov 61'1 eic Ivor ö vovS tiotovtioS, äaa' CX nävtia xai ßtit nävta xai 
if 9 avveatity avtiq auvwv MI £)Ct ztavtia ovx Exwv. ov yap ä0 SE 
oS " ov8E xwpic C"xaotov Twv Ev air ö?. ov TE yäp Eßtity E icaoc &? ) ov 
Kai irav'caxfi iräv "401 
Thus the intellect is not a nexus in which part `a' is external to part W. Rather each part 
-- using the term very loosely -- contains the whole. 402 Plotinus elsewhere employs the 
397 cf. 1.1 [53]. 8.4-6,3.7 [45]. 3.36-8 and 3.7 [45]. 5.25-8. 
398 Perhaps, it might be more helpful just to speak of the two sides, the epistemic subject and its objects, 
as having a dynamic relation and not a causal, so as to avoid confusion with the fact that the One is the 
cause of the intellect by way of emmanation. Regardless of this, what is crucial for my purposes is that the 
reciprocal relation between the two sides is understood as something which is not exclusively logical. 
399 6.2 [43]. 21.53ff. 
400 Plotinus certainly does not intend us to take the noetic world in a literal spatial sense. He is explicit 
that there is no place in that realm: uai ovöE ccönoq EKEi- (6.2 [43]. 16.5). For what it is worth, Plotinus 
does actually use the term voirröc Tönoc twice in 6.7. [38]. 35.5 and 41. However, on these occasions, he is 
using it for rhetorical purposes, quoting from Plato's Republic, 508c and 517b. The closest Plotinus comes 
to the notion of place is when he says that each intelligible is the same as its place (X6pa), 5.8 [31]. 4.18. 
401 1.8 [51]. 2.15-20. Trans: 'Intellect there is not like this, but has all things and is all things, and is with 
them when it is with itself and has all things without having them. For it is not one thing and they another; 
nor is each individual thing in it separate; for each is the whole and in all ways all. ' 
402 Emilsson, I think, states this very obscure matter very well when he remarks: 'Plotinus, ..., claims that 
the intellect and the ideas are not even two distinct parts or aspects of a thing unified into one (as one 
might say that the hard disk and the screen of a computer are one); they are one in a much stronger sense 
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Anaxagorean phrase to express what he means: &U' ogoi Ev evt it vTa. 403 It is not the 
case that one part of the intellectual structure grasps another part of that same 
intellectual structure qua part: 
... 
CK t Sý E öýov act cxaaTOV xat % to äµa cxaaTOV KM OA, ov 
cpavtgcTat ji v yäp µapoS, Evop&rat SE Tau 04ci tv öll fl ýrty ÖAov, ... 
404 
The reason Plotinus will not tolerate a mereological account of the intellect, at least not 
an exclusively discrete one, is because, if such were the case, then the intellectual 
subject and the intelligible object would be vulnerable to the claim that they did not 
entirely interpenetrate one another. And for Plotinus it is crucial that they do. Otherwise, 
the intellect will stand in a similar relation to its objects as did discursive reason: two 
things which are external to one another. And if that were the case, the intellect would 
rely upon images. Accordingly, Plotinus remarks of the intellectual realm: o 8F" iöiroq 
EKCi vo£pwS tiö äXXo ýv &XXcp. 405 Essentially Plotinus is after intertwined complexity 
(6'ORM%oic K(XI 6'ÜV8£6tc), along with complete interpenetration and some kind of 
identity. Thus there are very good grounds for claiming that the resolution of one attack 
of the Sceptics -- the overcoming of images by interpenetration of the intellectual subject 
and its object -- forces Plotinus to address another, Sextus' paradox. 
IV 
Sextus' Paradox Revisited 
Now as Plotinus is clearly not interested in a part/part account of the intellect, the only 
so that each idea in all of its parts is intellect and intellect is throughout ideas; thus, in Plotinus intellect 
without ideas is an impossibility and likewise ideas without intellect. ' E. K. Emilsson, `Plotinus on the 
Objects of Thought', p. 21. Gerson, I think wrongly, does speak of the forms in this context in terms of 
being aspects of the intellect. The problem with aspects, pace Emilsson, is that they do not allow for the 
required transparency which is so crucial to Plotinus. L. Gerson, `plodaus', pp. 50-1. Gerson actually does 
use the term partial identity (p. 51) by which he means the ideas partially overlap. There is an analogous 
problem in Plotinus about bow the individual intellect, which we all supposedly have, can contain the 
entirety of all intellect, what Plotinus refers to as the nä5. For a discussion of this problem, see G. J. P. 
O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the Self, pp. 62-3. 
403 6.6 [34]. 7.4. Trans: `..., but all things together in one. ' The phrase 'öµov nävta' occurs in the 
beginning of Anaxagoras' book, Fr. B1 D-K. 
404 5.8 [31]. 4.22-25. Trans: `But there each comes only from the whole and is a part and a whole at once; 
for it has the appearance of a part, but a penetrating look sees the whole in it, .... ' Plotinus goes on to 
compare it to the legend of Lynceus, an individual who was supposed to have looked into the inside of the 
earth, see Apollonius Rhodius I 151-5. 
405 5.9 [5]. 10.10. Trans: `And place there exists in the intellectual mode, the presence of one thing in 
another. 'Elsewhere we are told that the two sides, the subject and object, are fused together 
(cn y cpa9EVTac aü'coiS), 5.5 [32]. 2.1-9. 
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other alternative -- at least according to Sextus, given his materialist presuppositions 
-- is the whole/whole. The main obstacle in attributing a whole/whole reading to self- 
intellection is its apparent incompatibility with the subject-object distinction. Recall 
Sextus' argument: 
Kai 6 og Rev [sc. vovSJ cav'cöv KcatailaµßävE aOat of äv SvviOcill. 
ci yäp öA. og E avTÖV KataA, aµßävETC( t, 'XO; eaTat uat6.2 i yrt; Kai 
Katia?, a 4Mvwv, öaov S' övtioS tiov xatiaXaµ[3ävovTOS 66Ev iTt 
eßtiat TO Katiaa, aµßavöµE VOV " ... Lt µEV yap 
oA. ov, ouScv EaTat To 
ýrýtiovµevov. 407 
It is crucial to Plotinus' position that he can respond to this objection in such a way as 
not to rule out the subject-object distinction. 408 If he cannot, the claim that his is an 
account which offers us an adequate basis for a theory of self-intellection would be open 
to criticism. For Sextus' paradox prohibits the subject from having itself as object of 
intellection. That Plotinus was sensitive to Sextus' attack on self-intellection is clear 
from the manner in which he himself addresses the problem about what does and does 
not qualify for self-intellection. 409 To illustrate this, Plotinus explains that an awareness 
or apprehension which we might have of our historical self does not qualify as self- 
intellection precisely because in that context it is a matter of one part thinking or 
perceiving another part: 
01. ) yap do näv eßtiat EV tiw tiotovticw £'yvwßµtVOV, µrß K&KEtvov Toi 
vo11ßavroc tiä äXÄa r& av (M) xat Eaviö vEVOTýxötioS, Eatat tie ov 
' 410 ,,,, ' 411 TO crýtiovµcvov do avtio Eavtio, a%% aii, iw aýýw. 
This sort of part/part account in which one part of ourself is aware of another part of 
406 Sextus only canvasses two possibilities because of this materialist presuppositions. In other words, it 
is the implicit materialism of his paradox which enables him to take the part/part and whole/whole options 
to be exhaustive. If anything, the fact that Plotinus discards the mereological account and then offers an 
account in which he explicitly speaks of whole against whole (see below) could be taken, or is at least is 
plausible, as evidence that he is working within the Sextan framework. For he does not canvass any other 
sort of option. 
407 Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos, VII 311-312. Trans: `Now it will not be able as a whole to 
apprehend itself. For if as a whole it apprehends itself, it will be as a whole apprehension and 
apprehending, and, the apprehending subject being the whole, the apprehended object will no longer be 
anything; ... If as a whole, the object sought will 
be nothing. ' 
408 This is exactly Emilsson's point. His interpretation of Plotinus, based upon 5.3 [49]. 5, is that Plotinus 
accepts Sextus' point, abandoning the subject-object distinction. E. K. Emilsson, `Plotinus on the Objects 
of Thought', p. 33. I shall come back to Emilsson's account below. 
409 cf. n. 355. 
410 Even some of Plotinus' phraseology is strikingly similar to Sextus'. So we read in Sextus: oü8Ev 
141 carat Tö ýýco6 vov, while in Plotinus we find: Farm Tc ov ro ýrltovµEvov. 
411 5.3 [49]. 1.9-13. Trans: `For it would not be the whole which was known in these circumstances, if that 
thing which thought the others which were with it did not also think itself, and this will be. not what we 
are looking for, a thing which thinks itself, but one thing thinking another. ' 
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ourself, fails because the thinker and its object of thought do not entirely interpenetrate 
one another. In the case of one's empirical self-awareness, we have two distinct and 
different things, one of which is aware of the other, such as the rational part of my soul 
contemplating my body or the perceptive part seeing my body. So how can Plotinus 
integrate both subject-object distinction along with the whole/whole account? For the 
former entails heterogeneity or difference and the latter identity. The possibility of 
giving an account in which the noetic subject can be its own object in a fully transparent 
manner, requires that these two theses somehow be shown to be compatible. In other 
words, an adequate theory of self-intellection is contingent upon showing that Emilsson 
is wrong and that the whole/whole reading can be made compatible with the subject- 
object distinction. 
V 
The t ytßtia yEv1j 
In order to come to grips with these relations which are pulling in different directions, I 
must delve deeper into the internal structure of the intellect, which brings me to the 
µkytatia yEvv of the Sophist; or rather Plotinus' interpretation of them. For the intellect 
is constituted out of them: 
0 8¬ VOb; öv VOObV Kai OUVUetiov EK nävtWV, 0 Ev tit tiwv y¬vwv "412 
Thus it is in terms of being, motion, rest, sameness and otherness that Plotinus 
articulates the formal structure of the intellect's activity; how it is that the intellect is a 
Ev iro? c . 
413 The g' It yevij make up the conceptual skeleton of the intellect's 
Evep'yeta. Taking Ennead 6.2 as my guide, according to Plotinus it is incorrect to speak 
of the being of the intellect without concurrently (äµ(x) speaking of its movement 
415 (Kivrýßnc) 414 For the latter is the activity (ývEpycta) of that which is actively actual. 
As Plotinus says elsewhere, if the intellect stands still, it does not think: Ei 8' 
ECYTTIKEV, 
412 6.2 [43]. 18.11-12. Trans: `But the intellect, since it is being as intelligent and a composite of all [the 
genera]. is not one of the genera. ' 
413 6.2 [43]. 8.25-50 and 6.2 [43]. 15.1-19. Of course, the yevI1 are not exclusive to the intellect. They 
apply to everything, save the One. 
414 6.2 [43]. 15.11. 
415 6.2 [43]. 15.9. 
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ov voc71.416 Rest (c thatq) arises because xivilßng is not a changing of being's nature but 
rather its perfection. 417 Being throughout exists in the same state and in the same 
way. 418 Otherness enters into the account when distinguishing being, motion and rest 
from one another; 419 that is, when the intellect is grasped in its conceptual diversity, i. e. 
as XoX%, ä. 42° And sameness when the three are grasped in their unity, i. e. as Ev. 42' For 
the intellect, despite being all three, is also one. 422 The ycvi , therefore, are one way of 
seeing how the intellect is, to quote, a Ev ICOW. 423 
The epistemological motivation for such a move is clear: internal 
differentiation that accounts, at least in part, for the intellect having itself as an object of 
intellection. Internal differentiation of some sort is necessary if the intellect is to have 
itself as an intellectual object, and yet simultaneously be the subject of the intellectual 
act. The question is whether or not the µ&yw'ra ycvi in their application to the intellect 
are sufficient to account for such an epistemic relation. Do the pAytatia yEv rl prevent the 
intellect from being reduced to a simple inert entity, what Plotinus elsewhere refers to as 
an inert lump (0"yicoS)? 424 They do to this extent: the µE'ytara y£vTj show how it is that 
the intellect can be an EvEpyE ia. For intelligising in the context of the intellect requires 
both self-identity (or, perhaps, self-sameness is more correct) and self-otherness or 
difference, 425 i. e. different intellectual stages or intellectual moments which are not 
simply identical with one another but rather that lend themselves to being distinguished: 
SLÖ xai öpOwc tcpöTq'ra aaµßävet, '0710-0 voi S Mt oüata. Sei -yäp Töv 
ct. vovv &Et ctEp6Tgra xai tavtiö'tia ? agpav¬tv, Eipep voi a 426 
416 6.7 [38]. 13.39-40. 
417 6.2 [43]. 7.26-28. 
418 6.2 [43]. 7.30-31. 
419 6.2 [43]. 8.35-37. 
420 6.2 [43]. 15.14-15 
421 6.2 [43]. 8.37-38. This is not the only delineation that Plotinus offers of the five y výj. In 5.1 [10]. 4, he 
first discusses same and other and then introduces motion and rest. 
422 6.2 [43]. 15.14-15. 
423 6.2 [431.15.15. Of course, one might object and say that the pAytata yevi apply to everything save the 
One and so are not unique to the intellect. They do but not in the same way. When it comes to the intellect, 
we are looking at something strictly from a self-relational point of view. 
424 6.7 [38]. 14.8-11. 
425 It must be borne in mind that Plotinus' account of the intellect in this context of self-identity and 
otherness draws heavily on Plato's Parmenides (in particular the second hypothesis), a dialogue the 
dialectical exercise of which was not taken lightly by Plotinus and the Neoplatonists. See n. 385 and also 
L. Gerson. Plotinus, p. 45, n. 9. 
426 6.7 [38]. 39.4-7. Trans: `Therefore he [Plato) rightly understands that there is otherness and sameness 
where there is intellect and substance. For one must always understand intellect as otherness and sameness 
if it is going to think. ' Also cf. 5.1 [101.4.34-35. 
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If such distinctions were denied to the intellect, it would be impossible to distinguish 
conceptually between that which thinks and that which is thought. By ruling out the 
µ&yta ra ycv1j, it becomes impossible to apprehend how the intellect could have a 
relation in which it is simultaneously the thinking subject and its own object of thought. 
For to do so, presupposes that the intellect is capable of having internal epistemic 
relations, in particular having itself as an object of thought. But without the µhy crra 
ycv11, there would be a risk that the intellect was incapable of entertaining that or any 
other sort of relation, save simple self-identity. And if that were the case, Plotinus' 
account of intellection would be vulnerable to the objection that his account of the 
thinking is, at best, inconsistent and, at worst, contradictory, given his earlier claim that 
all thinking is of something (tiivöS). 427 It is essential, therefore, to have some way of 
understanding how the intellect can become more than one when thinking itself: 
vo11aa; SC c &thS 7toXiS yivctat, voltÖg, vowv, xtvovµEVOS xai öaa 
ä2 cL irpoai icet vw 428 
If not, the result is something which is in a state of utter simplicity and, as a result, 
incapable of the intellectual process: 
SEi &pa Ev Edvai äµcpw -- the 'E%v µEV, µil Svo SE av Ea'rat, ö 'n vo11aEt 
ovx e4cv wate ovöý voovv nat. ä7c? ovv cc" Pa [sc. 'C6 voeiv] xai ovx 
CX71XOvv SF-^t eivat. 429 
or at least the Plotinian description of it. Thus the jtytata yevij offer us a way of getting 
around the problem of simple identity without necessarily creating a plurality of 
existentially independent entities, which is necessary for any theory of self-intellection. 
VI 
The Noetic Intellect's Relation to Itself Revisited 
Having set out this formal structure of the intellect along with the need for its internal 
differentiation, I now need to say something about how that account -- an account which 
is the basis for the subject-object distinction -- is not incompatible with the whole/whole 
427 cf. n. 359. 
428 6.7 [38]. 39.14-16. Trans: But if he himself thinks he becomes many, intelligible, intelligent, in 
motion and everything else appropriate to Intellect. ' Similarly, at 5.6 [24]. 3.22ff. we read: `ti oüv to 
voovvn nkfio0q, Sei Fv crp (µi1) nxAOE1 Tö voEiv µi1 civat. Trans: `If, therefore, there is multiplicity in the 
thinking principle, there cannot be thinking in what is not multiplicity. ' 
429 5.6 [24]. 1.12-14. Trans: `It is necessary therefore to be one and a pair -- but if it is, on the other hand, 
one and not two, it will have nothing to think: so that it will not even be a thinking principle. ' 
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account of the intellect. I need to show that Plotinus' claim that when the intellect thinks 
itself, being one, it becomes two (&p pcu ouv ytvEtcn Ev 5v)430 can somehow be 
reconciled with Plotinus' other claim (the one upon which Emilsson bases his 
interpretation) : 
Ei 6' a&t& exEt, of i& v au== etc um) p. ¬piaat certhv et, äA. ß, ' rev 
icpty µcpißat ýavtiöv i cat 9ewpWv xat Exwv. Ei TovTO, &'i'rýv OEwpiav 
tiavtiov E tvat tiw 6Ewp11t , Kai Töv vovv taüTÖv eivat 'r voll T "431 
The background to this argument from 5.3 [49]. 5 is that the intellect always possesses its 
objects. If this were not the case, the intellect would be vulnerable to the claim that it 
focused upon images. 432 In virtue of having its objects at each logical or conceptual 
stage of its activity, Plotinus concludes that the contemplator and the contemplated are 
the same (iaviöv). Consequently, the distinction between the subject and object is 
untenable, or so Emilsson claims. Disregarding the evidence from the previous section 
about the need for the subject-object distinction, I think that the passage just quoted is 
not incompatible with this distinction once it is made clear how Plotinus understands 
such a distinction. 
For a start, that the activity of the intellect is constitutive of multiplicity 
within itself is clear. Plotinus speaks of there being a sort of internal occurrence (otov 
mxpq. uteaöv) when the intellect thinks itself, and it is this which makes it, the intellect, 
many: 
Et O U7 ft V Voi)S, Ö'CL 76OM), EGtt, xai do 11 vocty avtiö oiov napgi7 Eaöv, xäv 
i4 avtiov 171, A1101 1, ... 
433 
Now we know that the intellect's multiplicity, a multiplicity which is due to the intellect 
becoming two, i. e. a subject and object, will not be a plurality of parts. 434 Yet neither 
does Plotinus regard the noetic subject and its object as two different wholes qua 
substance; that is, two separate individuated objects which are simply existentially 
430 5.6 [24]. 1.6. 
431 5.3 [49]. 5.20-23. Trans: `But if it [intellect] has them [the intelligibles] themselves, it does not see 
them as a result of dividing itself, but it was contemplator and possessor before it divided itself. But if this 
is so, the contemplation must be the same as the contemplated, and intellect the same as the intelligible. ' 
See E. K. Emilsson, `Plotinus on the Objects of Thought', p. 33. 
432 5.3 [49]. 5.17-20. 
433 5.3 [49]. 11.26-28. Trans: `If then intellect is intellect because it is multiple, and thinking itself, even if 
it derives from intellect, is a sort of internal occurrence that makes it multiple, ... ' 
Cf. 6.9 [9]. 9.8 for 
another occurrence of nape mittw. 
434 To this extent I agree with Emilsson. 
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independent of one another: 
Tö [sc. vociv] SE ov KcexwptaTat TA ovßia, (ixxzc avvöv aütW öpä 
ýavtÖ. 435 
If he did, then he could not claim, as he so often does, that the act of intellection entails 
self-intellection. Rather, for Plotinus internal differentiation takes the form of different 
internal activities or different active states. Thus, immediately after speaking of self- 
intellection as involving a sort of internal occurrence (oiov ltap£µnE(; öv), Plotinus 
speaks of the multiplicity of evcp'y¬iai within the intellect: 
xai tit xwbvel ov'cw iXiOog Eival, 'EwS kß rIv ovßia µia; Tö y&p 
nX, Oog [sc. 'cob vocty] oÜ auvOEaEt;, äß, X' at £VEp'1/Elal aUTOÜ 'Co' 
nA, iOog. 436 
Now given that the part/part reading has been ruled out, these active states must be 
wholes. Moreover, as the multiplicity of the intellect -- at least in part437 -- is accounted 
for by the duality of subject and object, it follows that the subject and object will also 
have to be thought of as wholes. And that, in short this is Plotinus' answer to Sextus, 
save one qualification: It is not a duality but a triad. The structure of the intellect 
consists of the intellectual subject (vob; ), the intelligible object (voiiöv) and the act of 
thinking (vörlat; ), all of which are to be understood as wholes. But as they are not 
different wholes qua substance, their status as wholes will have to be understood in 
some other manner, i. e. active states or Evcp'ycu xt, all of which are of the same whole 
qua substance. 438 Such an account, i. e. attribution of different states to the whole, 
enables Plotinus to deal with Sextus' objection (on one level anyway) because the 
necessary slots which are required for self-intellection -- subject and object -- can be 
435 5.6 [24]. 1.5-6. Trans: `But intellect is not distinct qua substance, but keeps company with itself and so 
sees itself. ' 
436 5.3 [49]. 12.1-3. Trans: `But what prevents it from being a multiplicity in this sense, as long as it is one 
substance. For the multiplicity [of intellect] is not a plurality of compositions but its activities are the 
multiplicity. ' Although the term `states' is not Plotinus' own, I don't think it unfair of me to use it, since it 
does capture what, I think, Plotinus is getting at when he talks about the intellect qua thinker, as opposed 
to object thought. I could just as easily use the term `disposition' (or even `sense') and say the intellect has 
different dispositions which amounts to the same thing, but again this is not Plotinus' own term. The 
important point to get across is that intellect does have logical moments that differ from one another 
connotationally. 
437 I say in part because obviously the plurality of intelligibles is also constitutive of plurality. However, 
the plurality of intelligibles already presupposes the distinction between the subject and object, and thus is 
of derivative importance to my account of self-intellection. 
438 It should be noted that Plotinus is not always consistent in his use of these three terms, cf. J. 
Bussanich, The One and its Relation to the Intellect in Plotinus, p. 58. However, at 5.3 [49]. 5.44-50 (the 
passage which I shall come to below and which concludes the chapter upon which Emilsson bases his 
interpretation) it is clear that they do represent different states of the intellectual whole. 
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filled or satisfied by this one whole, the intellect. For Plotinus could argue in response to 
Sextus that intellect qua whole acts on itself qua whole, both being the same whole qua 
substance but different qua states. Self-intellection, therefore, would consist in intellect 
qua S1 bringing itself against itself qua S2: 439 
ýý ýr teýerýesr ^s ýrýr Ta Yap ovta opwv &avTOV , upa scat opwv evepyeta rev Km i1 evep'ycta 
(X1)TOS- voi S yäp Kai vörlatS Ev " icai öXoS öXcp, ov µtpet äa. XO 
µepoS 440 
This would allow the intellect to be conceptually divided on one level, while leaving its 
identity relation intact on another. Each active state is the whole, just with a specific 
connotation that can be differentiated from the other ones. So, for example, the intellect 
qua thinking subject is different from the intellect qua intelligible object. One thinks and 
the other is thought. So too with the act of thinking, it is different from that which has 
the power441 to think and that which can be thought. Such connotational differences are 
what enables Plotinus to circumvent Sextus' paradox: 
fr svtrtsr tr sFt... 
KaL Catty ovx EtEpov 11 voTat; xaL f ovcCa avtirI Kcz av n Cavti71v 
voei 1l (p1 atC, o1 EtiEpov, äxx' rj ? 4yq, TO vooi t vov Kai TO voovv, 
nXfjOo; öv, wS S&SEtictiat no? axj. 442 
Because of these connotational differences, Plotinus' account of self-intellection avoids 
the pitfall of simple identity. For without them, the intellect could not have itself as an 
object of intellection: 
% oko q 8E ovx airX6g yivETat vowv EavTÖv, Ö Xk& SEL Tn% v voTjaty T7jv 
7tEpi avtiov rTýpov Vivat, Et TL 0 SvvatTO votiv avcÖ. '3 
Yet by the same token -- and this is the crucial bit -- Plotinus' notion of wholes, while 
439 Of course, one could argue that such connotational differences were open to Aristotle. Therefore, why 
did he not employ them as a means of escaping from the identity thesis which undermined his account of 
self-intellection? The answer to this question is that, while he did have access to such connotational 
differences, he had them in the guise of potentiality. Accordingly, when it came to expressing his account 
in terms of actuality, only then could the force of the identity thesis be fully felt. Plotinus, on the other 
hand, has these connotational differences at the level of actuality. Thus his account of self-intellection 
does not fall prey to such a strong identity thesis. 
440 5.3 [49]. 6.6-8. Trans: `For in seeing the real beings it saw itself, and in seeing, it was in act, and its 
actuality was itself: for intellect and intellection are one; and it thinks as a whole with the whole of itself 
and not one part of itself with another. ' cf. 2.9 [33]. 1.33ff. and G. J. P. O'Daly, Plotinus' Philosophy of the 
Sglf, pp. 75-6 on the identity of subject and act. 
441 Plotinus does sometimes refer to the intellect as having certain powers (Suväµct; ), powers which are 
always actualised, cf. 6.7 [38]. 35.21. 
442 6.7 [38]. 40.16-19. Trans: `... and the thought and this substance are not different things, and, again in 
that the nature thinks itself, they are not different except in definition, what is thought and what thinks, 
that is, a plurality, as has often been demonstrated. ' 
443 6.7 [38]. 39.12-13. Trans: `But in general intellect is not simple when it thinks itself, but its thought 
about itself must be thought of another if it is to be able to think itself as anything at all. ' 
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satisfying the subject and object requirement, allows for the intellectual subject to have 
itself as object in completely transparent manner. For, as Plotinus is keen to emphasis, 
the intellectual process is a completely transparent one: 
Stacpavii yap nävTa xai 6uotetv6v 0168i ävTiTunov oü&&v, &XX& nöcc 
navtii (pavepo; ei; TO eiaw Kai nävta . 444 
No whole -- be it voi S, vörjat;, or vorliöv -- eclipses any of the other wholes. For when 
one comes up against another it sees itself. Accordingly, Plotinus concludes 5.3 [49]. 5 
(the chapter on which Emilsson bases his interpretation) by distinguishing these three 
states from one another, while also asserting an identity thesis which binds them 
together: 
e% to i ,itNt1s(.. , 
cv aµa navTa Eßtat, vouS, voT atq, To vo71Tov. Et ()vv i V07 10t; auTov 
Tö vorýTv, Tö Se vorýTÖV aüTo;, avTÖS &pa EavTÖV voi act " voi act yap 
T1j VO116El, 07EEp TV auto;, Kat voiiact To VolyTOV, onEp 71V auto;. Ka8 
EKätCpov &pa XavTÖV voljact, KaOOTt Kai i1 völatc avTÖS T IV, Kai 
K VJOtt Tö voýTÖV auto;, öýEp ývöEt Tý vorjcEt, 01v auto;. 445 
Now, if my interpretation of Plotinus can be shown to hold, it would be 
adequate to act as a basis for a coherent theory of self-intellection. For wholes and 
transparency, if they can be combined, enable the subject to have itself as an object of 
intellection, without the former being swallowed by the latter. Rather the account allows 
for a type of identity thesis to hold between the subject and object, which is crucial for 
any theory of self-intellection but it does so in a novel and unique way; by allotting a 
pivotal role to vörlat;, the act of the intellectual subject. Through placing as much 
emphasis on vöiwtc as Plotinus does, the subject never loses sight of itself in being 
identified with its object. 446 For the sake of clarity, let me call this new identity relation 
or thesis epistemic identity, given that it is founded upon the intellectual subject's act. 
The reason the epistemic subject never loses sight of itself in this act -- never becomes 
opaque but always remains transparent to itself -- is because this act is generated by or 
from it. Plotinus, breaking from the Aristotelian tradition, is actually allotting an active 
444 5.8 [31]. 4.5-6. Trans: `For all things there are transparent, and there is nothing dark or opaque; 
everything and all things are clear to the inmost part to everything. ' Cf. 5.8 [31]. 4.22-25. 
445 5.3 [49]. 5.43-50. Trans: `All together are one, intellect, intellection, the intelligible. If therefore 
intellect's intellection is the intelligible, and the intelligible is itself, it will itself think itself: for it will 
think with the intellection which it is itself and will think the intelligible, which is itself. In both ways, 
then, it will think itself, in that intellection is itself and in that the intelligible is itself which it thinks in its 
intellection and which is itself. ' 
446 cf. n. 440. 
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role to intellectual subject in its relation with its object, namely itself. 447 In order to see 
how Plotinus can successfully achieve such an identity relation, i. e. epistemic identity, in 
which the intellectual subject and object are the same as one another, yet connotationally 
differentiated but transparently so, I want to conclude with an examination of the 
Plotinus' original reworking of the traditional light analogy; an analogy which he 
employs to illustrate the noetic process, and the identity thesis -- what I call epistemic 
identity -- around which it operates. 
VII 
Lim 
If we return to the öux(pavij passage quoted above from 5.8 [31]. 4, Plotinus, as he does 
elsewhere, employs the image of light illuminating light: (p&); y' p [sc. £ait StacpavES] 
(poYrL448 By Plotinus' time, the light analogy had a very long tradition. The two most 
obvious instances being Plato's Republic and Aristotle's De Anima. 449 What both of 
these passages have in common is that they are structured in such a way that the Sun and 
the active intellect, respectively, are that in virtue of which the visible or intelligible 
objects are able to act upon the seer or the thinker. For in both instances they actualise 
the medium in such a way that objects become visible or intelligible. The Sun in the 
Republic does this by emitting light and the active intellect by being in a certain state 
like light. 450 Now there can be little doubt that Plotinus was very well aware of both 
these passages and this traditional use of light. 451 With this in mind, one can appreciate 
what a significant shift there is in his reworking of this famous analogy. For Plotinus 
radically alters the relation between the intellectual subject, the light and the object 
illuminated by the light: 
CK6 SE 6 St' thpov, (XW St' avtnjS, ätt Li & CýW. ä? p ovv cpuni 
447 cf. E. K. Emilsson, `Plotinus on the Objects of Thought', p. 41. 
448 5.8 [31]. 4.6. Also cf. 5.6 [24]. 1.16-22. 
449 Republic 509b2-20 and i A. 430a15-17. 
450 Obviously, I am not trying to imply that Sun and the active intellect are identical analogies, since the 
scope of the latter is much broader than the former. Nonetheless they do have somewhat similar roles in 
the context of allowing for the epistemic subject to be acted upon. 
451 Plotinus would certainly have known of the discussion of DA. 3.5, if by no other means than through 
Alexander of Aphrodisias. We have already witnessed his lifting of the writing tablet analogy from DA. 
3.4. We also know he was aware of Plato's Sun analogy because he employs a very similar, if not 
identical, Sun analogy at 6.7 [38]. 16.25ff., when speaking of his first principle. 
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cXXo cpü: S öpä, oü St' &Aaov. (pc)S a" pa452 , 9* Xko a bp? " avtö apa 
ahne 6pä. 453 
In the noetic world (Ex&i), seeing is not through another (St'F-pov) but through itself 
(St' avifjg). This is because the focus of the subject, the seer, is not directed outwards 
(&rt µ118E E4(0). The first sentence of this passage, I think, implies that the intellect qua 
the subject of the perception, is its own medium. For it sees St' (A)ti-1S and, 
consequently, it itself establishes or generates the correct conditions for the occurrence 
of sight. In this context, the 8t' is pivotal because it is indicative of what Plotinus 
considers to be passive and active. For if the intellect were to see St' VrEpou (the 
traditional Platonic and Aristotelian usage), then there would be grounds for taking the 
medium to be external to the intellectual subject, with the result that when it, the 
medium, is in the proper state, i. e. activated, then and only then can the subject be acted 
upon by the intelligible object. Thus Plotinus, given his preference for St' aü c as 
opposed to St' &repou, clearly differs from both the Aristotelian and Platonic usage of 
light in this epistemological context. For, according to their analogies, the source of light 
was something independent of the subject. It is that which brought about the right 
conditions which in turn enabled the objects to act upon the epistemic subject. 454 To 
make Plato and Aristotle conform to the Plotinian usage, we would have to say that the 
seer and the passive intellect themselves respectively activate the medium in such a way 
as to make the visibles or intelligibles actually visible or intelligible. In other words, 
they would have to make what they take to be passive active. That they do not, at least in 
part, can be traced to the fact that they do not develop this doctrine of noetic internality 
(ötit µß$E E4 o), which is understandable since, as we have seen, Plotinus is partly 
motivated to do so because of the Sceptics and his response to them. 
Plotinus concludes (ovv) from the first sentence that the intellect being light 
452 The Armstrong edition misprints this as &pa. 
453 5.3 [49]. 8.21-24. Trans: `But in the intelligible world, seeing is not through another [sc. medium], but 
through itself, because it is not directed outside. Intellect therefore sees one light with another, not through 
another. Light then sees another light: it therefore itself sees itself. ' It should be noted that this sort of 
intellectual image of light meeting light can be found in Plato's Timaeus as an account of how actual 
vision works, cf. 45b2-d3. I thank Gerard O'Daly for pointing this out to me. 
454 Recall that even with the Aristotelian usage from D. A. 3.5, it is only when the active intellect is in a 
certain state that the intelligibles are able to act upon the intellectual subject: `... 
ö [sc. vovc] SE Tau nävta 
f f/ \II\\\/wIt 
note v, wS EýtS'rtS, olov TO cpü " tponov dap Ttva xat To cpi notci Ta 
SvvaµEt ovta Xpc ua FvEp to 
xpcuµa-ra. ' Trans: `... and there is another (sc. intellect) which 
is so by producing all things, as a kind of 
disposition, like light does; for in a way light too makes colours which are potential into actual colours. ' 
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(q &w) sees another light (äXA, o (p&c) with another light (& AV (oti) not through another 
(Si' aXXov). Are we to infer from this sentence that we are dealing with three different 
lights and, if so, exactly how are they different? Moreover, when intellect sees one light 
with another, what is the force of the 'with'? Taking the questions in order, we know 
that the lights are not different from one another as discrete parts of a whole differ from 
one another for two reasons: Plotinus has already rejected the part/part reading and light, 
at least according to Plotinus, is an incorporeal entity, 455 rendering it indivisible. 456 
Moreover, we also know that we are not dealing with different separate independent 
substances (that is, different wholes qua substance), since he has already said in the 
opening sentence that the intellect's attention is not directed outwards. The light at 
which the intellect is looking must be itself. We are only examining one numerical entity 
as far as substance is concerned. For the seer, the seeing and the seen belong to the same 
thing. But the level of substance is not the only one with which we are working. And 
this brings us to the second question, the force of the 'with". 
I understand the `with' to mean that the intellect itself, in addition to being 
the first light (9(0; ), i. e. the intellectual subject, is the other light (&XXT cp(oii) qua 
völatc457 and that light brings itself to bear on the other light (&A) o qpw) which is itself 
qua vorytiöv. For if one compares this sentence to the sentence in the passage we had 
earlier, when discussing how none of the wholes eclipsed one another (voijß£t yäp in 
Voi et, öi£p 71v aütiöS, KUL Voiiet'CÖ % If Vo yr'v, ö7£p iv a&röS, 5.3 [49]. 5.43-50) one can 
see that the `with' picks out the bringing of the intellect's self qualified in a specific way 
against itself qualified in another way; 458 what could be called whole against whole. 
This interpretation of the sentence explains the choice of `with' over `through' in that 
`with' in the present context, just as St' avtific in the previous sentence, renders the 
subject active, whereas the `through' would make it passive. 459 For the `with' articulates 
455 2.1 [40]. 7.26-28 and 4.5 [29]. 6-7. 
456 According to Plotinus at 6.4 [22]. 8.18-19 only corporeal bodies are divisible, since they have 
magnitude. 
457 cf. 5.3 [49]. 6.7-8 and n. 438. 
458 The present passage which is under examination, much more than the one we had previously, 
emphasises the transparency of the wholes in no uncertain terms. 
459 Just as there were probable grounds for saying that Plotinus was consciously altering the traditional 
light analogy, here it would seem as if he were consciously inverting the through/with dichotomy which, 
as we saw in Chapter III, is central to Socrates' account of the epistemic subject in the icotvä passage of 
the Theaetetus. For Plotinus either knows of the Theaetetus directly or through Alexander. Plotinus. by 
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the conceptual development or non-temporal sequences of the subject's act. 0 It 
identifies the subject not just with the object but with the act as well. 461 Yet it also 
conceptually differentiates the subject and its act from that of which they are the object. 
However, Plotinus does not jump from saying intellect sees one light with 
another to the final conclusion that intellect sees itself, i. e. self-intellection. Rather he 
offers the interim conclusion: (p&); äpa cp& S äXXo opä " Plotinus arrives at this 
conclusion, on my interpretation, because of the work the `with' reading has done. For 
we now know that we are not dealing with something which is absolutely simple. There 
might only be one substance as such but if it is not capable of internal differentiation, 
then we are back to the simple identity claim. And if that is the case, then we have 
undercut the entire intellectual process. To put it another way, if we do not have this 
interim conclusion (qD( äpa 9(0; &A, Xo bpä), we would have a reductio. For the 
argument would look something like this: 
The object of the intellect's intellection is itself and so it can act as its 
own medium. 
Both it and its object are the same thing simpliciter. 
Simple identity rules out any sort of intellection. 
Hence the intellect cannot think itself. 
And so we would have contradicted the first premise. Hence the intellect being (p&)cal 
sees Tcat. The second light is different from the first in as much as the first is the 
seeing seer and the second the seen, the intellectual subject and object. This provides, 
along with the act, the necessary internal differentiation for an intellectual process within 
one substance. Accordingly, it is crucial that cpwcai see cpwca2 qua &XXo. By the same 
token however, since we are only dealing with one light, Plotinus is able to reach his 
desired conclusion of self-intellection. 462 For the lights might be &XXo connotationally 
using `with' in this context, it would seem, is further emphasising the identity between the epistemic 
subject and the medium against a backdrop in the Theaetetus in which the two were heterogeneous, i. e. the 
epistemic subject and its sense organs. Cf. Myles Burnyeat, `Plato on the Grammar of Perceiving', p. 29. 
460 Plotinus' use of light at 5.5 [32]. 7.13ff does not contradict my argument, because that context, again, 
is one of the intellect's inner light. 
461 cf. n. 440. 
462 At the outset (n. 356), I said I hope to show that not only Emilsson was wrong in his interpretation of 
Plotinus but Gerson was as well. The problem with Gerson's interpretation, I suggest, is that it derives 
self-intellection in the wrong way. For he maintains that `S knows P' is the same `S knows that S knows 
P'. The truth of that claim I do not dispute. Moreover, that `S knows that S knows P' need not be taken to 
be propositional, I also do not dispute. What I do dispute is that this is the manner in which Plotinus 
derives his notion of self-intellection. Rather, I would argue that because the intellectual subject is 
transparently couched in its object, it thinks itself and is directly self-reflexive. Gerson's account does not 
sufficiently account for the Aristotelian influence (see n. 384). However. I do follow Gerson in 
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but not substantially. Thus aütiö äpa av'cö öpä. We have an identity relation, which 
tolerates internal differentiation. Moreover, it is a differentiation which takes the form of 
whole against whole, allowing for the subject-object distinction and yet not prohibiting 
the intellect from knowing itself. On the contrary, the whole/whole relation, according to 
Plotinus, is the only way in which the intellect could know itself fully. Hence just as 
Plotinus incorporated the Sceptic's attack on the reliability of impressions and actually 
employed it at the discursive level, here too he incorporates another attack, Sextus' 
paradox. It informs his account of self-intellection. 
VIII 
The Resolution 
So is Plotinus' account of the intellect's relation to itself adequate to accommodate a 
coherent theory of self-intellection? Yes. For what he has done, especially with his use 
of the light imagery, is not to only make the subject active, but has done so in such a 
way that the subject, being active, remains transparent to itself throughout the 
intellectual activity. It sees itself in its object qua thinking subject. For Plotinus' usage 
of light highlights how the subject is couched in its object such that it and its act are not 
opaque but transparent. This is very different from what we saw with Aristotle's 
identification of the subject and object. For he (and Plato) did not speak of seeing the 
medium itself. Plotinus' reference to light as an object is essentially the same as his 
remark in the second part this chapter, when he was quoted as saying that the intellect 
does not see an external object but rather sees the seeing. 463 It sees its activity. In this 
sense the identity relation between Plotinus' intellectual subject and object is mediated 
by the subject's act and, as such, it is a weaker identity claim than that of Aristotle's; I 
have called it epistemic identity. For the identity relation between the intellectual subject 
and object which Aristotle postulated was such that the subject was subsumed by its 
object. Plotinus' unique identity relation is achieved through combining his response to 
maintaining that the intellect is non-propositional. See L. Gerson, Plotinus, pp. 54-5. For the debate over 
whether the intellect is propositional or not cf. Richard Sorabji, Time. Creation and the Continuum, p. 153 
and A. C. Lloyd, The Anatomy of Neoplatonism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 168 
respectively. 
463 cf. n 380. 
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Sextus' whole/whole criticism with his account of internal differentiation. In other 
words, it is through synthesising the whole/whole account with the need for the intellect 
to be a one-many that he achieves an adequate theory of self-intellection. One could 
state the matter as follows: By bringing together Plato, or at least his interpretation of 
Plato, with the one-many account which he derives from the dialogue the Parmenides. 464 
and Sextus' whole/whole criticism, Plotinus recasts the Aristotelian notion of self- 
intellection. 
No doubt all of this is true. However, one might go further back. For Plotinus 
regards his account of the intellect and self-intellection to derive its inspiration from and, 
at least in part, to be a commentary on Parmenides' third fragment: 
... 
int rov rov [sc. intellect] SIJXOVött 11511 Ev ag(pw ovx oiKctw(m, 
wßirep E ni tiiIc VI)XIIc cijS äpIatiic, äA, ß, ' oOotc xat 'rw T xü v Tb 
elvat xai tiö voety civact. 465 
For Plotinus, it is because thinking and being are the same that neither side subsumes the 
other in the act of self-intellection. Instead the subject has itself as an object. 
But does such an identity thesis as epistemic identity work? Was Parmenides 
wrong, given his identity thesis, to collapse the epistemic subject and it object into one 
another rendering them unintelligible? To put it another way, has Plotinus offered us an 
adequate account of self-intellection? That depends on the sort of identity theorist you 
are. If you are a strong identity theorist and take the line that identity always entails the 
demise of the subject and object and that weak identity is nothing more than empty 
metaphor, then no, Plotinus' account does not suffice. However, if you allow for weaker 
theories of identity, such as epistemic identity, then Plotinus has established an adequate 
basis for a theory of self-intellection. 
464 See 5.1 [10]. 8.26 and n. 385. 
465 3.8 [301.8.7-8. Trans: `... it is clear that in intellect both are one, not by becoming akin, as in the best 
soul, but qua substance, and because "thinking and being are the same. "' See Armstrong, Enneads, vol. 3, 
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